Retaliation by Brake, Deborah L.






Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brake, Deborah L., "Retaliation" (2005). Minnesota Law Review. 2.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2





Deborah L. Brake 
I. Introduction ...................................................................... 19 
II.  The Need to Protect Discrimination  
  Claimants: Lessons from Social Science.......................... 25 
 A. The Background: The Reluctance to  
Acknowledge and Report Discrimination ................. 25 
 B. Why Retaliate? Persons Who Claim  
  Discrimination Are Disliked for  
  Transgressing the Social Order................................. 32 
 C. The Function of Retaliation: Silencing  
  Challengers and Preserving Existing  
  Power Structures ....................................................... 36 
III.  The Promise of the Retaliation Claim ............................. 42 
 A. Jackson and the Controversy Over  
  Implying a Retaliation Claim From a  
  Ban on Discrimination............................................... 43 
 1. The Disconnect Between Retaliation and 
Discrimination Under Existing Precedent .......... 46 
 2. The Reconciliation of Retaliation and  
Discrimination in Jackson ................................... 51 
 3. The Promise of Jackson and the  
Possibilities for Further Theorizing .................... 57 
 B. Refocusing on Privilege and the  
  Resistance to Racist and Sexist Norms..................... 60 
 C. Adding Content to Equal Citizenship ....................... 67 
 
  Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
Many thanks to Martha Chamallas, Theresa Beiner, Joanna Grossman, and 
Verna Williams for sharing their thoughtful comments and reactions. I bene-
fited from opportunities to present earlier drafts of this work at the 2004 Law 
and Society conference and at a Faculty Workshop at Hofstra University 
School of Law. I am grateful to Emily Thomas for her excellent and dedicated 
research assistance, which made this Article possible. My work on this Article 
was supported by a Deans Scholarship Award from the University of Pitts-
burgh School of Law. 
BRAKE_3FMT 10/26/2005 08:40:30 PM 
2005] RETALIATION 19 
 
 1. Fostering Cultural Transformation..................... 70 
 2. Collective Engagement and Social Bonds ........... 74 
IV.  Reconsidering Doctrinal Limits on Retaliation............... 76 
 A. The Reasonable Belief Doctrine ................................ 76 
 B. How Courts Use Reasonable Belief to  
Reinforce Narrow Constructions of 
  Discrimination ........................................................... 86 
 1. Masking the Complexity of Discrimination ........ 86 
 2. Ignoring the Interconnectedness Between 
Different Types of Subordination ........................ 93 
 3. Enforcing Artificial Lines Between  
Victims and Nonvictims Within Institutions ...... 94 
 4. Imposing a Narrow and Court-Centered  
Definition of Reasonableness ............................... 98 
 C. A Call for Reforming Reasonable Belief ................. 102 
V. Conclusion....................................................................... 104 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the wealth of scholarship about discrimination and ine-
quality, retaliation is an understudied phenomenon. The vast 
majority of legal scholars who write about discrimination focus 
their energies on the important work of enriching prevailing 
understandings of bias and how law regulates it. Legal scholar-
ship has not paid sufficient attention to the ways people are 
punished for challenging inequality and the laws response to 
these challenges. Retaliation, in particular, is typically re-
garded as an afterthought, a relatively small part of a larger 
scheme for enforcing substantive legal protections. This Article 
develops a broader theory of retaliation and its place in the 
antidiscrimination project. By shining a spotlight on retaliation 
and its relationship to discrimination law, it seeks to develop a 
better understanding of both retaliation and discrimination and 
the legal principles that govern them. 
Retaliation is an important social phenomenon, deserving 
of study for several reasons. First, it is prevalent. Although it is 
impossible to know how often retaliation follows challenges to 
discrimination within institutions, the evidence suggests it is 
far from uncommon. Retaliation claims make up a significant 
portion of the claims asserted in discrimination cases.1 Social 
 
 1. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Har-
assment Law, 27 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript 
at 41, on file with author) (describing their empirical study of racial harass-
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dynamics within institutions make retaliation a likely response 
to charges of discrimination. Recent social science research 
shows that women and persons of color are perceived nega-
tively and are disliked by majority group members when they 
step forward to challenge discrimination.2 By challenging dis-
crimination and unjust social privilege, they are perceived as 
transgressing the social order, creating prime conditions for re-
taliation. Because retaliation can occur in any institution and 
in response to any type of discrimination challenge, the prob-
lem of retaliation cuts across discrimination law broadly and is 
not limited to any one legal context. 
Second, retaliation is powerful medicine, functioning to 
suppress discrimination claims and preserve the social order.3 
Fear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent 
instead of voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination. 
When challengers are brave enough to overcome their fears of 
speaking out, retaliation often steps in to punish the challenger 
and restore the social norms in question. To a large extent, the 
effectiveness and very legitimacy of discrimination law turns on 
peoples ability to raise concerns about discrimination without 
fear of retaliation. The recent trend towards legally enforced 
privatization in the assertion and resolution of discrimination 
complaints gives added importance to the laws treatment of re-




ment cases and noting that nearly half of the racial harassment cases in a 
random sample of all racial harassment cases through 2002 included claims 
for retaliation); Sex Discrimination Cases Predominate in Recent Class Actions 
Filed by EEOC, 71 U.S.L.W. 2158 (Sept. 10, 2002) (reporting that, of the fifty-
two class action cases filed by the EEOC between October 1, 2001 and June 
30, 2002, twenty-five of the cases included claims of retaliation); Wendy 
Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race and National Origin Employment Discrimina-
tion Litigation in Federal District Courts 19, (Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 05-09, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=678082 (finding, in her empirical study of race and national origin 
discrimination litigation in district courts, that the most common type of claim 
was for retaliation, at 51 percent); NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & 
FAMILIES, WOMEN AT WORK: LOOKING BEHIND THE NUMBERS 12 (2004), 
http://app.nationalpartnership.org/docs/CRA%2040th%20Ann%20Report.pdf 
(analyzing data on workplace discrimination claims and observing that in fis-
cal year 2003, retaliation charges comprised 27.9 percent of the total charges 
filed with the EEOC). 
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
 3. The social dynamics of retaliation are discussed at length, infra, Part 
III.C. 
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crimination complaints through internal institutional proc-
esses, the need for strong legal protection from retaliation be-
comes all the more urgent.4 
Third and finally, the extent of protection from retaliation 
found in discrimination law tells us a great deal about the 
scope of discrimination law and the values it protects. The na-
ture of the relationship between discrimination and retaliation 
was the subject of a recent case in the United States Supreme 
Court, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education.5 This case 
required the Court to decide whether a broad proscription 
against sex discrimination, Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972,6 necessarily includes protection from retaliation 
for challenging discrimination under the statute.7 The contours 
of this relationship are as important for what they reveal about 
the scope of discrimination law as the treatment of retaliation 
in particular. This Article contends that a careful study of re-
taliation and its relationship to discrimination raises pressing 
questions about the scope of the antidiscrimination principle 
and the laws animating values. 
Recognizing retaliation as a form of discrimination, one 
that is implicitly banned by general proscriptions of discrimina-
tion, pushes the boundaries of dominant understandings of dis-
crimination in useful and productive ways. Theorizing retalia-
tion as a form of discrimination requires moving beyond 
discrimination laws current dominant framework of status-
based differential treatment and toward a broader conception 
that views discrimination as the maintenance of race and gen-
der privilege. Retaliation, functioning as it does to maintain so-
cial hierarchies and punish outliers, fits well within such a 
framework. Conceptualizing retaliation as proposed in this Ar-
 
 4. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (describing legal doc-
trines and trends promoting the privatization of information gathering and 
dispute resolution for claims of bias and discrimination in the workplace). Le-
gal doctrine has begun to encourage a similar trend in schools, by requiring 
certain claimants to provide prior notice through school grievance procedures 
before gaining legal protection from discrimination. See Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (requiring prior notice to school of-
ficials followed by deliberate indifference to establish school liability for 
teacher-student sexual harassment); see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of 
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999) (adopting the same standard for sexual har-
assment by students). 
 5. 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005). 
 6. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). 
7. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1502. 
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ticle offers a number of advantages for discrimination law. By 
shifting the focus from the status-based treatment of individu-
als to larger questions of illegitimate privilege and the impor-
tance of contesting inequality, the retaliation claim permits a 
more fluid conception of social identity than that offered by the 
traditional anti-differentiation model. The retaliation claimant 
need not establish that she was treated worse as a woman, 
but rather that she was penalized for challenging sexist prac-
tices. Thus, this approach avoids the problem with traditional 
discrimination claims of unintentionally reinforcing an essen-
tialist view of what it means to be a woman through the as-
sertion of a sex-equality right. In addition, by valuing and pro-
tecting the claimants choices and actions in challenging 
inequality, the retaliation claim is less vulnerable than other 
types of discrimination claims to criticisms that it turns claim-
ants into passive victims of an oppressive social structure. Fi-
nally, the retaliation claim shifts the focus from an individuals 
prejudicial intent to his or her actions in shutting down opposi-
tion to inequality. In each of these respects, the retaliation 
claim offers important insights about how discrimination law 
can best disrupt social and institutional inequality. 
In addition to these benefits, theorizing retaliation as a 
form of discrimination adds an important dimension to current 
understandings of the democratic underpinnings of discrimina-
tion law. Recognizing protection from retaliation as implicit in 
a legal ban on discrimination furthers the democratic values at 
the foundation of the laws nondiscrimination guarantee. Dis-
crimination law is often understood as promoting the ideal of 
equal citizenship as necessary to a fully functioning democracy. 
However, the components of equal citizenship and the social 
practices that promote equal citizenship are rarely examined. 
Studying the retaliation claim generates new insights into 
these questions. By protecting practices that challenge racism 
and sexism, the retaliation claim promotes the elimination of 
illegitimate racist and sexist preferences that taint democratic 
outcomes. In addition, by protecting challengers of discrimina-
tion regardless of their social group membership, the retalia-
tion claim enables coalition building and collective opposition to 
racism and sexism that often cuts across social groups. In the 
process, it protects the construction of equal citizens who work 
together in the pursuit of social change and the social bonds 
that develop through such alliances. 
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However, in the final analysis, the retaliation claim is only 
as promising as its defining doctrines allow. The retaliation 
claims potential to push discrimination law in progressive di-
rections depends on the calibration of legal rules that set its 
limits. One of the most restrictive and damaging doctrinal lim-
its that has emerged in recent years is the requirement that 
the plaintiff demonstrate a reasonable belief that the underly-
ing conduct at the source of her complaint amounts to unlawful 
discrimination. This doctrine has not received scholarly atten-
tion commensurate with its importance. As applied by courts, 
the reasonable belief doctrine severely undercuts the laws pro-
tection of persons who challenge inequality. This Article advo-
cates revisiting this doctrinal limit in order to realize the full 
potential of the retaliation claim. 
Finally, a note is in order about the focus of this Article. 
This discussion of retaliation focuses primarily on challenges to 
race and gender inequality. Challenges to inequality and dis-
crimination on any grounds risk triggering retaliation, and 
much of the analysis of this Article applies to institutional and 
legal responses to discrimination claims more generally. While 
emphasizing only two aspects of identity and bias risks over-
simplifying both the complexity of subjects and the complexity 
of bias,8 this Article focuses primarily on challenges to race and 
gender inequality for two reasons. First, legal protections from 
retaliation are tied to nondiscrimination guarantees that single 
out race and gender, along with other protected class statuses, 
and treat them as single-axis forms of bias. Although race and 
gender bias are complex in their similarities and differences, 
the legal standards for retaliation treat challenges to race and 
gender bias the same. The analysis here draws substantially on 
case law addressing protection from retaliation for challenging 
race and gender discrimination. Second, the social science lit-
erature surveyed for this Article focuses primarily on race and 
gender bias, and reveals a similar dynamic with respect to re-
taliation as punishment for challenging race and gender ine-
quality. I do not suggest that race and gender are fungible. 
Rather, they share important commonalities in how retaliation 
punishes outsiders who challenge systemic privilege, and it is 
 
 8. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of 
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, 
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Angela P. 
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 
(1990). 
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useful to examine race and gender bias as interlocking systems 
of subordination.9 Finally, the focus on race and gender in this 
discussion should not be read to imply that retaliation for chal-
lenging other kinds of inequality, such as sexual orientation 
discrimination, does not raise similar concerns. Indeed, the 
commonalities with respect to race and gender bias claimants, 
and the role of social power in the dynamics of retaliation, sug-
gest that the analysis offered here applies to challenges to 
other forms of bias as well. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II examines social 
science literature regarding retaliation in response to com-
plaints about discrimination. This section examines a number 
of questions, including why retaliation happens and what func-
tions it performs within institutions. This literature paints a 
picture of retaliation as a social dynamic that punishes trans-
gressions against the social order and silences challengers. The 
understanding of retaliation that emerges from this literature 
sets the stage for an exploration of the legal and theoretical 
questions about the proper treatment of retaliation under dis-
crimination law. 
Part III turns to legal understandings of retaliation and its 
relationship to nondiscrimination guarantees. This section ex-
amines the recent controversy over implying a private right of 
action against retaliation in a nondiscrimination statute that is 
silent about retaliation claims. After explaining this doctrinal 
controversy and its culmination in the Jackson case, this sec-
tion contends that the issue of whether to recognize such an 
implied private right of action is a tougher question than is 
commonly assumed. The current dominant interpretation lim-
its discrimination to the status-based differential treatment of 
individuals. Recognizing retaliation as a form of intentional 
discrimination, as the Court did in Jackson,10 requires pushing 
the scope of discrimination law beyond the current dominant 
understanding. The remainder of this section offers a theoreti-
cal approach that reconciles discrimination law with implicit 
protection from retaliation by conceptualizing discrimination as 
encompassing systemic race and gender privilege and the pun-
 
 9. Cf. Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of 
Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251 (2002) 
(analyzing the interlocking and symbiotic nature of systems of subordination 
and advocating strategies for change that emphasize the overlaps and connec-
tions between social groups). 
 10. 125 S. Ct. at 150910. 
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ishment of persons who contest it. Finally, this section elabo-
rates the many advantages such an understanding holds for 
discrimination law, including the furtherance of the laws de-
mocracy-enhancing values. 
Part IV turns from the promise of the retaliation claim to 
the reality of restrictive doctrinal limits that currently under-
mine its potential. This section discusses the reasonable belief 
doctrine in retaliation claims and criticizes its current applica-
tion in the courts. In the final analysis, the reasonable belief 
doctrine requires reconsideration in order to avoid turning the 
retaliation claim into a vehicle that legitimates privilege and 
inequality instead of undermining them. The Article concludes 
that, like much discrimination law, the retaliation claim, as 
currently constructed, simultaneously tantalizes and then re-
treats in its promise to disrupt entrenched systems of privilege 
and inequality. 
II.  THE NEED TO PROTECT DISCRIMINATION 
CLAIMANTS: LESSONS FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE 
The social science literature on bias and the dynamics of 
challenging discrimination shows retaliation to be a powerful 
weapon of punishment for persons who challenge the hierar-
chies of race and gender. The research discussed in this section 
reveals three main points. First, retaliation operates against a 
backdrop of widespread reluctance to acknowledge and report 
discrimination. This reluctance reflects an acute understanding 
of the social costs of identifying and challenging discrimination. 
Second, persons who challenge discrimination are often dis-
liked by the beneficiaries of the social structure. This dislike 
creates prime conditions for retaliation. Third, the threat of re-
taliation functions as a powerful silencer. It suppresses chal-
lenges to race and gender bias, thereby functioning to preserve 
the social order. The understanding of retaliation that emerges 
from this literature demonstrates the need for strong legal pro-
tection from retaliation against persons who identify and chal-
lenge inequality. 
A. THE BACKGROUND: THE RELUCTANCE TO ACKNOWLEDGE 
AND REPORT DISCRIMINATION 
As anyone who has experienced bias or prejudice knows, 
naming and challenging discrimination is socially and psycho-
logically difficult. By the time retaliation intervenes to punish 
someone for alleging discrimination, that person has already 
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overcome a myriad of psychological and social forces operating 
to suppress that claim. Research in social psychology has 
documented a marked reluctance among the targets of dis-
crimination to label and confront their experiences as such. It is 
worth discussing this phenomenon at the outset, as it is an im-
portant piece of the social fabric suppressing claims of bias, and 
provides the background against which retaliation performs its 
work. 
Persons subjected to unfairness have a widely shared re-
luctance to see themselves as victims.11 This general disinclina-
tion becomes particularly salient in the context of acknowledg-
ing ones own experiences with discrimination. Persons who 
acknowledge that discrimination disadvantages their social 
group as a whole nonetheless tend to see themselves as the 
lucky exceptions, even when confronted with reason to believe 
that they themselves have experienced discrimination.12 
Recent studies in this area have continued to show a gen-
eral reluctance on the part of women and persons of color to 
perceive themselves as targets of discrimination, notwithstand-
ing evidence that discrimination has occurred. One recent se-
ries of studies using women to test perceptions of sex bias and 
African Americans and Asian Americans to test perceptions of 
race bias found a shared tendency to resist interpretations of 
discrimination in situations where it was ambiguous, but likely 
to have occurred.13 Employing a model often used in this litera-
ture, the subjects were given a series of written aptitude tests 
and then presented with poor test results, along with informa-
tion suggesting some chance, in varying degrees of likelihood, 
that their test had been evaluated by a grader who was biased 
against their social group.14 The subjects then answered ques-
 
 11. The research discussed here specifically focuses on the reluctance of 
individuals to acknowledge race and/or gender bias, but it is consistent with 
other general psychological phenomena, including the tendency to underesti-
mate the occurrence of negative events, the illusion of unique invulnerability, 
and the better-than-average effect. See, e.g., Karen M. Ruggiero & Donald M. 
Taylor, Why Minority Group Members Perceive or Do Not Perceive the Dis-
crimination That Confronts Them: The Role of Self-Esteem and Perceived Con-
trol, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, 386 (1997). 
 12. See, e.g., Faye J. Crosby, Why Complain?, 49 J. SOC. ISSUES 169, 174 
(1993); Elizabeth H. Dodd et al., Respected or Rejected: Perceptions of Women 
Who Confront Sexist Remarks, 45 SEX ROLES 567, 56869 (2001) (summariz-
ing research showing that women tend to explain away sexism, despite evi-
dence that it has occurred). 
 13. See Ruggiero & Taylor, supra note 11, at 376, 385. 
 14. Id. at 377, 381. The subjects in both groups were undergraduate stu-
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tions about their test-taking experience, including questions 
designed to elicit their perceptions of why they performed 
poorly on the test.15 The researchers found that the subjects 
consistently blamed the poor test results on themselves rather 
than on discrimination, except for those who had learned with 
certainty that their judge had been biased.16 Interestingly, the 
rate of self-blaming, as opposed to discrimination claiming, was 
nearly identical when there was any ambiguity about discrimi-
nation by the graders, regardless of whether the information 
suggested a high or low likelihood of such discrimination.17 
In examining the reasons for this phenomenon, researchers 
found that the subjects who attributed their poor test results to 
personal failings were able to preserve their self-esteem as so-
cial actors, albeit at the expense of their self-esteem in the per-
formance domain.18 Avoiding attributions of discrimination en-
abled the subjects to preserve their socially oriented self-esteem 
and their feelings of control over their destiny.19 
 
dents who were recruited to participate in the study from an introductory psy-
chology course. Id. at 376, 381. The study was closely modeled on an earlier 
study using women as subjects, where women were told, after receiving nega-
tive test results, that 100 percent, 75 percent, 50 percent, 25 percent, or 0 per-
cent of the judges discriminated against women. Id. at 374 (explaining earlier 
research). In all but the 100 percent group, the women consistently blamed 
themselves rather than discrimination for the poor results. Id. Perhaps most 
strikingly, they were equally likely to blame themselves given a 75 percent 
likelihood of discrimination as they were when given a 25 percent likelihood. 
Id. The follow-up study discussed in the text sought to replicate these results 
using two subject groups, one examining gender and the other examining race, 
and sought to probe more deeply the reasons for the reluctance to blame dis-
crimination. Id. at 376. 
 15. Id. at 377, 381. 
 16. Id. at 378, 382. In the experiment with Asian-American and African-
American subjects, the researchers found that the Asian-American subjects 
exhibited a slightly greater tendency to blame the test results on personal fail-
ings. Id. at 382. Interestingly, in an identical study done earlier, white and 
male subjects in control groups did not minimize perceived discrimination, but 
were highly vigilant in perceiving discrimination against themselves, suggest-
ing the importance of social group membership in explaining the reluctance to 
make attributions to discrimination. Id. at 386. 
 17. Id. at 378, 382. 
 18. Id. at 379, 383. 
 19. Id. at 38485. The efforts of the subjects to manage their identity, and 
its attendant costs, remind me of Pat Williamss work discussing her own ef-
forts to construct something positive from that part of her that is shaped by 
racial oppression. See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND 
RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 216 (1991). She discussed her conflicting 
feelings about her mothers statement when she got in to Harvard Law School, 
that she had it in [her] blood because the slave owner who raped her great-
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These findings support prior research documenting the 
threat that acknowledging discrimination poses to an individ-
uals sense of control and invulnerability.20 The widely shared 
just world hypothesis, which posits a common desire to be-
lieve that the world is a just place, encourages such cognitive 
distortions to enable people to attribute negative outcomes to 
factors within their individual control.21 Since perceiving and 
acknowledging discrimination is a prerequisite for engaging in 
any form of considered resistance to it, one unfortunate impli-
cation of these findings is that members of stigmatized social 
groups are less inclined to challenge systemic discrimination, 
thereby silently facilitating it.22 
For those targets of discrimination who overcome their own 
psychological resistance to perceiving themselves as victims of 
discrimination, additional obstacles suppress publicly confront-
ing and reporting it. Social psychologists have noted a striking 
gap between recognizing an experience as discrimination and 
publicly naming it as such.23 Most of the research on the low 
level of reporting discrimination has been done in the area of 
sexual harassment. Social science literature on sexual harass-
ment abounds with findings showing that sexually harassed 
women most often choose coping strategies of avoidance or de-
nial and that the least likely response is to report the harass-
ment to someone in a position of authority.24 The low likelihood 
 
grandmother was a lawyer. Id. Among Williamss mixed emotions was a feel-
ing of pride of ownership of her abilities. Id.  
 20. See Crosby, supra note 12, at 174. 
 21. Cf. id. (discussing cognitive distortions). 
 22. See, e.g., Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, A Stress and Coping Per-
spective on Confronting Sexism, 28 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 168, 175 (2004) 
([A]cknowledging prejudice and discrimination is an essential precursor to 
efforts aimed at mitigating the injustices that might otherwise continue to ex-
ist . . . . [W]hen groups of disenfranchised individuals come together with a 
common goal, such as reducing sexism, this can result in social movements 
that bring about changes that actually affect how the group is treated.). 
 23. See id. at 168; Charles Stangor et al., Reporting Discrimination in 
Public and Private Contexts, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 69, 69 
(2002) ([P]rior research has shown that members of stigmatized groups are in 
many cases unlikely to report that negative events that occur to them are due 
to discrimination, even when this is a valid attribution for the event.). 
 24. See, e.g., Mindy E. Bergman et al., The (Un)reasonableness of Report-
ing: Antecedents and Consequences of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. AP-
PLIED PSYCHOL. 230, 230 (2002); Shereen G. Bingham & Lisa L. Scherer, Fac-
tors Associated with Responses to Sexual Harassment and Satisfaction with 
Outcome, 29 SEX ROLES 239, 240, 24748 (1993); Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., 
Why Didnt She Just Report Him? The Psychological and Legal Implications of 
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of reporting sexual harassment cuts across differences in racial, 
cultural, and professional backgrounds.25 
The robustness of social science findings on the reluctance 
of women to publicly confront sexist behavior is all the more 
significant in that it defies expectations about how women be-
lieve they would behave if confronted with discrimination. In 
one important study of womens responses to sexism, the vast 
majority of the women subjects predicted that they would chal-
lenge certain sexist remarks when asked how they would re-
spond to a specific scenario involving blatantly sexist com-
ments.26 However, in another part of the same study, a 
 
Womens Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 117, 12021 
(1995); Barbara A. Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed Or-
ganizations: Consequences of and Coping with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VO-
CATIONAL BEHAV. 28, 3739 (1993); Deborah Erdos Knapp et al., Determinants 
of Target Responses to Sexual Harassment: A Conceptual Framework, 22 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 687, 69093 (1997); Laurie A. Rudman et al., Suffering in 
Silence: Procedural Justice Versus Gender Socialization in University Sexual 
Harassment Grievance Procedures, 9 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 519, 520 
(1995); see also David Sherwyn et al., Dont Train Your Employees and Cancel 
Your 1-800 Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction 
of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1280 (2001) (reporting the results of a study finding 
that among women who ultimately sued their employers for sexual harass-
ment, nearly half, 42 percent, did not report the harassment prior to suing and 
only 15 percent did so in a timely manner). 
 25. See, e.g., Knapp et al., supra note 24, at 687, 69394 (citing research 
showing no relationship between womens race and their responses to sexual 
harassment); S. Arzu Wasti & Lilia M. Cortina, Coping in Context: Sociocul-
tural Determinants of Responses to Sexual Harassment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 394, 402 (2002) (reporting the results of a study comparing re-
sponses to sexual harassment by professional women in Turkey, professional 
and working class Anglo-American women in the United States, and profes-
sional and working class Hispanic women in the United States, and finding 
that women from all of these backgrounds resorted to advocacy-seeking, such 
as reporting, complaining or speaking with management, the least frequently 
in responding to sexual harassment). Even women attorneys, a group one 
might expect to be especially confident in asserting their rights, exhibit a re-
luctance to publicly claim bias. See Lilia M. Cortina et al., Whats Gender Got 
to Do with It? Incivility in the Federal Courts, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 235, 259
60 (2002) (describing a study of female attorneys responses to incivility in le-
gal practice, a phenomenon with a gender-based dimension); cf. Cheryl R. Kai-
ser & Carol T. Miller, Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making Attribu-
tions to Discrimination, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254, 255 
(2001) (describing a study of female attorneys responses to sex discrimination 
in the workplace). 
 26. Janet K. Swim & Lauri L. Hyers, Excuse MeWhat Did You Just 
Say?!: Womens Public and Private Responses to Sexist Remarks, 35 J. EX-
PERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 68, 6888 (1999). The scenario involved a conver-
sation in which a male colleague made three remarks with overtly sexist over-
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majority of female subjects did not in fact challenge the same 
sexist remarks when actually faced with such a scenario.27 The 
womens silence in the face of sexist behaviors reflected the in-
fluence of social constraints and the fear of negative judgments 
if they confronted the offender, rather than an acceptance of, or 
acquiescence in, the situation.28 
This striking gap between expected and actual responses to 
bias was confirmed in a subsequent study designed to more 
closely replicate an employment setting.29 In this study, college-
age women were asked to predict how they would respond to 
three sexist questions in a job interview. A different group of 
subjects, also college-age women, were then placed in a simu-
 
tones: (1) openly endorsing traditional gender roles, (2) seeing women as sex 
objects, and (3) expressing the view that women are responsible for domestic 
chores. See id. at 73. The researchers counted a subjects response as a con-
frontation if she confronted one or more of these three comments. See id. at 
7576. 
 27. Id. at 79. Although very few women predicted that they would not re-
spond to the sexist comments, id. at 8183, in fact, only 45 percent confronted 
the remarks in some way, most frequently using indirect strategies such as 
asking the commentator to repeat himself or asking a rhetorical question. Id. 
at 7576. Only 16 percent of the women directly challenged any of the re-
marks, id. at 79, despite the fact that the women in the first part of the study 
had overwhelmingly predicted that they would directly challenge the sexist 
remarks. Id. at 8183. Among the variables correlated with a confrontation 
response, one of the highest was a predisposition to a feminist and activist ori-
entation. Id. at 7879. The researchers concluded that it takes a person par-
ticularly committed to resisting sexism to overcome the social influences con-
straining confrontation. Id. at 85. Interestingly, the women were somewhat 
less likely to confront the remarks when there was another woman present in 
the group when the incident occurred, as opposed to when they were the only 
woman in the group. Id. at 7980. Apparently, the presence of another woman 
who was silent reinforced the subjects own inclination to remain silent, while 
the absence of another woman placed the sole moral responsibility on the sub-
ject to confront the sexist comments. See id. at 80. 
 28. Id. at 79 (reporting that, among the women who did not engage in con-
frontation, three-quarters judged the commentator as prejudiced and 91 per-
cent held negative views toward him); see also Dodd et al., supra note 12, at 
567, 569 (discussing womens fears of how others would perceive them if they 
confronted sexism). 
 29. See Julie A. Woodzicka & Marianne LaFrance, Real Versus Imagined 
Gender Harassment, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 15 (2001). In the first part of the study, 
197 college-age female respondents read a written scenario describing the job 
interview and were asked how they would respond. Id. at 2021. The study 
was designed to further test and explore findings from prior research, includ-
ing the Swim and Hyers study discussed above, supra note 26, showing a large 
gap between womens expectations that they would confront or report sexism 
compared to their actual non-confrontational responses. See Woodzicka & La-
France, supra, at 1519 (discussing problems with prior studies and research 
methods). 
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lated job interview, allegedly to qualify for a research assistant 
position, and were asked the same three sexist questions.30 
Again, womens actual responses were dramatically less con-
frontational than predicted, with very few women confronting 
the questioner in any way.31 Once again, the tepid responses 
reflected an acute awareness of the social costs of confronting 
discrimination, rather than an acceptance of the situation.32 
This research reveals a world in which even seemingly 
passive targets of discrimination respond as active agents who 
make choices about when to confront, challenge, or ignore 
prejudice. Most significantly for our purposes, the research 
demonstrates that the widespread failure to confront discrimi-
nation publicly, contrary to expectations, is largely shaped by  
 
 
 30. See Woodzicka & LaFrance, supra note 29, at 2122. The offending 
questions were asked by a male interviewer and were interspersed with more 
normal interview questions. Id. at 22. The three questions were: (1) do you 
have a boyfriend?, (2) do people find you desirable?, and (3) do you think it is 
important for women to wear bras in the workplace? Id. Each of these ques-
tions was pretested, using a different set of subjects, to confirm that it was 
perceived by women to be sexually harassing. See id.  
 31. See id. at 2324. A strong majority of the women in the first group, 68 
percent, had predicted they would refuse to answer at least one of the ques-
tions, with 62 percent saying they would ask the interviewer why he had 
asked the question or tell him the question was inappropriate and 28 percent 
saying they would take more drastic measures such as abruptly leaving the 
room or rudely confronting the interviewer. Id. at 21. Of the women actually 
on the receiving end of the questions, over half ignored the sexist nature of the 
questions altogether, responding literally to the question asked, and slightly 
over one-third politely asked the interviewer why he asked the question, but 
then proceeded to answer it anyway. Id. at 2324. Of the subjects who asked 
why the interviewer had asked the question, 80 percent did so after the inter-
view was over, while at the moment the question was asked, they simply re-
sponded. Id. at 24. None of the women refused to answer any of the questions, 
directly challenged the interviewer, left the interview, or reported the inter-
viewer to an authority figure. See id. 
 32. Most of the women in the first part of the study predicted that they 
would feel angry if they were asked such questions, but among the women ac-
tually in the interview setting, the predominant emotional response was fear: 
40 percent of the women reported feeling fear and only 16 percent reported 
feeling angry at the time. Id. at 25. Fear was more salient than anger in pre-
dicting the subjects response. See id. at 26; cf. id. at 18 (explaining that 
[t]argets of sexual harassment fear retaliation, reprisals, and even physical 
harm and citing literature interpreting sexual harassment as a manifestation 
of intimidation rather than sexuality). Interestingly, the researchers who ob-
served the interviews noted that the most common physical response to the 
harassing questions was to smile, but that the smile represented the type of 
smile identified by prior psychological research to signal appeasement and ac-
commodation rather than enjoyment. See id. at 2627. 
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an acute perception of the social costs of doing so.33 The next 
section addresses these social costs, and the conditions that 
give rise to them. 
B. WHY RETALIATE? PERSONS WHO CLAIM DISCRIMINATION 
ARE DISLIKED FOR TRANSGRESSING THE SOCIAL ORDER 
A disturbing body of research demonstrates a high propen-
sity for men and white persons to dislike women and people of 
color when they claim discrimination, even when the claim is 
meritorious. The social penalty for transgressing social roles 
and challenging perceived inequality sets the stage for retalia-
tion. 
Social psychologists have found that women and racial mi-
norities are perceived as troublemakers and hypersensitive 
when they confront discrimination.34 One of the path-breaking 
studies of its kind, conducted in 2001 by social psychologists 
Cheryl Kaiser and Carol Miller, found that African Americans 
who blamed discrimination for a poor performance rating on a 
test were viewed more negatively than African Americans who 
blamed themselves.35 The predominantly white evaluators con-
sistently rated an African-American student more negatively
as a complainer, a troublemaker, hypersensitive, emotional, ar-
gumentative, and irritatingwhen he attributed his poor test 
 
 33. Cf. Bergman et al., supra note 24, at 237 ([O]ur results and oth-
ers . . . also show that reporting can harm the victim in terms of lowered job 
satisfaction and greater psychological distress. Such results suggest that, at 
least in certain work environments, the most reasonable course of action for 
the victim is to avoid reporting. (citations omitted)). 
 34. See Stangor et al., supra note 23, at 70 (citing research demonstrating 
the social costs of reporting discrimination). See generally Crosby, supra note 
12, at 17071 (discussing social norms that depict people who complain as un-
attractive whiners and malingerers, while promoting the ideal of suffering un-
complainingly as noble); Kaiser & Miller, supra note 22, at 168, 175 (explain-
ing their own work and citing other studies). 
 35. Kaiser & Miller, supra note 25, at 261. The study involved predomi-
nantly white male subjects who read a written scenario describing an African-
American college student who completes a test and is then informed that there 
is some chance, of varying degrees, that the test will be evaluated by a racist 
judge. See id. at 25657. The accounts varied, with the student being told that 
one, four, or all of the eight judges (all of whom were white) discriminated 
against African Americans. See id. at 257. In the scenario, the African-
American student then learns that he received a failing grade, after which he 
completes a survey evaluating the experience and rating the factors he be-
lieved affected his performance. See id. The subjects of the study read this ac-
count and responded to questions designed to reveal their reactions to the Af-
rican-American student. See id. 
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performance to discrimination rather than to his own ability, 
regardless of the objective likelihood that the student actually 
experienced discrimination.36 A follow-up experiment by the 
same researchers examined whether external attributions more 
generally, and not necessarily attributions to discrimination, 
might explain the negative reactions.37 The results of this ex-
periment confirmed that attributions of discrimination by an 
African-American student triggered negative reactions towards 
him, while another external attribution, blaming the test, did 
not.38 This research adds to the body of work documenting the 
social costs incurred by members of stigmatized groups when 
they assert claims of discrimination.39 
A 2003 follow-up study by the same researchers found that 
the social penalty persists even when the subjects are exposed 
to persuasive evidence that discrimination actually had oc-
curred.40 These results were strikingly similar to the earlier 
study: subjects viewed the African-American interviewee more 
negatively, as a troublemaker, hypersensitive and irritating, 
when he blamed racism for his failure to get the job, even when 
the subjects were exposed to direct evidence of the interviewers 
prejudice and discrimination.41 The authors concluded that so-
cial and interpersonal costs continue to penalize members of  
 
 
 36. See id. at 261. Interestingly, at the same time that subjects rated the 
student negatively for claiming discrimination, they also rated the student as 
more true to self when he attributed the poor results to discrimination
suggesting that the subjects might have recognized that discrimination had 
occurred and gave the student some credit for standing up for himself, but de-
valued him nonetheless for claiming discrimination. See id. at 262. 
 37. See id. at 259. 
 38. See id. at 261. 
 39. See id. at 25556 (describing research documenting the high costs im-
posed on members of stigmatized groups when they report discrimination). 
 40. Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Derogating the Victim: The Inter-
personal Consequences of Blaming Events on Discrimination, 6 GROUP PROC-
ESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 227 (2003). As with their 2001 study, the subjects 
were predominantly white undergraduates who agreed to participate in the 
study. Id. at 229, 234. The earlier experiment design was modified to have the 
subjects read a portfolio of a job interview with the reactions and comments of 
both the interviewer, who was white, and the interviewee, who was African 
American. Id. at 230. The subjects read the interviewers comments, explain-
ing why the interviewee did not get the job, which reflected a range of subtle 
to blatant racial prejudice. Id. at 23031. The subjects then read the inter-
viewees reactions to the interview, including his perceptions about why he did 
not get the job, which varied from blaming his own interviewing skills and job 
competition to blaming discrimination. Id. at 231. 
 41. See id. at 23435. 
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stigmatized groups who report discrimination, and that even 
direct exposure to evidence of prejudice does not temper the 
negative reactions to persons who claim discrimination.42 
Social scientists likewise have documented negative reac-
tions to women who confront sexism. One recent study found 
that womens confrontations of sexism typically generated feel-
ings of hostility or amusement rather than guilt or remorse.43 
Another recent study examining mens and womens reactions 
to a womans response to sexist comments found that men liked 
the woman less when she confronted sexist remarks than when 
she ignored them.44 The male subjects in the study reserved 
their harshest disapproval for women who confronted com-
ments that were blatantly sexist; women who confronted more 
ambiguous remarks as sexist did not trigger the same degree of 
dislike.45 The researchers accounted for this surprising finding 
by explaining that the women who confronted the more blatant 
sexism represented a more clear challenge to the social order 
and transgressed traditional gender-role expectations.46 They 
explained the social penalty as part of a social dynamic of pun-
ishing role transgressions that occurs when a member of a 
stigmatized group challenges the social hierarchy.47 
The greatest social penalty imposed on persons who claim 
discrimination is inflicted by social groups in a position of privi-
 
 42. See id. at 234; see also id. at 22829 (describing the implications of 
their own work and citing other research demonstrating that African Ameri-
cans anticipate social backlash if they confront discrimination). The authors 
speculated that the social costs of claiming discrimination may result in part 
from the desire to see oneself, and ones social group, as egalitarian. Id. at 235. 
 43. Alexander M. Czopp & Margo J. Monteith, Confronting Prejudice (Lit-
erally): Reactions to Confrontations of Racial and Gender Bias, 29 PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 532, 541 (2003) (stating that the predominant 
evaluative sentiment resulting from confrontations about gender-biased be-
havior was amusement). 
 44. Dodd et al., supra note 12, at 57475. 
 45. See id. at 575. 
 46. See id. (explaining the more tepid reaction to the ambiguous remarks); 
id. ([P]erhaps [it was] because her unprovoked remark was dismissed as 
without legitimate cause. On the other hand, the target womans response to 
the clearly sexist remark was legitimate, and as a consequence perhaps made 
especially salient the fact that she was transgressing her gender role by stand-
ing up to a man in that situation.). 
 47. Id. at 56869 (explaining that when women challenge sexism, the 
confrontation goes against the more passive, proper female gender role pre-
scribed by society); cf. Swim & Hyers, supra note 26, at 69 (explaining that 
the dynamic of punishment in response to transgressing gender roles contrib-
utes to the social constraints that suppress womens confrontations of sexism). 
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lege with respect to the discrimination in question. In the study 
just described of mens and womens reactions to a womans re-
sponses to sexism, the female subjects in the study, in sharp 
contrast to the male subjects, responded more favorably to the 
woman when she confronted the sexist remarks than when she 
ignored them.48 The researchers explained that the gender dif-
ference in reactions reflects mens greater inclination to punish 
transgressions from expected gender roles, and the greater ten-
dency of women to respond more positively to departures from 
gender roles.49 Other research confirms that social group mem-
bership significantly influences reactions to persons who claim 
discrimination.50 For example, one study found that women and 
African Americans were more likely to claim discrimination 
privately and anonymously or in the presence of a member of 
their same social group, and less likely to do so publicly and in 
the presence of men or white persons, respectively.51 The re-
searchers attributed the different responses to the subjects 
 
 48. See Dodd et al., supra note 12, at 57475. The authors noted the 
Catch-22 this creates for women in mixed-sex settings, forcing women faced 
with sexism to choose between being better liked by men or better liked and 
respected by other women. Id. 
 49. See id. at 575. 
 50. Cf. Kaiser & Miller, supra note 22, at 168 (explaining research finding 
that women are reluctant to tell members of high-status groups that they have 
been discriminated against). 
 51. See Stangor et al., supra note 23, at 73. The women and African-
American subjects in this study were told that they had received a failing 
grade on a test, and then provided with facts suggesting a varying likelihood 
that discrimination, rather than ability, accounted for the negative results. Id. 
at 7172. The subjects were told that the test measured creativity, and were 
informed that the grader was male or female or European American or African 
American, whichever was the opposite of the subjects own sex or ethnicity. Id. 
at 71. Subjects were then given the graders written comments, which dis-
closed bias towards the subjects social group. Id. The subjects were then 
asked to rate the degree to which certain possible reasons, including ability 
and discrimination, explained their failing score. Id. The subjects were told in 
advance that they would have to make the rating anonymously or out loud in 
front of an interviewer. Id. at 7172. The study format was similar to that 
used by Ruggiero and Taylor, supra notes 1319, with the primary difference 
being the manipulability of the situation in which the subjects were asked to 
explain the negative test results. Stangor et al., supra note 23, at 7172. The 
female and African-American subjects were much more likely to make attribu-
tions of discrimination either privately or in the presence of a member of their 
same social group, and much less likely to do so in the presence of a male or 
white person. Id. at 73; cf. Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Mul-
tiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMENS RTS. L. REP. 7, 7
8 (1989) (describing multiple consciousness, and posing the hypothetical ex-
ample of a woman of color who shapes her responses in a first year criminal 
law class on rape, depending on the race and gender of the professor). 
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acute awareness of the different levels of social costs. This lit-
erature strongly suggests that the beneficiaries of the social or-
der are the most likely to resent and punish its challengers. 
Finally, the social costs of claiming discrimination are pri-
marily reserved for low-power or stigmatized social groups. 
White persons and men are less susceptible to social costs when 
they publicly portray themselves as victims of race or sex dis-
crimination.52 When women and persons of color identify and 
object to discrimination, however, they are perceived as trans-
gressing the social order, setting in motion a dynamic that sets 
the stage for retaliation. 
C. THE FUNCTION OF RETALIATION: SILENCING CHALLENGERS 
AND PRESERVING EXISTING POWER STRUCTURES 
Retaliation performs important work in institutions. One 
of the most palpable functions of retaliation is to suppress chal-
lenges to perceived inequality. Retaliation performs much of 
this work without ever actually being inflicted on the potential 
challenger. Decisions about whether to challenge discrimina-
tion rest on a careful balancing of the costs and benefits of do-
ing so.53 The failure to report or confront discrimination often 
reflects expected social costs rather than an individuals pri-
vate, benign interpretation of an event.54 For example, women 
 
 52. See, e.g., Ruggiero & Taylor, supra note 11, at 386 (explaining the re-
sults of an earlier study in which male subjects did not minimize perceived 
discrimination, but were highly vigilant in perceiving discrimination against 
themselves); Stangor et al., supra note 23, at 7273 (discussing the results of 
control groups using men and white persons as discrimination claimants, and 
showing little evidence of high social costs when men and white persons at-
tribute their own negative outcomes to discrimination); cf. MICHELLE FINE, 
DISRUPTIVE VOICES: THE POSSIBILITIES OF FEMINIST RESEARCH 64 (1992) (dis-
cussing the importance of relative social power as an influence on womens re-
actions to discrimination, and noting that persons of relatively high social 
power are more likely to succeed when they assert a single act of taking con-
trol, such as filing a complaint or voicing a grievance). 
 53. See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 24, at 23042 (discussing research 
on whistleblowing generally, and sexual harassment specifically, finding that 
persons engage in cost-benefit analysis to decide how to respond to wrongdo-
ing). 
 54. See Czopp & Monteith, supra note 43, at 541 (If confrontations 
against sexism are perceived as likely to yield aversive and unsuccessful re-
sults, a potential confronter may refrain from challenging future sexist acts, 
unintentionally conveying passive acceptance of such behavior.); Stangor et 
al., supra note 23, at 73 (describing research showing that even when persons 
accurately perceive discrimination, they often choose not to report it because 
of the social costs of doing so); Swim & Hyers, supra note 26, at 68 (describing 
research on the influence of social context on confronting discrimination and 
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who choose not to confront discrimination typically do so be-
cause they believe that the costs of confrontation outweigh the 
benefits, while women who report discrimination tend to be 
more optimistic about the likely benefits and costs of doing so.55 
An analysis of the costs and benefits of reporting discrimina-
tion, rather than an ethic of caretaking or an aversion to con-
flict, best explains womens decisions not to report discrimina-
tion.56 In this cost-benefit analysis, reporting discrimination is 
perceived to entail high costs.57 Fear of provoking retaliation, in 




concluding that women who choose not to confront sexism act as strategic ne-
gotiators of threatening situations). 
 55. See Kaiser & Miller, supra note 22; cf. Knapp et al., supra note 24, at 
703 (observing that younger workers are more likely to make formal com-
plaints than older workers because younger workers have more positive expec-
tations about the reporting process). 
 56. See Rudman et al., supra note 24, at 519, 53438 (describing the re-
sults of their study on the comparative impact of procedural justice and a 
caring perspective as causative factors in the failure to report sexual har-
assment, and finding the former to be more responsible for the underreporting 
of sexual harassment). The picture that emerges of women in this literature 
resonates with Professor Kathryn Abramss theory of partial agency, in which 
women are constrained by their circumstances, but act as strategic social ac-
tors nonetheless. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion 
in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995). 
 57. See, e.g., Kaiser & Miller, supra note 22, at 169 (describing one study 
finding that women perceive confronting sexist remarks to be equally risky to 
responding with physical aggression against the perpetrator); id. at 168, 175 
(concluding that fear of the consequences explains much of the gap between 
labeling a behavior as discrimination and confronting those responsible or re-
porting it to others). 
 58. See, e.g., Dodd et al., supra note 12, at 569 (explaining that fears of 
not being believed, being retaliated against, being humiliated or of having 
ones job negatively affected all contribute to the reluctance of women to con-
front sexism); Fitzgerald et al., supra note 24, at 127 (Studies of victims con-
sistently report that fear of personal or organizational retaliation is the major 
constraint on assertive responding.); Gutek & Koss, supra note 24, at 39 (ex-
plaining that women rarely confront or report sexual harassment because they 
fear that it wont accomplish anything and fear retaliation); Kaiser & Miller, 
supra note 22, at 169 (The most commonly documented barrier to confronting 
discrimination is interpersonal costs, such as being perceived as a trouble-
maker or experiencing retaliation.); Knapp et al., supra note 24, at 702 (iden-
tifying fear of retaliation or isolation and not wanting to be labeled a trouble-
maker or victim as primary reasons for not reporting sexual harassment); cf. 
Crosby, supra note 12, at 174 (It is . . . widely known that to speak out 
against injustice is to invite condemnation, and this knowledge, added to the 
other disincentives, can be enough to assure at least temporary silence.). 
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Fears of retaliation turn out to be well-founded. Retaliation 
occurs with sufficient frequency to justify perceptions of the 
high costs of reporting discrimination and support the rational-
ity of decisions not to do so.59 However, it is not the potential 
for retaliation in the abstract that effectively silences chal-
lenges. Retaliation occurs within an institutional context, and 
institutions retain a great degree of control over the extent to 
which fears of retaliation silence potential claims of discrimina-
tion. The organizational climate, including institutional norms 
and the organizations tolerance for discrimination and retalia-
tion, has a profound influence on how persons choose to re-
 
 59. See, e.g., Jane Adams-Roy & Julian Barling, Predicting the Decision to 
Confront or Report Sexual Harassment, 19 J. ORG. BEHAV. 329, 334 (1998) (de-
scribing a study finding that women who reported sexual harassment through 
formal organizational channels experienced more negative outcomes than 
those who did nothing); Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Womens Stories 
in Sexual Harassment Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 12425 
(2001) ([M]any plaintiffs lawyers would tell you that once an employee com-
plains about discrimination on the job, he or she can usually consider that em-
ployment relationship over.); Donna J. Benson & Gregg E. Thomson, Sexual 
Harassment on a University Campus: The Confluence of Authority Relations, 
Sexual Interest and Gender Stratification, 29 SOC. PROBS. 236, 24445 (1982) 
(discussing the results of a study of university students finding that female 
students who confronted their professors about harassment were more likely 
to experience retaliation than to reestablish a mutually satisfying teacher-
student relationship); Bergman et al., supra note 24, at 230 (describing the 
results of a study finding that even in those situations where women believed 
that confronting the harassment made things better, empirical outcomes ac-
tually demonstrated the opposite); Bingham & Scherer, supra note 24, at 247
48 (describing the results of a study showing that making a formal or informal 
complaint produced worse outcomes than alternative responses, such as doing 
nothing, talking to the harasser, or seeking social support); Fitzgerald et al., 
supra note 24, at 122 (describing the results of a study of state employees find-
ing that 62 percent of the women who reported sexual harassment experienced 
retaliation, with the most assertive responses often triggering the harshest 
response); id. at 123 (describing the results of another study finding that one-
third of the persons who filed formal harassment claims said that it made 
things worse, and still another study finding that assertive responses were 
associated with more negative outcomes of every type, even after controlling 
for the severity of the harassment); Matthew S. Hesson-McInnis & Louise F. 
Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: A Preliminary Test of an Integrative Model, 27 
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 877, 896 (1997) (Contrary to conventional wisdom, as-
sertive and formal responses were actually associated with more negative out-
comes of every sort.); Knapp et al., supra note 24, at 711 ([A] very common 
negative reaction experienced by women who officially complain is public hu-
miliation.); Janet P. Near & Tamila C. Jensen, The Whistleblowing Process: 
Retaliation and Perceived Effectiveness, 10 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 3, 17 (1983) 
(describing the results of their study on women who filed sex discrimination 
complaints against their employer with the Wisconsin Equal Rights Division, 
finding that 40 percent of the women reported experiencing retaliation). 
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spond to perceived discrimination.60 If a target believes, based 
on past observations, that confronting or reporting discrimina-
tion is likely to trigger retaliation, she will be much less in-
clined to engage in such a response.61 Retaliation has height-
ened power to silence discrimination claims within institutions 
that have a high tolerance for discrimination and retaliation.62 
The other important work performed by retaliation is to 
preserve institutional power structures in the process of fend-
ing off challenges to them. Retaliation performs this function 
both when it is actually inflicted and when the threat of re-
taliation disproportionately chills complaints by persons with 
relatively lower social and institutional power. As a social and 
institutional practice, retaliation is fueled by and magnifies ex-
isting power disparities between the challengers and the bene-
ficiaries of discrimination. 
Retaliation is more likely to occur against vulnerable em-
ployees who lack the support of organizational powerbrokers.63 
Conversely, the more support a target receives from important 
persons within the organization, the less likely the target will 
be subjected to retaliation.64 Because low-power persons are 
particularly susceptible to retaliation, the fear of retaliation is 
especially chilling and all the more effective in silencing their  
 
 
 60. See, e.g., Knapp et al., supra note 24, at 712; see also id. at 70708 
(discussing literature on whistleblowing showing that organizations that are 
more hierarchical, bureaucratic, and authoritarian are also more likely to ig-
nore dissent and suppress whistleblowing). 
 61. See id. at 711 (discussing research showing that beliefs about the po-
tential efficacy of reporting and the likelihood of retaliation shape the forma-
tion of targets responses); id. at 699700 (discussing research showing a 
feedback loop where past outcomes of responses to harassment influence ex-
pectancies for future outcomes, and thus shape present responses). 
 62. See, e.g., Bingham & Scherer, supra note 24, at 245 (observing that 
the likelihood of individuals complaining to organizational authorities depends 
on their perception of whether the organization will take the complaint seri-
ously and assist in resolving the situation); Fitzgerald et al., supra note 24, at 
122 (discussing research showing that when the severity of the harassment 
was controlled for, the most powerful predictor of reporting was organizational 
context and the organizational norms and culture that also correlate with the 
likelihood of sexual harassment). 
 63. See Near & Jensen, supra note 59, at 21, 23 (reporting the results of a 
study of women who filed sex discrimination complaints against their employ-
ers with the Equal Rights Division of Wisconsin finding perceived support of 
top management to be inversely related to the comprehensiveness of retalia-
tion). 
 64. See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 24, at 232, 236. 
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opposition.65 The fear of retaliation is particularly debilitating 
for persons with low-institutional power across multiple dimen-
sions. For example, women who are especially isolated and to-
kens in their jobs, women in nontraditional employment, and 
women who are especially vulnerable in their jobs are more 
likely to be silenced by the threat or fear of retaliation.66 
At the same time that retaliation preys on the most vul-
nerable persons in institutions, it simultaneously magnifies the 
power of high-status persons to engage in discrimination. 
Power relations between the perpetrator and target greatly in-
fluence how the organization responds to reports of discrimina-
tion. Organizations are more likely to remedy discrimination 
when the targets of discrimination are higher-status, and least 
likely to do so where a lower-status target complains of dis-
crimination by a higher-status perpetrator.67 As the perpetra-
tors power increases relative to the target, reporting discrimi-
nation is less likely to lead to a positive outcome for the 
target.68 The potential for retaliation increases as the power 
disparity widens between a low-status target and a higher-
status perpetrator.69 Perhaps not surprisingly, then, women 
and men of color tend to file a disproportionate number of re-
 
 65. See, e.g., Knapp et al., supra note 24, at 694 (explaining research 
showing that targets of sexual harassment are least likely to report or con-
front the harassment when the perpetrator is a supervisor or other person 
with higher organizational power); cf. id. at 70405 (explaining converse find-
ing that persons of higher occupational status who wield more power within 
the organization are more likely to report the harassment because they are 
better positioned to avoid retaliation). 
 66. Id. at 704 (noting that gender pioneers do not expect that they will be 
supported, and are more isolated, and under great pressure to fit in). 
 67. See Bergman et al., supra note 24, at 239 (Organizations are less 
likely to take action against high-status perpetrators, and as the organiza-
tional power and status of the perpetrator increase, the likelihood of organiza-
tional action decreases.). 
 68. See Bingham & Scherer, supra note 24, at 244, 260. Not surprisingly, 
employees also reported lower levels of satisfaction with the outcome of report-
ing harassment when they perceived their work climate as tending to encour-
age sexual harassment. Id. at 261. 
 69. See Cortina et al., supra note 25, at 25859 (citing and explaining 
their 2001 study of federal court employees, which showed that retaliation in-
creased when employees spoke out against more powerful organizational 
members). See generally Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice, 
Risking Retaliation: Events Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the 
Workplace, 8 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 247 (2003) (explaining that 
the relative social positions of the target and the perpetrator affect both the 
form and likelihood of retaliation). 
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taliation claims.70 The greater the power disparity between the 
wrongdoer and the victim, the greater the extent to which the 
victims resistance deviates from prescribed institutional and 
social positions, and the more likely it is that organizational 
members will sanction the challenger.71 Retaliation thus serves 
as a mechanism to maintain hierarchies within institutions 
and restore the social norms that are challenged by claims of 
wrongdoing.72 
Like discrimination, retaliation is a product of an organiza-
tions existing climate and structures.73 It is more likely to oc-
cur in organizations with a high tolerance for, and incidence of, 
discrimination.74 The relationship between discrimination and 
 
 70. See NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 1, at 
12 (analyzing 2003 EEOC data and reporting that 30 percent of retaliation 
claims are filed by women of color, 27 percent by men of color, 26 percent by 
white women, and only 11 percent by white men). 
 71. See Cortina et al., supra note 25, at 259 (explaining that exposing the 
misbehavior of a highly placed person in an organization questions the hierar-
chy of the organization, causing the dominant coalition to retaliate in order to 
restore organizational hierarchy); id. (explaining that whistleblowing by a 
lower status person against higher-status persons is seen as deviant behavior 
and a more serious offense in a socially stratified society . . . likely to evoke the 
greatest sanction). 
 72. See Cortina & Magley, supra note 69, at 260 ([O]rganizations use re-
taliation to maintain social control over dissidents and restore group norms.); 
cf. Marcia A. Parmerlee et al., Correlates of Whistleblowers Perceptions of Or-
ganizational Retaliation, 27 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 17, 1920, 3031 (1982) (discuss-
ing research suggesting that retaliation can be used for diverse purposes, in-
cluding silencing, discrediting and damaging dissidents and punishing 
vulnerable challengers in order to warn other persons against challenges to 
authority, and explaining the challenge to organizational authority that whis-
tleblowing presents). 
 73. Cortina & Magley, supra note 69; Near & Jensen, supra note 59, at 5
8; cf. Bergman et al., supra note 24, at 233 (Organizational responses may 
function as a continuation of the harassing behaviors, in that negative organ-
izational responses (e.g., retaliation) may further victimize the harassment 
target. Thus, job-gender context may influence responses to reports in much 
the same way that it affects sexual harassment.); Parmerlee et al., supra note 
72, at 30 (suggesting that the acts of individual supervisors are part of an or-
ganizational process, and explaining that the support of top management 
strongly influences retaliation, demonstrating that retaliation is an organiza-
tional response, and not the act of lone individuals). 
 74. See Bergman et al., supra note 24, at 23637 (stating that 
[r]etaliation and minimization [of the harassment] were associated with 
higher perpetrator rank, more negative organizational climates, and greater 
frequency of sexual harassment[,] and noting that, as organizational toler-
ance for sexual harassment increases, so does retaliation for reporting it); cf. 
Czopp & Monteith, supra note 43, at 536 (citing research showing that low-
prejudice people react to discovering their biases with feelings of guilt, 
whereas high-prejudice participants were more likely to react with feelings of 
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retaliation is reciprocal: just as the tolerance for discrimination 
increases the likelihood of retaliation, retaliation also encour-
ages further discrimination.75 
III.  THE PROMISE OF THE RETALIATION CLAIM  
The realities of retaliation in response to claiming dis-
crimination necessitate strong legal protection from retaliation 
if the law is to provide meaningful nondiscrimination guaran-
tees. However, despite the connections developed in the social 
science literature between retaliation and the furtherance of 
discrimination, current legal understandings of discrimination 
require some theoretical stretching to encompass retaliation. 
The disconnect between retaliation and discrimination under 
existing doctrine recently came to a head in Jackson v. Bir-
mingham Board of Education, which required the Court to de-
cide whether Title IX implies a private right of action for re-
taliation.76 An appreciation of the complexity of the issue in 
Jackson provides the opening to a broader rethinking of the 
boundaries of discrimination law and its relationship to retalia-
tion. This section contends that recognizing retaliation as a 
form of discrimination necessarily pushes the boundaries of 
current discrimination law in productive ways, both in terms of 
the scope of the antidiscrimination project and the values un-
derlying discrimination law. 
 
anger and irritation); Fitzgerald et al., Antecedents and Consequences of Sex-
ual Harassment in Organizations: A Test of an Integrated Model, 82 J. AP-
PLIED PSYCHOL. 578, 586 (1997) (explaining that harassment in organizations 
is a function of organizational climate, including the communicated tolerance 
for harassment, and structural factors such as the gender ratio of jobs com-
bined with the gendered nature of job responsibilities). 
 75. Research by social psychologists has shown that the social influence of 
hearing someone either condemn or condone racism strongly affects subjects 
reactions to racism. See Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Condemning and Con-
doning Racism: A Social Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79 J. AP-
PLIED PSYCHOL. 993, 995 (1994) (reporting the results of campus study explor-
ing the effects of the expression of social opinions on racism, and concluding 
that hearing statements condoning racism increased the subjects own racist 
sentiments). The authors found that this phenomenon occurred regardless of 
the race of the person condoning racism, and concluded that racist sentiment 
is malleable, and that reducing the social constraints on prejudice has the po-
tential to cause increased racism. Id. at 995, 997. 
 76. 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1502 (2005). 
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A. JACKSON AND THE CONTROVERSY OVER IMPLYING A 
RETALIATION CLAIM FROM A BAN ON DISCRIMINATION 
The Jackson case forced the Court to confront the relation-
ship between retaliation and discrimination in order to decide 
whether retaliation for complaining about a perceived Title IX 
violation is a form of intentional discrimination on the basis of 
sex. Although many nondiscrimination statutes, including Title 
VII,77 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,78 and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act,79 explicitly prohibit retalia-
tion, Title IX does not mention retaliation. Because Title IX is 
interpreted similarly to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,80 which prohibits race discrimination in federally funded 
programs and which is also silent with respect to retaliation, 
the Courts ruling in Jackson should also decide the fate of re-
taliation claims under Title VI.81 Regulations issued by the De-
partment of Education have long prohibited retaliation for as-
serting rights under both of these statutes,82 but the statutory 
silence left lower courts to struggle with whether to recognize 
an implied private right of action for retaliation under Title VI 
 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000). In language that serves as a model for 
other statutory bans on retaliation, Title VII states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to dis-
criminate against any of his employees or applicants for employ-
ment . . . because he has opposed any practice, made an unlawful em-
ployment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an inves-
tigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 
Id. 
 78. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000). 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (2000). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
 81. See, e.g., Litman v. George Mason Univ., No. 01-2128, 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 3533, at *23 (4th Cir. Feb. 25, 2004) (vacating and remanding the dis-
trict courts dismissal of a Title IX retaliation claim in light of a Fourth Circuit 
decision holding that Title VI includes a private right of action for retaliation, 
and noting that Title IX and Title VI should be interpreted in the same man-
ner). 
 82. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2000) (No recipient [of federal funds] or 
other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any 
individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by 
[Title IX or Title VI], or because he has made a complaint, testified, assisted, 
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing un-
der [Title IX or Title VI].). Both Title VI and Title IX explicitly authorize fed-
eral agencies to promulgate regulations interpreting and enforcing the statu-
tory ban on discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000); 20 U.S.C. § 1682 
(2000). 
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and Title IX.83 The Courts decision in Jackson to imply a re-
taliation claim from the general prohibition on sex discrimina-
tion also has implications for other legal sources of equality 
rights that are silent with respect to retaliation, including 42 
U.S.C. § 1983,84 the primary vehicle for asserting equal protec-
tion, and the Reconstruction statutes, sections 1981,85 1982,86 
and 1985.87 
In Jackson, a male teacher and coach of the girls high 
school basketball team at Ensley High School in Birmingham, 
Alabama, alleged retaliation for complaining about the unequal 
funding and unequal access to athletic facilities and equipment 
allotted to his team.88 School officials responded by relieving 
him of his coaching position.89 Mr. Jackson sued the Birming-
ham Board of Education in federal court, alleging retaliation 
under Title IX and the Department of Education regulation 
 
 83. For a discussion of the split in the courts over whether to recognize 
implied private rights of action for retaliation under Title IX and Title VI, see 
Bradford C. Mank, Are Anti-Retaliation Regulations in Title VI or Title IX En-
forceable in a Private Right of Action: Does Sandoval or Sullivan Control This 
Question?, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 47 (2004). 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (prohibiting deprivations of federal rights un-
der color of state law). 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) (prohibiting race discrimination in the making 
and enforcing of contracts); cf. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATE-
RIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 637 (6th ed. 2003) (observing that, 
even though recent appellate decisions have found implicit protection from re-
taliation in § 1981, this interpretation cannot be considered settled in light of 
the Supreme Courts decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 
164 (1989)). 
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000) (prohibiting race discrimination in property 
transactions). Although the Supreme Court previously recognized an implied 
private right of action for retaliation under this statute in Sullivan v. Little 
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 337 (1969), more recent Supreme Court 
precedent raised questions about the ongoing validity of Sullivan. See, e.g., 
Mock v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1022 (D.S.D. 2003) (ruling 
that Title IX does not create an implied private right of action for retaliation 
and questioning whether Sullivan survives the Supreme Courts decision in 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)). The Jackson decision put these 
doubts to rest, reaffirming Sullivan and construing that decision as recogniz-
ing implicit protection from retaliation in a broad nondiscrimination guaran-
tee, and not merely allowing third-party standing to assert nondiscrimination 
rights on behalf of others. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 
1497, 150506 & n.1 (2005). 
 87. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2000) (prohibiting a conspiracy to violate federal 
civil rights). 
 88. 125 S. Ct. at 1503. 
 89. See id. Mr. Jackson was not fired outright, since the school district re-
tained him as a teacher, but he lost his supplemental pay for coaching. Id. 
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barring retaliation for assertions of rights under Title IX.90 The 
district court dismissed the lawsuit on the ground that Title IX 
did not include an implied cause of action for retaliation.91 The  
Eleventh Circuit affirmed, citing the absence of textual support 
in Title IX for a retaliation claim and contrasting Title IXs si-
lence with Title VIIs express prohibition on retaliation.92 
While the Jackson case worked its way up to the high 
Court, the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite result in a case 
decided under Title VI. In Peters v. Jenney, a white female 
teacher and director of the schools gifted program alleged re-
taliation for her advocacy of changes to the programs selection 
criteria, which disproportionately excluded African-American 
students and, she believed, violated Title VI.93 The school dis-
trict responded by removing her from her position as director of 
the program.94 Her challenge to the school district fared better 
in the lower courts than the retaliation claim in Jackson. The 
Fourth Circuit disagreed with the Eleventh Circuits reasoning, 
finding the absence of statutory language on retaliation less 
significant and citing earlier precedent recognizing protection 
from retaliation as implicit in a prohibition on discrimination.95 
 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1344 & n.12 
(11th Cir., 2002), revd, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005). The Court granted certiorari on 
the question, [d]oes [a] private right of action for violations of Title IX encom-
pass redress for retaliation for complaints about unlawful sex discrimination? 
72 U.S.L.W. 3745 (U.S. June 15, 2004). 
 93. 327 F.3d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 94. See id. The school district did not remove Peters immediately, but de-
clined to renew her probationary contract. Id. 
 95. Id. at 31718 (citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 
229, 236 (1969) (recognizing an implied private right of action for retaliation 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, even though the statute does not mention retalia-
tion)). The Peters court also cited circuit court precedent recognizing a private 
right of action for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id; see, e.g., Murrell v. 
Ocean Mecca Motel, Inc., 262 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 2001) (recognizing a pri-
vate right of action under § 1981 for a white motel customer evicted due to as-
sociation with black customers); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 
576 (6th Cir. 2000) (permitting a white plaintiff allegedly retaliated against 
for opposing discrimination to bring suit under § 1981); Phelps v. Wichita Ea-
gle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 126667 (10th Cir. 1989) (recognizing standing to 
sue under § 1981 for a white attorney, who was allegedly subjected to adverse 
action because of his representation of black clients); Skinner v. Total Petro-
leum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1447 (10th Cir. 1988) (recognizing a § 1981 action 
by a white employee allegedly terminated for assisting a black employee); 
Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian Sch., 631 F.2d 1144, 1149 n.7 (4th Cir. 1980) 
(permitting suit under § 1981 for a white plaintiff who was retaliated against 
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Several district courts weighed in on both sides of the contro-
versy before the Supreme Court took up the Jackson case.96 
The issue before the Court in Jackson turned on whether 
the statutory ban on sex discrimination implicitly encompasses 
a private right of action for retaliation against persons who 
complain of discrimination.97 The Supreme Court ruled that it 
did, finding Title IXs ban on sex discrimination broad enough 
to encompass protection from retaliation notwithstanding the 
statutes silence on this question. The Courts ability to coher-
ently situate retaliation within a ban on discrimination ulti-
mately turned on how broadly or narrowly it construed dis-
crimination. However, neither the Supreme Court nor the 
lower courts that recognized retaliation claims fully engaged 
the complexity of the relationship between retaliation and dis-
crimination under existing law. The question in Jackson is a 
challenging one because current Supreme Court precedent con-
strues discrimination narrowly, thus making it difficult to im-
ply protection from retaliation from a general ban on discrimi-
nation. 
1. The Disconnect Between Retaliation and Discrimination 
Under Existing Precedent 
One important precedent complicating the issue in Jackson 
is Alexander v. Sandoval, in which the Court limited implied 
 
for opposing discrimination). These decisions, however, stand in some tension 
with the Supreme Courts reasoning in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 
(2001). See, e.g., Mock v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1021 
(D.S.D. 2003) (interpreting Sandoval as explicitly disavowing the method used 
in Sullivan to find a private right of action based on the usefulness of provid-
ing such a remedy). 
 96. Compare Chandamuri v. Georgetown Univ., 274 F. Supp. 2d 71, 83 
(D.D.C. 2003) (siding with the Fourth Circuit and implying a private right of 
action under Title VI), and Johnson v. Galen Health Insts., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 
2d 679, 695 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (holding that a private right of action for retalia-
tion exists under Title IX), with Mock, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1022 (siding with the 
Eleventh Circuit in refusing to recognize a private right of action for retalia-
tion under Title IX), and Atkinson v. Lafayette Coll., No. 7:01-CV-224-R, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1432, at *3334 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2002) (relying on 
Sandoval, discussed infra, to dismiss the plaintiff s Title IX retaliation claim 
alleging that she was removed from her position as athletic director for initiat-
ing an open discussion of Title IX athletics compliance issues at the college 
where she worked). 
 97. 125 S. Ct. at 1503. The Court chose not to rely on the Department of 
Education regulation prohibiting retaliation as the source of the retaliation 
action, forcing it to locate the retaliation claim squarely within the statutes 
nondiscrimination guarantee. Id. at 150607. 
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private rights of action under Title VI to only those actions that 
allege intentional race discrimination.98 Sandoval involved a 
Title VI challenge to an Alabama Department of Motor Vehicles 
rule refusing to offer drivers license tests in Spanish.99 Relying 
on an agency regulation interpreting Title VI to prohibit prac-
tices that disparately harm a racial group without sufficient 
justification,100 the plaintiffs alleged that the practice had a ra-
cially disparate impact on Latinos and Latinas.101 The Court 
rejected the plaintiffs claim, ruling that the disparate-impact 
regulation did not create a private right of action because it ex-
ceeded the scope of the statute, which prohibits only intentional 
discrimination.102 Because the Court found that the disparate-
impact regulation proscribed practices that are permitted by 
the ban on intentional discrimination, the regulation fell out-
side of the statutes implied private right of action.103 As Justice  
 
 
 98. 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001). 
 99. Id. at 27879. 
 100. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2004) (prohibiting the use of criteria or 
methods of administration having the effect of discrimination because of race, 
color, or national origin); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (2004) (preventing the De-
partment of Transportation from discriminating against the recipients of bene-
fits on the basis of race, color, or national origin). Section 602 of Title VI au-
thorizes federal agencies which are empowered to extend Federal assistance to 
promulgate regulations to enforce Title VI. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000). 
 101. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279. 
 102. Id. at 293. The Court first limited Title VI to intentional discrimina-
tion in dicta in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
287 (1978). In Sandoval, the Court assumed without deciding that the regula-
tions promulgated under § 602 of the statute could validly proscribe disparate 
impact for the purposes of agency enforcement of the statute, but ruled that 
they could not do so for the purposes of creating an implied private right of ac-
tion in court. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282. The Court first recognized a private 
right of action to enforce Title IX in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 
677, 717 (1979), and an implied private right of action for damages under Title 
IX in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992). The 
Courts discussion in Sandoval relies on these decisions as the departure point 
for the Title VI analysis as well. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280. 
 103. Id. at 285. The Court concluded that unlike § 601, which sets out the 
core nondiscrimination guarantee, § 602, which authorizes the agency to 
promulgate regulations, does not create an implied private right of action. Id. 
at 28889, 293. The Courts analysis reflects its increasingly strict approach, 
relying primarily on the text and structure of the statute, to decide whether to 
infer an implied private right of action from a statute that is silent on the 
question. Id. at 28788. The Court rejected an alternative approach that 
would interpret statutes to implicitly include such remedies as necessary to 
give effect to congressional intent. Id. at 287 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 
78 (1975)). Four Justices dissented. Id. at 293 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Scalia explained for the five-member majority, [a]gencies may 
play the sorcerers apprentice but not the sorcerer himself.104 
The Sandoval decision limited the Court to implying pri-
vate rights of action only for claims of intentional discrimina-
tion under Title VI, and by extension Title IX. Recognizing im-
plicit protection from retaliation under Title IX thus required 
the Court to situate retaliation within the category of inten-
tional sex discrimination.105 Doing so, however, puts some pres-
sure on the category of intentional discrimination as it has de-
veloped in modern discrimination doctrine. Notwithstanding 
the interdependence of discrimination and retaliation in the 
real world, it is not so easy to conceptualize retaliation as a 
form of intentional discrimination under the current dominant 
framework.106 
Intentional discrimination, also known as differential 
treatment and distinguished from disparate impact, typically 
denotes unfavorable treatment directed at someone because of 
his or her race, sex or other protected class status. The touch-
stone of the retaliation claim, on the other hand, is that the 
complainant was retaliated against for his or her actions oppos-
ing discrimination. The difference is apparent from the Jackson 
case itself. The coach, an African-American male, did not claim 
that he was fired because of his sex or that a female coach who 
raised Title IX concerns would have fared better, but that he 
experienced retaliation for his actions on behalf of his female 
 
 104. Id. at 291. The Courts own absence from the sorcerer/apprentice 
metaphor promotes the façade that the limits of statutory meaning are set by 
Congress and that the agency must abide by those limits. The metaphor ob-
scures the Courts own role in creating meaning, first in limiting the statute to 
intentional discrimination and then in setting the disparate-impact regulation 
as too far removed to qualify as a reasonable vindication of that principle. On 
the legitimating role of metaphor in Supreme Court rhetoric, see generally 
Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 
181 (2004). 
 105. Although not every court has decided the retaliation issue under Title 
VI and Title IX with reference to the space left by Sandoval, see, for example, 
Frazier v. Fairhaven School Community, 276 F.3d 52, 67 (1st Cir. 2002) (as-
suming that Title IX includes an implied private right of action without men-
tioning or considering Sandoval), the meaning and implications of Sandoval 
are central to the analysis, since any congruity between retaliation and inten-
tional discrimination is far from obvious. 
 106. See, e.g., Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 318 (4th Cir. 2003) (asserting 
a symbiotic and inseparable relationship between retaliation and intentional 
discrimination, but failing to specify the nature or contours of that relation-
ship). 
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students.107 Unlike the prototypical intentional discrimination 
model, the retaliation claim asserts that the harm was inflicted 
because of the complainants actions, apart from his or her pro-
tected class status. 
The Courts intentional discrimination jurisprudence, on 
the other hand, generally insists on status-based harm to an 
individual. For example, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ser-
vices, Inc., the Court reminded lower courts and litigants that a 
Title VII sex discrimination plaintiff must always establish 
that the adverse treatment occurred because of the plaintiff s 
sex.108 In Oncale, the plaintiff, an employee working on an oil 
rig, alleged that he was sexually harassed by his male co-
workers, who sexually and physically assaulted him and 
threatened him with rape.109 The lower courts had rejected the 
plaintiff s Title VII claim, reasoning that male-to-male harass-
ment can never amount to discrimination based on the plain-
tiff s sex.110 The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that same-
sex harassment may amount to sex-based discrimination, as 
long as the plaintiff proves that he was singled out for the har-
assment because of his sex.111 With this understanding, the 
Court remanded the case to the lower courts for further pro-
ceedings.112 Under the Courts reasoning, if Mr. Oncale had in-
stead claimed that he was harassed because of his opposition to 
company policy, his claim for sex discrimination would have 
failed unless he could show that a female worker who engaged 
in similar activity would have been treated better.113 A plaintiff 
 
 107. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1511 (2005). 
 108. 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
 109. Id. at 77. 
 110. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 
1996), revd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 111. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 8081. The Court then listed several ways a plain-
tiff could prove the because-of-sex element in a same-sex harassment case, 
such as: by showing that the harasser was homosexual and that the same 
overtures would not have been made to a person of the other sex; with evi-
dence that the harassment took such a sex-specific and derogatory form that it 
supports an inference that the harasser was motivated by a general hostility 
to members of the plaintiff s sex in the workplace; or by comparative evidence 
showing how the harasser treats members of both sexes in the workplace. See 
id. 
 112. Id. at 82. 
 113. Some theories of harassment would permit such a claim to succeed, 
even if the reason for the harassment was the reporting of non-gender related 
rule violations, because of the sexual and sex-typed nature of the harassment. 
See Deborah Brake, The Cruelest of the Gender Police: Student-to-Student 
Sexual Harassment and Anti-Gay Peer Harassment Under Title IX, 1 GEO. J. 
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who suffers adverse treatment because of something she has or 
has not done, as opposed to her status, generally cannot suc-
ceed on a claim for intentional discrimination. 
To give another example, in Personnel Administrator of 
Massachusetts v. Feeney, a woman raised an equal protection 
challenge to the states preference for veterans in civil service 
jobs, claiming that the states policy discriminated against 
women by creating an absolute preference for job applicants 
who had served in the military.114 The Court rejected this claim 
because the veterans preference did not, in the Courts view, 
treat the plaintiffs differently because they were women, but 
because of something they had not donealbeit something that 
many men but very few women had done.115 Likewise, the 
much-criticized Dont ask, dont tell policy toward gays and 
lesbians in the military has been salvaged from equal protec-
tion challenges by framing it as an act-based, rather than a 
status-based, ban.116 While this distinction has been justly 
criticized for assuming a clear line between actions and status, 
and for obscuring how acts produce subjects and how status 
merges with actions,117 its acceptance by most courts demon-
strates the salience of the act/status distinction in discrimina-
tion law, casting the Courts contrasting treatment of retalia-
tion claims into stark relief. The Courts Title IX cases have  
 
 
GENDER L. 37, 7682 (1999) (explaining and critiquing a sexual-in-nature 
model of sexual harassment). However, the Court in Oncale viewed the sexual 
nature of the harassment as insufficient by itself to establish the because-of-
sex requirement. 523 U.S. at 80.  
 114. 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979). 
 115. The Court in Feeney discounted the obvious link between status and 
acts in this context, refusing to acknowledge how sex constrained military ser-
vice given the militarys significant hurdles to military service for women and 
its encouragement and enforcement of military service for men. See id. at 276
78. By obscuring this connection, the Court was able to pretend that the dis-
crimination at issue was based on past military service without regard to the 
sex-based status of the persons eligible for the veterans preference. See id. at 
278 ([T]he history of discrimination against women in the military is not on 
trial in this case.). The Courts refusal to see the link between status and acts 
in this case reflects its emphatic adherence to an act/status distinction. 
 116. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 635 (2d Cir. 1998); Phil-
ips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1429 (9th Cir. 1997); Holmes v. Cal. Army Natl 
Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 113536 (9th Cir. 1996); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 
256, 261 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomason v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 92930 (4th Cir. 
1996); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
 117. See generally Janet E. Halley, The Status/Conduct Distinction in the 
1993 Revisions to Military Anti-Gay Policy: A Legal Archaeology, 3 GLQ: J. 
LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 159 (1996). 
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followed this same model of intentional discrimination, requir-
ing plaintiffs to demonstrate that the adverse treatment oc-
curred because of their sex.118 
2. The Reconciliation of Retaliation and Discrimination in 
Jackson 
Justice OConnors majority opinion in Jackson glossed 
over these difficulties by repeatedly and insistently asserting 
that retaliation for complaining about sex discrimination is a 
form of intentional discrimination on the basis of sex, with little 
explanation or analysis.119 In its failure to engage or acknowl-
edge the distance between retaliation for a persons actions and 
the dominant status-based framework of intentional discrimi-
nation, the Jackson decision is remarkably undertheorized. 
Neither the Jackson majority nor lower court decisions recog-
nizing an implied right of action for retaliation have satisfacto-
rily explained why retaliation counts as a form of intentional 
discrimination based on protected class status. 
The Courts primary, if not fully articulated, rationale for 
situating retaliation under the intentional discrimination um-
brella rests on the premise that opposition to intentional dis-
crimination triggered the retaliation.120 This approach treats 
 
 118. See, e.g., Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 
526 U.S. 629, 63335 (1999); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 
60, 75 (1992). 
 119. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1504 (2005) 
(Retaliation against a person because that person has complained of sex dis-
crimination is another form of intentional sex discrimination encompassed by 
Title IXs private cause of action.); id. ([R]etaliation is discrimination on the 
basis of sex because it is an intentional response to the nature of the com-
plaint: an allegation of sex discrimination.); id. (We conclude that when a 
funding recipient retaliates against a person because he complains of sex dis-
crimination, this constitutes intentional discrimination on the basis of sex, in 
violation of Title IX.); id. at 1507 (As we explained above, . . . the text of Title 
IX prohibits a funding recipient from retaliating against a person who speaks 
out against sex discrimination, because such retaliation is intentional dis-
crimination on the basis of sex.); id. ([W]e hold that Title IXs private right 
of action encompasses suits for retaliation, because retaliation falls within the 
statutes prohibition of intentional discrimination on the basis of sex.); id. at 
1507 n.2 (We interpret Title IXs text to clearly prohibit retaliation for com-
plaints about sex discrimination.); id. at 1507 n.3 (Because, as we explain 
above, . . . retaliation in response to a complaint about sex discrimination is 
discrimination on the basis of sex, the statute clearly protects those who suf-
fer such retaliation.). 
 120. The Solicitor General relied on a similar theory in its litigation posi-
tion as amicus curiae in support of the plaintiff. See Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, in Jackson v. Birming-
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the retaliation as a cover-up for the underlying unlawful dis-
crimination, such that the retaliation is folded into the illegal-
ity of the discrimination itself. To return to a variation on the 
Oncale hypothetical from above, the analogy would be if 
Mr. Oncale was targeted for the harassment because he had 
challenged an employment policy barring the hiring of women 
on the oil rig. The retaliation would amount to an extension of 
the unlawful discrimination, an action intentionally taken to 
continue the company policy of unlawful discrimination against 
women. The majority opinion in Jackson invoked this theory by 
locating the on the basis of sex requirement in the nature of 
the complaint that triggers the retaliatory action.121 Under this 
theory, retaliation is a form of intentional discrimination be-
cause it is part of an intentional cover-up and continuation of a 
policy of intentional discrimination. 
The difficulty with this theory is that it turns on the exis-
tence of underlying intentional discrimination, which the re-
taliatory act furthers. Yet, as Justice Thomas correctly pointed 
out in dissent, courts have never requirednor should they re-
quire, for reasons developed at length in the latter part of this 
Articleretaliation claims to be premised on the existence of 
actual, unlawful discrimination underlying the oppositional ac-
tion.122 It is as well-established as any doctrine in discrimina-
tion law that a plaintiff may succeed on a retaliation claim even 
if the assertion of underlying unlawful discrimination turns out 
 
ham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005) (No. 02-1672) (explaining that the 
petitioners retaliation claim falls within the ban on intentional discrimination 
because he claims that respondent engaged in intentional discrimination); 
see also Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 318 (4th Cir. 2003) (describing retalia-
tion as a means of implementing or actually engaging in intentional discrimi-
nation by encouraging such discrimination and removing or punishing those 
who oppose it or refuse to engage in it). 
 121. See Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1504 ([R]etaliation is discrimination on the 
basis of sex because it is an intentional response to the nature of the com-
plaint: an allegation of sex discrimination.); see also id. at 1507 (Where the 
retaliation occurs because the complainant speaks out about sex discrimina-
tion, the on the basis of sex requirement is satisfied.); id. at 1507 n.3 (Be-
cause . . . retaliation in response to a complaint about sex discrimination is 
discrimination on the basis of sex, the statute clearly protects those who suf-
fer such retaliation.). 
 122. See id. at 1512 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ([A] retaliation claimant need 
not prove that the complained-of sex discrimination happened. Although this 
Court has never addressed the question, no Court of Appeals requires a com-
plainant to show more than that he had a reasonable, good faith belief that 
discrimination occurred to prevail on a retaliation claim. Retaliation therefore 
cannot be said to be discrimination on the basis of anyones sex, because a re-
taliation claim may succeed where no sex discrimination ever took place.). 
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to be incorrect.123 Of course, there is some limit to how far the 
challenged conduct may stray from the category of unlawful 
discrimination, as discussed later in this Article, but no court  
recognizing a cause of action for retaliation has required proof 
of underlying unlawful discrimination as a prerequisite for a 
retaliation claim. 
The majority did not disagree with Justice Thomass 
statement of the law on this point, nor did it explain how the 
retaliation claim meets the on the basis of sex requirement if 
it turns out that the underlying conduct did not amount to ille-
gal sex discrimination at all. Given that there is some slippage 
between the subject of the complaint that provokes the retalia-
tion and the boundaries of unlawful intentional discrimination, 
the Courts approach runs into the very problem in Sandoval: 
the private right of action would forbid conduct that [the stat-
ute] permits, namely, conduct other than intentional discrimi-
nation.124 
Some lower courts have invoked a similar theory to connect 
retaliation to intentional discrimination by analogizing to the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which protects the deci-
sion to exercise a constitutional right from government pun-
ishment.125 The majority in Jackson did not resort to this doc-
trine, and doing so would not have strengthened its effort to 
fold retaliation into the ban on intentional discrimination. The 
problem with the analogy to unconstitutional conditions is the 
same as the problem with the cover-up theory: retaliation 
claimants need not prove that the conduct they challenged ac-
tually amounted to unlawful discrimination. This is a key dif-
ference between the retaliation claim and the law of unconsti-
tutional conditions. Government actions discouraging the 
exercise of constitutional rights cross the line only when there 
 
 123. See infra text accompanying notes 19395. 
 124. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 (2001) (It is clear now 
that the disparate-impact regulations do not simply apply § 601since they 
indeed forbid conduct that § 601 permitsand therefore clear that the private 
right of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce these 
regulations.). 
 125. See, e.g., Chandamuri v. Georgetown Univ., 274 F. Supp. 2d 71, 8182 
(D.D.C. 2003) (drawing on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to ex-
plain why bans on discrimination must include protection from retaliation); cf. 
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10 (1998) (explaining that retalia-
tion for exercising a constitutional right offends the Constitution [because] it 
threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right, and is thus akin to an 
unconstitutional condition demanded for the receipt of a government benefit 
provided). 
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is an actual constitutional right at stake. Punishing someone 
for doing something that does not amount to the exercise of a 
constitutional right does not trigger the doctrines protection.  
For example, the Court has held that depriving women of 
Medicaid funds for abortion does not place an unconstitutional 
condition on the exercise of the abortion right because the abor-
tion right includes only the right to freedom from government 
obstruction, and not a right to equal subsidization or to actually 
obtain an abortion.126 Of course, the framing of the right at 
stake in the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is famously 
malleable, as much scholarship demonstrates.127 Nevertheless, 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions requires an asser-
tion that an actual constitutional right is burdened.128 The re-
taliation claim, on the other hand, forbids retaliation for assert-
ing discrimination even if the underlying conduct did not 
amount to unlawful discrimination. The retaliation right is 
thus distinct from the right to nondiscrimination in a way that 
protection from unconstitutional conditions is not distinct from 
the underlying constitutional right. 
The Jackson majoritys second attempt to reconcile retalia-
tion with intentional discrimination under existing law is no 
more satisfying. In reasoning that appears to provide an alter-
native rationale from the cover-up theory criticized above, the 
majority accepted retaliation as a form of intentional discrimi-
 
 126. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 
464, 479 (1977). 
 127. See, e.g., David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting 
Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 
67980 (1992) (criticizing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions for its in-
sensitivity to the constitutional values central to the underlying right); Seth F. 
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive 
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 132426 (1984) (critiquing the distinction be-
tween positive and negative rights as it is used to demarcate unconstitutional 
conditions); Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 15556 
(1996) (explaining the circularity of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
because it does not specify the nature of the rights to be protected and fails to 
specify whether the parameters of those rights are contingent upon the grant-
ing of the benefit); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1413, 141617 (1989) (summarizing inconsistencies in the 
Courts application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions). 
 128. See Sullivan, supra note 127, at 1427 (explaining that the constitu-
tional interest at issue must rise to the level of a recognized right in order to 
trigger the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Why 
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With Particular 
Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990) (argu-
ing for the elimination of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions altogether 
because it obscures central questions about the scope of the underlying right). 
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nation because the retaliation claim is an important remedy to 
effectuate the statutes ban on intentional discrimination. As 
the Court observed, Title IXs remedial scheme would greatly 
suffer without protection from retaliation.129 The Court is cer-
tainly correct that protection from retaliation plays an impor-
tant remedial role in effectuating a ban on discrimination, and 
retaliation has often been described as remedial in nature.130 
By invoking the remedial rationale, the Court suggested the 
possibility that even if retaliation itself is not a species of inten-
tional discrimination, it should still be encompassed by the 
statute because it is an important part of an effective remedial 
scheme for eradicating intentional discrimination.131 
However, this way of relating retaliation to discrimination, 
as a useful remedy to effectuate the protected right, also runs 
afoul of Sandoval: the same could be said for the regulation 
covering disparate impact struck down in that case. Because 
proving intent is difficult, regulating practices that impose dis-
 
 129. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1508 (2005) 
(Reporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX enforcement and 
would be discouraged if retaliation against those who report went unpunished. 
Indeed, if retaliation were not prohibited, Title IXs enforcement scheme would 
unravel.); id. (Moreover, teachers and coaches such as Jackson are often in 
the best position to vindicate the rights of their students because they are bet-
ter able to identify discrimination and bring it to the attention of administra-
tors. Indeed, sometimes adult employees are the only effective adversar[ies] 
of discrimination in schools. (alteration in original) (quoting Sullivan v. Little 
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969))). 
 130. See, e.g., id. (citing Congresss twin purposes of avoiding federal sub-
sidization of discrimination and providing individuals protection from dis-
crimination, and stating that those objectives would be difficult, if not impos-
sible, to achieve if persons who complain about sex discrimination did not have 
effective protection against retaliation (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, 
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005) (No. 02-1672))); 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (describing the retaliation 
right in remedial terms, and stating that the purpose of the retaliation claim 
is to maintain unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms). 
 131. Legal scholars have questioned whether there really is a meaningful 
distinction between rights and remedies, or whether remedial choices merge 
with, and modify, underlying rights. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Re-
sistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and 
Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999). Without intending to 
take a position on this larger question, the discussion here, analyzing the im-
plications of Sandoval, assumes a separateness between remedy and right, 
largely because the Supreme Courts decision in Sandoval insists on such a 
distinction. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (rejecting the 
idea that it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as 
are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose expressed by a 
statute (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964))). 
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proportionate harm on suspect classes without adequate jus-
tification could be rationalized as a useful remedy for address-
ing intentional discrimination that would otherwise go unchal-
lenged. Indeed, this may be the best explanation for Griggs v. 
Duke Power, which held that Title VIIs ban on discrimination 
includes practices with a discriminatory effect and lacking in 
business necessity.132 While surely not every practice struck 
down as disparate impact serves as a remedy to unlawful in-
tentional discrimination, by the same token, not every success-
ful retaliation claim serves as a remedy for unlawful inten-
tional discrimination. As explained above, a successful 
retaliation claim may not necessarily stem from opposition to 
actual discrimination. Moreover, like the disparate impact 
regulation in Sandoval, the retaliation regulation is not strictly 
necessary as a remedy for intentional discrimination. Not all 
institutions retaliate and not every individual would be de-
terred from challenging unlawful discrimination even if they 
did. Recognizing a private right of action for retaliation merely 
because it is a useful remedy to effectuate the ban on inten-
tional discrimination cannot be reconciled with Sandovals em-
phatic refusal to infer that Congress meant to create a private 
right of action merely because doing so would create necessary 
and useful remedies for enforcing statutory rights.133 Perhaps 
this is why the Court in Jackson did not stand on the remedial 
rationale alone, and instead repeatedly and emphatically re-
turned to its insistence that retaliation is itself a form of inten-
tional discrimination on the basis of sex.134 
 
 132. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); see, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Struc-
tural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. LAW REV. 
(forthcoming 2006) (explaining the appeal of disparate impact doctrine as a 
means of reaching employer practices which serve as a cover for intentional 
discrimination, and citing sources explaining disparate impact doctrine on this 
ground); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 46667 (2001) (Disparate im-
pact cases of the first generation type also derived their moral bite and legiti-
macy from the prior era of deliberate exclusion, although they never fit neatly 
into the dominant antidiscrimination paradigm. Discriminatory application 
procedures and tests were problematic because they perpetuated patterns of 
past deliberate, systemic exclusion or reflected ongoing, though unstated, in-
tentional exclusion.). 
 133. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 28687. 
 134. See supra notes 11921 and accompanying text. 
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3. The Promise of Jackson and the Possibilities for  
Further Theorizing 
The Courts most notable and promising effort to make 
room for retaliation within the rubric of intentional discrimina-
tion appears in its discussion of a further difficulty: the retalia-
tion claimant may not be among the class of persons targeted 
by the alleged discrimination. The Board of Education in Jack-
son had argued, with success in the Eleventh Circuit, that even 
if Title IX encompassed protection from retaliation, Mr. Jack-
son could not invoke it since he was outside the class of persons 
protected by the statute.135 As was the case in Jackson, retalia-
tion claims are often brought by persons who are not them-
selves the targets of the alleged discrimination, but who object 
to perceived discrimination on behalf of others.136 This compli-
cation poses an added difficulty for situating retaliation as a 
form of intentional discrimination. Even if the retaliation 
against the target of discrimination counts as intentional dis-
crimination, notwithstanding the difficulties discussed above, 
there is a further challenge in explaining how a third person, 
one not subjected to the underlying alleged discriminatory con-
duct, experiences discrimination on the basis of sex when he or 
she is punished for complaining of discrimination against 
someone else. 
One possible escape from this difficulty might be to recog-
nize a form of third-party standing in which the target of the 
retaliation is permitted to assert the nondiscrimination rights 
of others. However, third-party standing is not an adequate so-
lution. Although some courts have recognized broad third-party 
standing to challenge discrimination against other persons, 
these cases differ from retaliation claims in important re-
spects.137 In the retaliation claim, the retaliation claimant 
bears the brunt of the retaliatory harm, and the injury is direct 
 
 135. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1346 (11th Cir. 
2002), revd, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005). 
 136. See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 577 (6th Cir. 
2000) (holding that a high-level affirmative action officer had a viable retalia-
tion claim due to his advocacy on behalf of women and minorities); Eichman v. 
Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 597 F.2d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1979) (upholding a 
retaliation claim brought by a university faculty member who alleged that he 
was fired after aiding a woman who was trying to exercise her Title VII rights 
to retain her job). 
 137. For a discussion of the third-party standing cases, see Noah D. Zatz, 
Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup Soli-
darity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 8391 (2002). 
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and palpable. In Jackson, for example, the firing of the coach is 
more than an extension of any sex-based harm to the female 
students, who may or may not experience harm from the firing 
of their coach.138 As the social science literature discussed 
above demonstrates, persons who challenge inequality face 
very real and substantial costs for doing so.139 The problem is 
not one of standing, but of linking the retaliation back to the 
ban on intentional discrimination. In the third-party standing 
cases, on the other hand, the injury stems from the original dis-
crimination, and the doctrine of standing is stretched to allow 
someone else to assert the injury on behalf of another. Perhaps 
for this reason, the Court in Jackson did not rely on third-party 
standing to support retaliation claims brought by persons who 
are not the targets of the underlying discrimination.140 
Instead, in a tantalizing move that begins to reveal the 
lengths to which the Courts decision stretches the boundaries 
of intentional discrimination, the Court suggested that on the 
basis of sex does not necessarily refer to the plaintiff s own sex 
or require the status-based differential treatment of the indi-
vidual plaintiff. Distinguishing Title IX from Title VII, the 
Court noted that it might have reached a different result for re-
taliation claims brought by persons not themselves subjected to 
the underlying discrimination if the statute had stated that no 
person shall be subjected to discrimination on the basis of such 
individuals sex.141 The Courts shift to disentangle intentional 
discrimination from the status-based differential treatment of 
individuals holds great promise for resting retaliation claims on 
a more secure foundation in discrimination law, and for reshap-
ing discrimination law itself. However, the Court stopped short 
of the implications of this opening, resting on a minor linguistic 
difference between Title IX and other discrimination statutes 
 
 138. It is possible, for example, that the students in a case like Jackson 
might dislike their coach and would not experience injury from the retaliation 
he experienced. Although relational harms from retaliation probably exist in 
the vast majority of cases, given the likelihood of some affinity between the 
targets of discrimination and the persons who take up their cause, such rela-
tional harms should not serve as a proxy for the harm to the target of the re-
taliation. 
 139. See supra notes 3452 and accompanying text. 
 140. 125 S. Ct. at 1507 (explaining that retaliation claims extend to those 
who oppose discrimination against others); id. at 1505 & n.1 (refusing to limit 
Sullivan to a mere decision about standing and instead reading it to interpret 
a general prohibition on racial discrimination to cover retaliation against 
those who advocate the rights of groups protected by that prohibition). 
 141. Id. at 1507 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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that is weak and ultimately unpersuasive. As Justice Thomas 
correctly noted in his dissent, the terms, on the basis of sex, 
because of sex and because of such individuals sex have 
long been viewed as interchangeable.142 Moreover, cases 
brought under Title IX, no less than other nondiscrimination 
statutes, have required the plaintiff to prove that she herself 
was subjected to differential treatment based on her protected 
class status.143 The Courts attempt to stem the broader impli-
cations of disentangling the ban on intentional discrimination 
from status-based differential treatment with the language of 
Title IX falls far short of a compelling rationale. In the end, the 
Court simply retreated to its emphatic assertion that the plain-
tiff in Jackson had indeed experienced discrimination on the 
basis of sex because he was punished for complaining about sex 
discrimination, without resolving the difficulties with this ap-
proach under existing discrimination law, as elaborated 
above.144 
Neither the majority opinion in Jackson nor the lower 
court litigation over the private right of action controversy has 
fully engaged the complexity of situating retaliation as a form 
of intentional discrimination as currently framed. The better 
approach is to recognize the malleability of intentional dis-
crimination in legal discourse and to shift the boundaries of 
that category to make room for retaliation claims. Recognizing 
retaliation as a species of intentional discrimination has the po-
tential to push the scope and boundaries of discrimination law 
in constructive directions and to bring the law closer to its ani-
mating ideals. Rather than limiting discrimination to the 
status-based differential treatment of individuals, discrimina-
tion law should be understood as aspiring to secure two related 
objectives: (1) dismantling unjust systems of privilege by pro-
tecting outliers and challengers of the gender/racial order; and 
(2) furthering the democratic values of equal citizenship. Re-
taliation implicates both of these values and deserves protec-
tion under discrimination law on these grounds. As im- 
 
 
 142. Id. at 1511 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 1512 (citing Title IX cases). 
 144. Id. at 1507 (majority opinion) (Where the retaliation occurs because 
the complainant speaks out about sex discrimination, the on the basis of sex 
requirement is satisfied. The complainant is himself a victim of discriminatory 
retaliation, regardless of whether he was the subject of the original com-
plaint.). 
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portantly, recognizing retaliation as a species of discrimination 
promotes an understanding of discrimination law consistent 
with these objectives. 
B. REFOCUSING ON PRIVILEGE AND THE RESISTANCE TO  
RACIST AND SEXIST NORMS 
Situating retaliation as intentional discrimination requires 
stepping outside the framework of status-based differential 
treatment and into a broader conception of discrimination as 
the maintenance of race and gender privilege. Retaliation, 
functioning as it does to maintain social hierarchies and punish 
outliers, fits well within such a framework. 
The questions raised above concerning retaliation and its 
relationship to intentional discrimination revisit ongoing de-
bates about the scope and meaning of the antidiscrimination 
principle. One site in these debates is the contested space left 
by the Supreme Courts decision in Hopkins v. Price-
Waterhouse.145 In that case, the Court ruled that sex stereotyp-
ing is a form of sex discrimination, upholding the plaintiff s 
claim that she was denied partnership in the accounting firm 
because she defied the firms expectations of how she should 
perform her femininity.146 Writing for a plurality, Justice 
Brennan wrote, [w]e are beyond the day when an employer 
could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they 
matched the stereotype associated with their group.147 Al-
though Justice Brennans language suggests little tolerance for 
sex stereotyping or gender role policing of any kind, the deci-
sion lends itself to competing interpretations, fueling the con-
troversy over the scope of the antidiscrimination principle. 
One of the broader interpretations of this precedent is that 
gender privilege, and the punishment of persons who challenge 
the gender order, amounts to unlawful discrimination. This 
view could potentially unsettle Title VII decisions upholding 
employer prerogatives to bar employees from dressing in ways 
that fail to conform to traditional gender roles, such as by firing 
men who wear earrings or requiring women, but not men, to 
wear skirts.148 It also calls into question rules punishing gay 
 
 145. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 146. Id. at 258. 
 147. Id. at 251. 
 148. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrahs Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1083 
(9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a Title VII claim by female bartender challenging 
rule requiring female beverage servers to wear make-up); Baker v. Cal. Land 
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men and lesbians for defying sex role expectations through 
their attraction to persons of the same sex, disrupting case law 
drawing the boundaries of sex discrimination law to exclude 
sexual orientation bias.149 Increasingly, a number of recent 
court decisions have accepted this broad reading of Hopkins 
and have applied the antidiscrimination principle to weed out 
gender role policing, or the punishment of persons for trans-
gressing gender privilege.150 Applied broadly, this principle has 
 
Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974) (upholding different hair-length and 
grooming requirements for men and women under equal employment oppor-
tunity provision of the Civil Rights Act); Oiler v. Winn Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-
3114, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417, at *2532 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (reject-
ing a male plaintiff s Title VII allegation that he was fired for failing to con-
form to gender stereotypes by cross-dressing). But see Frank v. United Air-
lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that gender-specific weight 
requirements challenged by female flight attendants violated Title VII); 
Fischer v. Portland, No. CV 02-1728, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20453, at *28 (D. 
Or. Sept. 27, 2004) (upholding a female plaintiff s Title VII claim that she was 
harassed for being a lesbian who wore mens clothes to work, wore no make-up 
and wore a short masculine hairstyle, finding that plaintiff showed sufficient 
evidence that she was harassed for not conforming to traditional gender 
stereotypes, and denying defendants motion for summary judgment); Tronetti 
v. Healthnet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(Sc), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23757, at *12, 15 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (upholding a transsexuals claim of 
sex discrimination that he was fired for failing to act like a man); Barnes v. 
City of Cincinnati, No. C-1-00-780, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26207, at *17 (S.D. 
Ohio Mar. 8, 2002) (denying an employers motion for summary judgment 
where the male plaintiff was fired for cross-dressing and not conforming to 
masculine stereotypes). 
 149. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 
259 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding the district courts grant of summary judgment 
for the defendant, where the plaintiff s sex-based harassment claim was based 
on sexual orientation rather than sex); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 
F.2d 327, 32930 (9th Cir. 1979) (ruling that sexual orientation discrimination 
is outside the bounds of Title VII), abrogated by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. En-
ters., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 150. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 57175 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(relying on Hopkins in support of decision reversing grant of summary judg-
ment by the district court in a sex discrimination claim by a transsexual fire-
fighter who alleged harassment and retaliation because of his nonconforming 
gender identity as a male to female transsexual); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 
Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 106364 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that an em-
ployees sexual orientation neither provides for nor precludes a claim for sex-
ual harassment); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 
2001) (upholding a Title VII claim alleging anti-gay harassment on a gender 
stereotyping theory); Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, No. 02-3157, 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8521, at *56 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 2003) (accepting a plaintiff s gen-
der stereotyping theory to support the hostile work environment claim for har-
assment based on sexual orientation, but ultimately rejecting the claim for 
lack of severity or pervasiveness); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 
(D. Mass. 2002) (rejecting the defendants motion for summary judgment on 
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the potential to challenge systems of gender privilege that ele-
vate traditional versions of masculinity and femininity above 
alternative nonconformist performances of gender identity. 
Numerous legal scholars have pressed the case for recon-
structing discrimination law to dismantle systems of race and 
gender privilege.151 Professor Stephanie Wildman, a leading 
theorist who has advocated such a shift, defines privilege as 
the systematic conferral of benefit and advantage, usually re-
ferring to the unjust allocation of privilege along historically 
problematic lines such as race and gender.152 She advocates a 
reorientation of discrimination law to spotlight how power sys-
tems of race, gender, and sexual orientation regenerate dis-
criminatory patterns that maintain hierarchies of oppres-
sion.153 She is critical of narrow constructions of discrimination 
law focusing on differential treatment based on specific identity 
categories, and of the laws complacency with respect to power 
systems that operate within and across such categories to sus-
tain unjust privilege. Professor Wildman argues that the lan-
guage of discrimination law is sufficiently broad to encompass 
the disruption of systems of privilege, and criticizes courts that 
decline to take the doctrine in that direction.154 
This broad conception of the antidiscrimination principle 
has not gone unchallenged. A narrower view, and still the 
dominant view in the courts, is that the Court in Hopkins 
merely articulated a variant of the prevailing anti-
differentiation principle.155 Under this interpretation, the prob-
 
the plaintiff s claim that he was harassed for not measuring up to his co-
workers stereotypes about masculinity); Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 108991 (D. Minn. 2000) (denying the defendants 
motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff s Title IX claim alleging har-
assment based on sexual orientation because even though Title IX does not 
cover sexual orientation discrimination, the plaintiff established that he was 
harassed for not meeting his peers expectations of masculinity).  
 151. See, e.g., BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE: WHITE RACE 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW 1718 (1998) (urging a reformulation of dis-
crimination law that acknowledges and renounces white privilege); Ehren-
reich, supra note 9, at 255, 275 (urging advocacy focused on interlocking sys-
tems of oppression); Symposium, Whiteness: Some Critical Perspectives, 18 
WASH. U. J. L. & POLY (forthcoming 2005). 
 152. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE 
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 29 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic 
eds., 1996). 
 153. Id. at 5, 2728. 
 154. Id. at 2933. 
 155. See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (rejecting application of the Hopkins theory to a claim involving 
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lem in the case was that women, but not men, faced a Catch-22: 
all employees had to exhibit masculine traits to succeed in the 
partnership, but only women were penalized for doing so.156 
This interpretation would have a narrower scope and would not 
upset the kinds of practices described above. An anti-
differentiation principle would permit institutional practices 
that privilege traditional forms of masculinity and femininity 
so long as men and women have an equal opportunity to con-
form to their respective gender roles without incurring dispa-
rate penalties for doing so. 
Debates over the scope and limits of discrimination law 
continue to percolate in a variety of doctrinal areas. The mean-
ing of any legal prohibition against discrimination is contested 
and unstable, vacillating between formal equality and anti-
differentiation and a broader, more far-reaching understanding 
in which discrimination law functions as a vehicle for interro-
gating entrenched systems of race and gender privilege. The 
recognition of retaliation as implicit in the nondiscrimination 
guarantee bolsters this latter understanding and is best seen as 
one more push to redefine discrimination to include punishing 
departures from a social order bounded by race and gender. 
 
anti-gay harassment); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 
26465 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting a Title VII harassment case where the har-
assment occurred because of sexual orientation and not sex); Simonton v. 
Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (granting the defendants motion for 
summary judgment on the plaintiff s claim of anti-gay harassment by co-
workers where there was no basis in the record to surmise that [the plaintiff] 
behaved in a stereotypically feminine manner and that the harassment he en-
dured was, in fact, based on his non-conformity with gender norms instead of 
his sexual orientation); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 108586 
(7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the plaintiff s claim for anti-gay harassment where 
the unfavorable treatment was because of work conflicts and the plaintiff s 
apparent homosexuality and his perceived desire for some sort of physical in-
timacy with them[,] and not because of his sex); Martin v. N.Y. State Dept. of 
Corr. Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d 434, 44647 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting the plain-
tiff s Title VII harassment claim where [t]he torment endured by [the plain-
tiff], as reprehensible as it is, relates to his sexual orientation, and he failed 
to show that the harassment he endured was, in fact, based on his non-
conformity with gender norms instead of his orientation (citing Simonton v. 
Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 156. Justice Brennans opinion also might be read to support this view, fo-
cusing on the Catch-22 language instead of the broader antistereotyping lan-
guage quoted supra note 147 and accompanying text. See Hopkins v. Price-
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (An employer who objects to aggres-
siveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an 
intolerable and impermissible Catch-22: out of a job if they behave aggres-
sively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.). 
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Recognizing retaliation as a species of discrimination helps 
construct discrimination law to encompass challenges to unjust 
privilege and to move beyond securing class-neutral treatment 
of individuals. This understanding best captures what retalia-
tion is about and why it is a form of intentional discrimination. 
As the earlier discussion of social science literature illustrates, 
retaliation silences opposition to inequality and punishes per-
sons for challenging racism and sexism. By enforcing silence 
and acquiescence, retaliation protects privilege and sustains its 
invisibility.157 Opposition to discrimination has the potential to 
disrupt systems of privilege by rendering the privilege visible. 
When retaliation intervenes to punish such opposition, it pre-
serves privilege by punishing challenges to race and gender hi-
erarchy. By protecting persons who oppose inequality, dis-
crimination law, through the retaliation claim, promotes the 
construction of antiracist and antisexist identities and facili-
tates the destabilization of unjust systems of privilege. 
Conceptualizing retaliation in this way offers a number of 
advantages for discrimination law. At the outset, it shifts the 
focus from neutral, individualistic status-based treatment to 
questions of illegitimate privilege and the importance of con-
testing inequality.158 The retaliation claim recognizes and pro-
tects the value of resisting inequality in particular social and 
institutional settings. By protecting against retaliation, the 
claim focuses on the discourses that shape social equality, 
which discourses get protected, and why. It conceives of dis-
crimination as a social practice, rather than an abstract neutral 
principle of equal treatment. The conception of discrimination 
that it rests upon is contingent, rather than static, and histori-
cally grounded. 
Equally important, this understanding of why discrimina-
tion law encompasses retaliation claims permits a more fluid 
conception of social identity than that offered by the anti-
differentiation approach. In a retaliation claim, it is not a per-
sons fixed status-based identity that triggers legal protection, 
 
 157. See WILDMAN, supra note 152, at 8 ([S]ilence in the face of privilege 
sustains its invisibility.); id. at 30 ([P]erhaps most important, privilege is not 
visible to the holder of the privilege.); id. at 107 (explaining that silence 
about privilege ensures its perpetuation). 
 158. See also Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and 
Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217, 235
36 (1993) (describing privilege as unearned power that is systematically con-
ferred and suggesting an awareness of this privilege is necessary to challeng-
ing race and gender hierarchies). 
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but rather her participation in a discourse that challenges ine-
quality.159 By encompassing retaliation claims, discrimination 
law protects the subjects identity-formation instead of taking a 
passive, preexisting identity as the starting point.160 So under-
stood, the retaliation claim is less vulnerable to the radical cri-
tique of equality rights that requiring subjects to claim a fixed 
and stable social identity reinforces the very categories that 
enable systems of race and gender privilege to continue.161 Be-
cause the trigger for protection is the subjects actions and not 
her status as a member of a social group, the retaliation claim 
creates the possibility of challenging inequality without further 
solidifying the categories of race or gender.162 The retaliation 
claimant need not establish that she was treated worse as a 
woman, but rather that she was penalized for challenging sex-
ist practices, thus avoiding unintentionally reinforcing an es-
sentialist view of what it means to be a woman in the course 
 
 159. Of course, the challengers own racial or gender identity is not com-
pletely separate from the challenge to inequality and the resulting punish-
ment. Expectations about proper social roles are certainly shaped by racial, 
gender, sexuality, and other components of an individuals identity. See Zatz, 
supra note 137, at 10809 (contending that punishing intergroup solidarity is 
a form of stereotyping in which institutions monitor and regulate social inter-
actions based on the targets identity status). But the retaliation claim does 
not depend on any particularized identity status of the target. For example, 
both a white person and an African American who challenge racism risk pun-
ishment for not acting consistent with white privilege, and both would have a 
retaliation claim for the resulting retribution. 
 160. Seen in this light, discrimination laws inclusion of the retaliation 
claim is an example of the potential for laws acceptance of the theoretical turn 
to performative theories of identity. See, e.g., Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, 
The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 717 (2001) (ex-
plaining that discrimination targets people not just for their status but for 
how they perform their identity). Retaliation can be seen as the policing and 
punishment of antisexist and antiracist identities, or the enforced suppression 
or covering of these identities. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 
769 (2002) (developing a theory of coveringor downplaying ones underly-
ing identityas an underexamined form of oppression). By embracing the re-
taliation claim, discrimination law protects performances of identity that chal-
lenge the rigidity of status hierarchies. 
 161. See Wendy Brown, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights, in LEFT LEGAL-
ISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 42034 (Wendy Brown & Janey Halley eds., 2002) (elabo-
rating a critique of identity-based nondiscrimination rights). 
 162. Cf. WILDMAN, supra note 152, at 23 (criticizing categorical thinking 
for obscuring the complexity of the individual); Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern 
Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1075 
(1992) (Only when sex means more than male or female, only when the word 
woman cannot be coherently understood, will oppression by sex be fatally un-
dermined.). 
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of asserting a sex equality right.163 By leaving more room for 
the complexity of the subject, the retaliation claim enhances 
the potential for the subjects role in subverting the categories 
of race and gender.164 At the same time, the retaliation claim 
avoids one of the greatest pitfalls of postmodernism: the move 
to transcend the reality of social groups by exposing their fluid-
ity.165 The retaliation claim does not seek to rise above or deny 
the reality of social groups; rather it protects discourses that 
challenge the rigidity and status hierarchies of social groups.166 
With such a theoretical grounding, the retaliation claim is well-
positioned to prompt a rethinking of the regulation of social 
identities and how equality law can best disrupt systems of 
race and gender oppression.167 
A related advantage to this theorizing of retaliation is that 
it acknowledges the oppressiveness of systems of subordination 
while simultaneously recognizing and protecting the agency of 
persons caught up in those systems.168 The retaliation claim fo-
 
 163. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 161, at 422 (To have a right as a woman 
is not to be free of being designated and subordinated by gender. Rather, 
though it may entail some protection from the most immobilizing features of 
that designation, it reinscribes the designation as it protects us, and thus en-
ables our further regulation through that designation.). 
 164. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female 
Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479 (1994) (discussing the need for discrimination 
law to recognize the complexity of subjects in addressing their discrimination 
claims). 
 165. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About 
Women?, 1 UCLA WOMENS L.J. 15, 22 (1991) (urging the importance of a 
continued focus on the situation of working women as a social group); Catha-
rine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687, 
694700 (2000) (criticizing postmodernist critiques of feminism for ignoring 
social reality); cf. Ehrenreich, supra note 9, at 255 ([I]t is crucial that we re-
tain some method for talking meaningfully about groups, for preserving no-
tions of identity.). 
 166. Cf. NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON 
THE POSTSOCIALIST CONDITION 167 (1997) ([W]e can accept the critique of 
essentialism without becoming postfeminists.). 
 167. Cf. id. at 166 (Complex, shifting, discursively constructed social iden-
tities provide an alternative to reified, essentialist conceptions of gender iden-
tity, on the one hand, and to simple negations and dispersals of identity, on 
the other.); WILDMAN, supra note 152, at 3133 (explaining that law en-
trenches privilege when it allows the punishment of those who refuse to acqui-
esce in privilege, and emphasizing that the choice of a privileged person in 
how to respond to privilege is not exercised independent of law). 
 168. See, e.g., ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND 
RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 11114 (1999) (offering a 
dynamic yet constrained view of group agency in which subordinated groups 
are simultaneously constrained by subordinating systems and actively engag-
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cuses on the claimants choices and actions challenging inequal-
ity. For this reason, it is less vulnerable to the criticism of anti-
subordination theories for emphasizing seamless structures of 
inequality that dominate passive victims.169 By providing space 
for persons to oppose inequality, discrimination law has the po-
tential to expose the rifts and fissures in systems of dominance 
and make room for them to be contested, bringing discrimina-
tion law closer to realizing its emancipatory potential.170 
Finally, this understanding of why discrimination law en-
compasses retaliation shifts the focus from the discriminators 
prejudicial intent to his or her actions in shutting down opposi-
tion to inequality. Instead of an inquiry into the actors racist or 
sexist mindset, the analysis centers on the silencing of dis-
courses that challenge how an institution practices race and 
gender privilege. This formulation offers a conception of dis-
crimination as premised not on the discriminators subjective 
mindset, but on the preservation of race or gender privilege and 
the suppression of challenges to them. 
C. ADDING CONTENT TO EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 
In addition to challenging narrow constructions of dis-
crimination law, recognizing retaliation as a form of discrimi-
nation promotes important values and aspirations underlying 
discrimination law, giving added weight to the reasons why we 
care about discrimination in the first place. The retaliation 
claim furthers the democratic values at the foundation of laws 
nondiscrimination guarantee. 
One of the core values underlying discrimination law is the 
desire to facilitate a system of democratic governance based on 
an ideal of equal citizenship. The value choices reflected in dis-
crimination law cannot be understood without some apprecia-
tion of how they enhance democracy and the legitimacy of de-
mocratic outcomes. One of the leading theories for explaining 
 
ing in resistance against those systems). 
 169. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 8, at 581, 61213 (criticizing the antisub-
ordinationists focus on female victimhood for being untrue to the experience of 
black women who have formed their identity largely through creative action 
rather than shared victimhood); Mahoney, supra note 158, at 217 (criticizing 
the antisubordination approach for overemphasizing the victimization of 
women and adopting a view of gender oppression that centers on what is done 
to women). 
 170. I am loosely borrowing this phrase from Nancy Fraser, who has 
lauded the emancipatory potential of oppositional practice. See FRASER, su-
pra note 166, at 162. 
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the moral force of discrimination law, the process theory advo-
cated by John Hart Ely and others, justifies strictly scrutiniz-
ing legislative decisions motivated by racism on the ground 
that such stigma poisons democratic outcomes by thwarting the 
legislatures ability to act with due regard for the interests of 
all citizens.171 As Andrew Koppelman has explained, under this 
theory, racist preferences that target a discrete and insular mi-
nority are problematic because they undermine the very reason 
for respecting democratic outcomes in the first place.172 Our le-
gal systems respect for the outcomes of democratic processes is 
premised on an equal respect for people and their choices. Cer-
tain preferences, such as those based on racism and sexism, are 
illegitimate because they deny the respect to persons as equal 
citizens that is at the foundation of democracy.173 
This understanding of discrimination as poisoning the out-
comes of the democratic process is not limited to discrimination 
by government actors. Similar reasons justify the extension of 
statutory prohibitions on discrimination to certain non-
governmental institutions, such as workplaces and schools.174 
The extension of statutory discrimination law to private actors 
reflects the recognition that some nongovernmental institutions 
also serve important functions in sustaining a democracy based 
on equal citizenship. Workplaces and schools, for example, play 
an important aspirational role in constructing the norms and 




 171. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 14557 (1980) (explaining that strictly scrutinizing legisla-
tive classifications which disadvantage discrete and insular minorities pro-
motes equal concern and respect for all persons); see also RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at xii, 272 (1978) (explaining that the right to 
equality is fundamental); Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term
Foreword: In Defense of the Anti-Discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
78 (1976) (explaining that, despite the fact that some race-dependent deci-
sions are rational, many are based on assumptions of the differential worth of 
racial groups, which must then be protected by antidiscrimination laws). 
 172. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUAL-
ITY 3839 (1996). 
 173. Id. at 39 (arguing that racist preferences must be excluded under both 
Elys and Dworkins theories because allowing racism to influence decision 
making would contradict the very reasons for valuing a democratic decision-
making process). 
 174. Id. at 14 (Antidiscrimination law reaches private action because some 
private actors are held to the same obligation not to discriminate that gov-
ernment has (whatever that obligation may be).). 
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ceed. Racism and sexism within these institutions undermine 
their ability to foster the conditions necessary for equal citizen-
ship. 
The full extension of discrimination law to certain nongov-
ernmental actors is particularly important and justified in light 
of the turn toward privatization of formerly public processes for 
resolving disputes within these institutions. In recent years, le-
gal standards have shifted to favor internal and less formal 
mechanisms for resolving discrimination complaints, especially 
in institutions such as workplaces and schools, prior to or in-
stead of litigation and other government-controlled proc-
esses.175 These developments have made equal citizenship 
guarantees all the more essential within these institutions. The 
public nature of such dispute resolution processes should not be 
obscured by the redirection of official responsibility into private 
hands. Just as fair and unbiased treatment in the judicial proc-
ess is critical to equal citizenship guarantees, so should the le-
gally sanctioned use of internal grievance procedures be ac-
countable to the demands of equal citizenship. 
Discrimination law, as applied to both government actors 
and nongovernmental institutions, seeks to promote practices 
conducive to equal citizenship. As Andrew Koppelman has ex-
plained, in order to encourage these practices, discrimination 
law must strive to eliminate the source of illegitimate prefer-
ences by eradicating racism and sexism in the broader culture 
and society, as well as within specific institutions.176 Only then 
can the legislative and policy outcomes of the democratic proc-





 175. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 4 (describing internal mechanisms for re-
solving discrimination complaints in the workplace); see also Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (requiring prior notice to school 
officials followed by deliberate indifference to establish school liability for 
teacher-student sexual harassment); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 
526 U.S. 629 (1999) (same for student-to-student harassment). 
 176. KOPPELMAN, supra note 172, at 4344 (arguing that since even uncon-
scious racist preferences can affect the decision-making process, process the-
ory requires cultural transformation to eliminate racist preferences in decision 
making); id. at 17 (The aspirations of each theorist can only be realized in the 
context of a larger transformative projectone that seeks to eliminate from 
ordinary social life the meanings, practices, and institutions that unjustifiably 
stigmatize and disadvantage some groups.). 
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This account of the democratic underpinnings of discrimi-
nation law, sketched so briefly here, leaves many unanswered 
questions about what it means to be an equal citizen and what 
practices promote the construction of equal citizenship. The re-
taliation claim offers one set of answers to these questions. By 
protecting persons who challenge racism and sexism, the re-
taliation claim furthers equal citizenship in two respects. First, 
it promotes cultural transformation by protecting practices that 
challenge racism and sexism, thereby helping to eradicate the 
roots of the illegitimate preferences that taint democratic out-
comes. And second, it enables coalition building and collective 
opposition to racism and sexism that cuts across social group 
membership. In the process, it protects the construction of 
equal citizens who work together in the pursuit of social change 
and the social bonds that develop through such alliances. 
1. Fostering Cultural Transformation  
If racism and sexism in the broader culture undermine 
equal citizenship and interfere with the proper functioning of 
democracy, then legal protection from retaliation is crucial to 
fulfilling the goals of discrimination law. In a democracy based 
on equal citizenship, there must be sufficient room to contest 
racism and sexism in order to foster cultural transformation 
and eradicate the illegitimate preferences that undercut equal 
citizenship. Retaliation silences complaints about inequality 
and cuts off the deliberation and dissent necessary for cultural 
transformation. When it occurs within schools and workplaces, 
it weakens the capacity of these institutions to promote a fully 
functioning democracy. A deliberative democracy based on 
equal citizenship requires space for people to contest the power 
hierarchies that can distort the ability of the less powerful to 
participate freely in deliberation. Through the retaliation 
claim, discrimination law recognizes that contesting racism and 
sexism is a valuable form of civic participation and integral to 
the values underlying antidiscrimination law.177 
 
 177. In elaborating on the contours of democratic process justifications for 
discrimination law, Professor Koppelman draws on James Liebmans work ap-
plying democratic theory to antidiscrimination law. Id. at 50. As Professor 
Liebmans work explains, the premise that all citizens must be accorded equal 
concern and respect assumes that citizens have an equal capacity to define 
the good for themselves. Id. Unlike Professor Elys theory, which seeks to 
free representatives decision making from prejudice, Professor Liebmans ap-
proach focuses on citizen participation in the political process. Id. The latter 
approach especially supports an understanding of discrimination law that 
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The retaliation claim is particularly well-suited to serve 
the interests of cultural transformation because it focuses on 
persons who challenge institutional practices from within insti-
tutions. Critiques by insiders provide an especially promising 
vehicle for fostering cultural transformation within institu-
tions.178 Challenges to race and sex bias made by persons out-
side the relevant community often generate added resistance 
by virtue of their outsider status, as exemplified by the height-
ened resistance to the civil rights movement based on the no-
tion, however facetious, that the community was fine until out-
siders swooped in to stir up trouble.179 Persons who are part of 
the relevant community are often in the best position to raise 
challenges to that communitys prevailing norms. The value of 
promoting change from within is reflected in the policies of dis-
crimination law that favor the voluntary resolution and preven-
tion of discrimination claims.180 By protecting challenges to ra-
 
provides strong protection for citizen resistance to racist and sexist norms. Id. 
 178. See, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RE-
SPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 40 (1970) (dis-
cussing exit and voice as strategies for prompting organizational change 
and noting that voice plays an especially important role for organizational 
change when the person exercising voice is a member of the organization). 
 179. For an example of a judicial opinion reflecting hostility to outsiders 
from the civil rights movement, see Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539, 
54143 (S.D. Miss. 1962), aff d, 313 F.2d 637 (5th Cir.), in which the district 
court praised the city segregationists and chastised the self-styled Freedom 
Riders who aroused strained racial feelings in challenging racial segrega-
tion in public facilities in Jackson, Mississippi. 
 180. Numerous doctrines in discrimination law favor the prevention of dis-
crimination and the voluntary resolution of discrimination claims without re-
sort to formal legal proceedings. See, e.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 
2342, 2347 (2004) (holding that an employer may defend against constructive 
discharge, absent an official adverse action, by showing (1) that it had in-
stalled a readily accessible and effective policy for reporting and resolving 
complaints of sexual harassment, and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed 
to avail herself of that employer-provided preventive or remedial apparatus); 
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assn, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (barring punitive dam-
ages under Title VII where employer had made a good faith effort to prevent 
discrimination); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) 
(adopting an affirmative defense to vicarious liability for supervisory sexual 
harassment in which defendant may prevail by showing that it acted reasona-
bly to prevent and address sexual harassment, such as by adopting a sexual 
harassment policy, and that plaintiff acted unreasonably in failing to prevent 
or correct the harassment, such as by failing to report it or invoke such a pol-
icy); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (same); Gebser 
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (limiting school liability 
for a teachers sexual harassment of a student to cases in which school officials 
had actual notice of the harassment and responded with deliberate indiffer-
ence); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (adopt-
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cism and sexism from within institutions, the retaliation claim 
serves the same policy objective. 
The sweep of retaliation claims to include persons who are 
not members of the social group targeted by discrimination also 
furthers the goal of cultural transformation. Persons outside 
the class of the targets of discrimination are often better posi-
tioned to oppose discrimination because they are less likely to 
be perceived as overreacting or self-interested.181 Hence it is es-
sential that the retaliation claim protect all persons within in-
stitutions who challenge inequality, including persons who are 
outside of the social group that experiences the discrimination. 
The retaliation claim is also well-suited to foster cultural 
transformation due to the nature of the institutions governed 
by it. The institutions subject to the prohibition on retaliation 
are of special importance in the project of cultural transforma-
tion. Schools and workplaces in particular play important roles 
in the construction of citizens. Such institutions must allow 
space for contesting prevailing race and gender norms if dis-
crimination law is to serve its democracy-enhancing objectives. 
Few other settings are discrete and manageable enough to 
promote the kind of frequent human interaction necessary to 
engage in deliberative practices. 
The Supreme Court recognized the role schools play in 
promoting civic participation in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.182 In explaining why racial segregation violated equal pro-
 
ing the same standard of school liability for student-to-student sexual harass-
ment); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (describing 
the primary objective of Title VII as a prophylactic one in preventing dis-
crimination); cf. Martin H. Malin, Ethical Concerns in Drafting Employment 
Arbitration Agreements After Circuit City and Green Tree, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 
779, 78087 (2003) (discussing the case law favoring mandatory arbitration of 
employment discrimination disputes and the role of legal counsel for employ-
ers in constructing the arbitration process). 
 181. See, e.g., FINE, supra note 52, at 7172 (explaining research showing 
that victims who invoke procedures to address inequities that befall them 
are more likely to appear self-serving and less likely to gain the social support 
necessary to be effective, while non-victims who seek recourse on behalf of 
others are more likely to appear benevolent and to receive praise and rewards 
for doing so); Czopp & Monteith, supra note 43, at 532, 534, 541 (explaining 
research showing that when sources acted in support of their groups interest 
(i.e., their position confirmed group-based expectancies), processing decreased 
among message recipients, and concluding that Blacks and women who con-
fronted others were perceived as overreacting to a greater extent than Whites 
and men even though both the initial biased response and the subsequent con-
frontation were exactly the same). 
 182. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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tection, the Court emphasized the important role of public 
schools in providing a foundation for good citizenship by teach-
ing the values and skills necessary for a well-functioning de-
mocracy.183 More recently, the Court acclaimed the democracy-
enhancing role of universities in Grutter v. Bollinger,184 in 
terms that strongly suggest the importance of teaching civic 
virtue by promoting respect for persons across racial differ-
ences and the importance of diversity in interactions with oth-
ers. Both decisions craft interpretations of equality law based 
partly on the value of promoting the role of education in teach-
ing antistereotyping, and by extension, good citizenship. 
Workplaces too serve as important sites for civic participa-
tion and the construction of citizens.185 In todays society, there 
is little opportunity, other than at work, for adults to hold sus-
tained, in-person discussions and debates about social values 
with a relatively diverse group of fellow citizens.186 The work-
place is a major site for the practice and construction of citizen-
ship based on a model of equal respect.187 Because of the cen-
trality of these institutions to civic engagement, it is especially  
 
 
 183. Id. at 493 (Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expen-
ditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of 
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our 
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the 
very foundation of good citizenship.). 
 184. 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (We have repeatedly acknowledged the over-
riding importance of preparing students for work and citizenship, describing 
education as pivotal to sustaining our political and cultural heritage with a 
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society. This Court has long rec-
ognized that education . . . is the very foundation of good citizenship. For this 
reason, the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions 
of higher education must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or 
ethnicity. (citations omitted)); id. at 333 (crediting the law schools stated 
mission of diminishing the force of . . . stereotypes by admitting a critical 
mass of underrepresented minorities). 
 185. See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORK-
PLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003) (making an excel-
lent case for viewing the workplace as a central site of civic engagement in the 
democratic process). 
 186. Id. at 1225, 6162 (emphasizing the uniqueness of the workplace in 
todays society in terms of closeness with others, a high level of diversity in 
interactions with others, and norms favoring civility in order to work effec-
tively with others). 
 187. Id. at 30 (discussing the workplace as a prominent site of teaching 
civic skills); id. at 11822 (explaining the importance of public discourse in 
democratic theory and why discourses at work are essential to this type of 
public deliberation). 
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important that discrimination law protect persons who partici-
pate in discourses challenging racism and sexism in schools 
and workplaces. 
Finally, and also in furtherance of the project of cultural 
transformation, the retaliation claim allows space for the con-
struction of antiracist and antisexist identities through the 
practice of opposition to racism and sexism. It values and pro-
tects a form of citizenship that is active, participatory, and en-
gaged in cultural transformation. In this way, the retaliation 
claim protects the practice of equal citizenship. The potential 
for cultural transformation is two-fold, derived both from resis-
tance to the discrimination, with the chance that the resistance 
will change institutional practices, and from the construction of 
the challengers identity. Even if the opposition does not ulti-
mately result in changing the challenged practice, it may fur-
ther the challengers own identity as someone who fights ra-
cism or sexism and cares about equality in a wider variety of 
settingsa citizen who practices equal citizenship and regards 
others as equals. In this way, the retaliation claim protects the 
construction of equal citizens through the process of opposition 
to inequality. 
2. Collective Engagement and Social Bonds  
By protecting against retaliation, discrimination law en-
courages the development of social bonds that transcend fixed 
identity categories. The retaliation claim protects oppositional 
practice, as opposed to status-based identity, thus facilitating 
alliances and coalitions centered upon collective challenges to 
inequality.188 Protection from retaliation provides a necessary 
foundation for building social movements within institutions to 
contest racial and sexual hierarchy. By extending protection 
beyond the immediate targets of discrimination to include pro-
tection for any person who opposes it, discrimination law allows 
 
 188. Id. at 26 (discussing the connectedness and solidarity that comes from 
shared opposition to objectionable practices in the workplace); cf. WILDMAN, 
supra note 152, at 45 (explaining the need for white people to examine and 
challenge their own race privilege); Ehrenreich, supra note 9, at 31920 (con-
tending that seeing identity groups as fluid, overlapping and co-constitutive 
entities, rather than as fixed and discrete, problematizes the notion of inter-
group conflict and facilitates the recognition of commonalities); Harris, supra 
note 8, at 612 (advocating alliances between men and women who share a 
feminist political vision, and recognizing how black women especially can con-
struct their identities in opposition to race and sex oppression through crea-
tive action). 
BRAKE_3FMT 10/26/2005 08:40:30 PM 
2005] RETALIATION 75 
 
the mobilization of collective strategies for opposing inequality 
instead of seeing discrimination as only the problem of the tar-
geted individual.189 In the process, it acknowledges the collec-
tive responsibility for addressing discrimination and refuses to 
marginalize sexism and racism as issues belonging exclusively 
to women and people of color.190 The social bonds that develop 
through collective opposition to racism and sexism promote a 
shared interest in the well-being of fellow citizens that is cru-
cial to the equal citizenship model.191 
For equal citizenship to be anything but aspirational, dis-
crimination law must provide sufficient space for contesting 
racist and sexist norms that are inconsistent with equal citi-
zenship. By valuing and protecting a form of civic engagement 
that is actively involved in the opposition to inequality and that 




 189. Cf. SHIRLEY CASTELNUOVO & SHARON R. GUTHRIE, FEMINISM AND 
THE FEMALE BODY: LIBERATING THE AMAZON WITHIN 36 (1998) (advocating 
feminist strategies that seek solutions in a cohesive, group setting, and argu-
ing that only collective action can effectively challenge social norms); FINE, 
supra note 52, at 6364 (criticizing mainstream social psychology literature for 
emphasizing individualist coping strategies, and arguing that individual re-
sponses to injustice often work best for persons in more privileged circum-
stances and may ultimately reinforce and justify existing power inequalities). 
For this reason, the retaliation claim is well-suited to avoid the reverse resis-
tance problem of subtly reinforcing the dominant discourse. Foucault has ar-
gued that reverse resistance discourse is just the flip side of the dominant 
discourse, which it ultimately reinforces. See CASTELNUOVO & GUTHRIE, supra 
at 37. (explaining Foucaults reverse resistance theory). This theory posits 
that, for example, a lesbian who advocates gay and lesbian rights engages in 
reverse resistance by accepting heterosexual power discourse in which sexual-
ity is categorized as normal or abnormal. Id. By defending herself as normal, 
she implicitly accepts the psychological, medical, and legal discourses that link 
sexuality and identity and define heterosexuality as normal. Id. Opposition 
to discrimination by nontargets is more likely to escape the reverse resistance 
problem because it destabilizes the boundaries of protected class status that 
distinguish victims from oppressors. 
 190. Cf. WILDMAN, supra note 152, at 16 (lamenting the ability of members 
of privileged groups to opt out of struggles against oppression, and noting 
that it is a privilege that can be exercised by silence); Crosby, supra note 12, at 
17576 ([A] persons sense of well-being depends not only on his or her per-
sonal situation but also on the situations of others in the society. Mens health, 
for example, has been found to suffer when they work in environments that 
discriminate against women. (citation omitted)). 
 191. See ESTLUND, supra note 185, at 83 (describing [t]he cultivation of 
interpersonal ties across racial lines as a public good that enriches civic and 
social life by promoting a feeling of being in this together that is essential in 
a diverse democracy). 
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claim can play an important role in effectuating the democracy-
enhancing goals of discrimination law.192 In the process, it 
helps add content to the ideal of equal citizenship. 
IV.  RECONSIDERING DOCTRINAL  
LIMITS ON RETALIATION 
As with much discrimination law, the promise of the re-
taliation claim is threatened by the development of restrictive 
doctrine that undercuts its transformative potential. Despite 
the potential of the retaliation claim to strengthen and further 
the antidiscrimination project, courts have imposed doctrinal 
limits that serve to legitimize inequality rather than interro-
gate it. One of the most problematic limits is the requirement 
that the challenger have a reasonable belief that the challenged 
conduct amounts to unlawful discrimination. Through this doc-
trine, courts have reinforced selective and narrow interpreta-
tions of discrimination, while labeling broader conceptions as 
unreasonable. In the process, they have left challengers unpro-
tected if their quest for equality goes beyond the narrowest and 
most minimal of nondiscrimination guarantees. 
A. THE REASONABLE BELIEF DOCTRINE 
To understand how the reasonable belief requirement 
thwarts the potential of retaliation claims, it is necessary to 
provide some background on the structure of retaliation claims 
under Title VII, the original source of the reasonable belief doc-
trine. Two key principles lay the groundwork for this discus-
sion. 
First, and as mentioned earlier, plaintiffs need not prove 
unlawful discrimination as a prerequisite for succeeding on a 
retaliation claim.193 Protection from retaliation would mean lit-
tle if it were otherwise. Most people lack knowledge about 
 
 192. Cf. id. at 10304 (discussing Alexis de Tocquevilles argument that the 
success of democracy hinges on cooperation, empathy, and interdependence 
among different communities in society). 
 193. For a sampling of cases explaining the rationale behind this rule, see 
Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 477 (1st Cir. 2003); Payne v. 
McLemores Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1139 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Parker v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 1980); Sias 
v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978); Hearth v. 
Metro. Transit Commission, 436 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D. Minn. 1977); EEOC v. C 
& D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1975). 
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whether what they perceive as discrimination is actually 
unlawful, and judicial outcomes in discrimination cases fre-
quently depend on the identity of judges and jurors. It would be 
highly risky to complain of discrimination if protection from 
subsequent retaliation depended on first proving unlawful dis-
crimination.194 Moreover, certain discrimination claims require 
prior notice to succeed, leaving claimants in a Catch-22 if com-
plaints of discrimination did not trigger protection from retalia-
tion unless and until the underlying incidents gave rise to a 
claim of unlawful discrimination.195 
A second established principle, also important for under-
standing Title VIIs reasonable belief doctrine in practice, is 
that protection from retaliation extends to participation in for-
mal legal proceedings under Title VII as well as informal, in-
ternal challenges to perceived discrimination. Two separate 
clauses in Title VII extend protection to persons who complain 
of discrimination depending on the form their challenge takes. 
Employees who pursue the redress provided under the statute, 
such as filing or assisting with an EEOC complaint or a law-
suit, are protected by Title VIIs participation clause, which 
protects an employee from retaliation if he or she has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].196 A 
separate clause, known as the opposition clause, makes it 
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his 
employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice 
made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].197 The 
opposition clause extends protection from retaliation to persons 
 
 194. See, e.g., Crumpacker v. Kan. Dept of Human Res., 338 F.3d 1163, 
1172 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the defendant states argument that Congress 
overstepped its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment when it created a 
retaliation action for opposing conduct that falls short of actual unlawful dis-
crimination, and explaining: The determination of what constitutes prohib-
ited conduct under Title VII continually evolves as courts continue to struggle 
with the question of the types of workplace discrimination and harassment 
which are prohibited by Title VII. (citations omitted)). 
 195. See, e.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2347 (2004) (con-
structive discharge); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649-
50 (1999) (student-to-student sexual harassment); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (sexual harassment by a supervisor); Gebser 
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998) (sexual harassment of 
a student by a teacher); Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., 123 F.3d 868, 873 
(6th Cir. 1997) (co-worker sexual harassment). 
 196. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). 
 197. Id. 
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who complain informally of discrimination, stopping short of 
invoking the formal legal machinery of Title VII.198 Such pro-
tection is essential to support Title VII policies favoring the 
prevention of discrimination and the early, informal resolution 
of complaints.199 Charges of discrimination rarely reach the 
EEOC or the courts without some higher-level person first 
learning of the complainants concerns. Without protection from 
retaliation at the early, less formal stages of complaining, chal-
lengers would be chilled from ever complaining or be forced into 
taking formal legal action when informal action might have 
been a more appropriate response, at least initially.200 
As described so far, retaliation law accepts two important 
principles, both of which are fully consistent with the promise 
and objectives of the retaliation claim: first, persons are pro-
tected from retaliation even if the conduct they challenge does 
not rise to the level of unlawful discrimination, and second, 
both formal and informal methods of complaining are pro-
tected. A problem arises from an important qualification courts 
have imposed on these principles which substantially limit the 
ability of persons who complain informally of inequality to ob-
tain protection from retaliation. Courts require a closer prox-
imity between the underlying conduct and the narrow universe 
of unlawful discrimination when the challenger raises her con-
 
 198. There is some uncertainty as to which clause governs participation in 
an employers own investigation of discrimination charges. The categorization 
largely turns on whether the employers investigation responds to or is inde-
pendent of the filing of an EEOC charge. See, e.g., EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., 
Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000) (declining to extend participation 
clause protection to participation in employer internal investigations con-
ducted prior to receiving notice of an EEOC charge); Clover v. Total Sys. 
Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that Title VIIs par-
ticipation clause applies to participation in an employers internal investiga-
tion when it follows notice of an EEOC charge). 
 199. For early cases citing this rationale to justify protection from retalia-
tion for challenging perceived discrimination under the opposition clause, see 
Payne v. McLemores Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1139 (5th Cir. 
1981); Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 1980); 
Hearth v. Metro. Transit Commn, 436 F. Supp. 685, 68889 (D. Minn. 1977). 
 200. See, e.g., Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981). For similar reasons, courts have also protected informal opposition 
under statutes that do not contain an express opposition clause. See, e.g., 
EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992) (extending pro-
tection from retaliation under the Equal Pay Act to a female custodian who 
informally protested gender-based wage discrimination); Davis v. Flexman, 
109 F. Supp. 2d 776, 803 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (interpreting § 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act to encompass protection from retaliation for informally complaining 
of discrimination against the disabled). 
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cerns informally as opposed to participating in formal Title VII 
proceedings. When the challenge counts as participation in 
formal legal proceedings, the employee is protected regardless 
of the merits of the underlying assertion of unlawful discrimi-
nation.201 However, when the challenge occurs more informally, 
outside of an EEOC or judicial proceeding, the claimant must 
have a reasonable belief that the challenged conduct violated 
the statute.202 Because most people informally express their 
opposition to employer practices before resorting to legal action, 
the stricter standard imposed under the opposition clause turns 
out to be a critical gatekeeper.203 Furthermore, the trend to-
ward privatization of discrimination complaints, enforced by 
legal doctrines channeling complaints through internal and in-
 
 201. See, e.g., Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (protecting the plaintiff from retaliation under the participation 
clause even though the plaintiff s testimony was unreasonable). To fail under 
the participation clause, the merits of the underlying complaint must go well 
beyond unreasonableness to the point of being false and malicious. See, e.g., 
Johnson v. ITT Aerospace, 272 F.3d 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing that 
the participation clause does not protect plaintiffs who file frivolous charges 
with the EEOC); Barnes v. Small, 840 F.2d 972, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding 
that the participation clause does not protect employees from making false 
and malicious charges). 
 202. See, e.g., Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) 
(per curiam); EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 
1983); De Anda v. St. Joseph Hosp., 671 F.2d 850, 852 (5th Cir. 1982); Rucker 
v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 203. The added difficulty of proceeding under the opposition clause is not 
solved by the ability to gain broader legal protection from retaliation by par-
ticipating in formal Title VII proceedings. The participation clause applies 
only to retaliation that occurs after the initiation of formal proceedings, and 
not to any retaliatory acts that occurred after the informal opposition to the 
practices but before the formal filing of a Title VII charge. Moreover, there is 
some evidence that courts are beginning to import the objective reasonable-
ness requirement to claims brought under the participation clause as well. See 
Fine v. Ryan Intl Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that it is 
improper to retaliate against an employee for filing a lawsuit based on a rea-
sonable, good faith belief, as long as the claim is not completely groundless); 
Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding 
the plaintiff s participation clause claim where the [p]laintiff could have rea-
sonably believed that he was engaging in protected activity when he filed his 
EEOC complaint); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1454 
(11th Cir. 1998) (stating that courts have not yet resolved whether the partici-
pation clause contains a good faith, reasonable basis requirement); Childress 
v. City of Richmond, 919 F. Supp. 216, 219 (E.D. Va. 1996) (rejecting a group 
of white male officers participation clause claim where their charge of dis-
crimination against women and African Americans amounted to a charge of 
favorable treatment for white males and was spurious under Title VII),  
aff d, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998). 
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formal grievance procedures as a prerequisite to formal legal 
action, makes the reasonable belief doctrine all the more impor-
tant.204 
The Supreme Court recently applied the reasonable belief 
standard to a retaliation claim under Title VIIs opposition 
clause in Clark County School District v. Breeden.205 In a per 
curiam opinion, the Court ruled that the plaintiff s retaliation 
claim failed because she lacked a reasonable, good faith belief  
that the conduct she complained of rose to the level of unlawful 
discrimination.206 The plaintiff in Breeden alleged that during a 
meeting she attended with a male supervisor and a male co-
worker, the two men engaged in sexually explicit dialogue.207 
Specifically, while reviewing psychological evaluation reports of 
job applicants, the supervisor read aloud a comment disclosing 
that one of the applicants had said to a co-worker, I hear mak-
ing love to you is like making love to the Grand Canyon.208 Af-
ter reading the comment aloud, the supervisor looked at the 
plaintiff and said, I dont know what that means.209 The male 
co-worker answered, Well, Ill tell you later, and the two men 
chuckled.210 The plaintiff complained about this exchange to 
the co-worker and the supervisor who were in the meeting and 
to an assistant superintendent who supervised the plaintiff.211 
She alleged that she was assigned less desirable job duties and 
relieved of her supervisory responsibilities in retaliation for her 
complaints.212 She subsequently filed a formal Title VII charge 
 
 204. See EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 
2000) (holding that the participation clause applies only to Title VIIs ma-
chinery, such as proceedings and activities connected with a formal EEOC 
charge, but not to participation in the employers internal complaint mecha-
nisms); see also Edward A. Marshall, Title VIIs Participation Clause and Cir-
cuit City Stores v. Adams: Making the Foxes Guardians of the Chickens, 24 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 7475 (2003) (stating that courts findings 
that the participation clauses absolute retaliation protection is unavailable to 
employees who act outside the statutory machinery of Title VII or file com-
plaints or testify in an employers own, internal grievance process . . . leaves 
employees forced into compulsory arbitration . . . without the protections from 
reprisal that have long been recognized as essential to the effective enforce-
ment of Title VII). 
 205. 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
 206. Id. at 270. 
 207. Id. at 269. 
 208.  Id.  
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See Breeden v. Clark County Sch. Dist., No. 99-15522, 2000 U.S. App. 
BRAKE_3FMT 10/26/2005 08:40:30 PM 
2005] RETALIATION 81 
 
based on the same incident, after which she was transferred to 
a different job location.213 The claim for retaliation based on the 
change in job duties was governed by the opposition clause, 
while the change in job location fell under the participation 
clause.214 
Applying the reasonable belief standard to the facts in 
Breeden, the Court quickly dismissed the reasonableness of the 
plaintiff s belief that the above exchange amounted to unlawful 
sexual harassment.215 The Court did not question whether such 
sexual banter might, as part of a pattern of similar incidents, 
contribute to the creation of a hostile environment.216 Rather, 
the Court found this single incident insufficiently severe or 
pervasive to rise to the level of a hostile environment.217 Be-
cause the Court determined that the plaintiff lacked a reason- 
 
 
LEXIS 17564, at *5 (9th Cir. July 19, 2000) (describing the factual background 
of the dispute), revd, 532 U.S. 268 (2001).  
 213. Id. at *8. 
 214. Id. at *2. 
 215. The Court noted that it had no occasion to rule on the propriety of 
the reasonable belief standard because even assuming it is correct, no one 
could reasonably believe that the incident recounted above violated Title VII. 
532 U.S. at 270. The Courts decision forecloses a more lenient standard re-
quiring only a subjective good faith belief, and raises a question as to whether 
the Court intended to suggest that plaintiffs must do more than show a rea-
sonable, good faith belief that the underlying conduct violated Title VII. How-
ever, in light of the settled nature of this question in the lower courts, it is 
unlikely that the Court will require more than this. Cf. Jackson v. Birming-
ham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1512 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Al-
though this Court has never addressed the question, no Court of Appeals re-
quires a complainant to show more than that he had a reasonable, good-faith 
belief that discrimination occurred to prevail on a retaliation claim.). 
 216. The Court did not question, for example, whether the conduct occurred 
because of the plaintiff s sex. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 
523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (The critical issue, Title VIIs text indicates, is whether 
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of em-
ployment to which members of the other sex are not exposed. (citation omit-
ted)). The closest the Court came to suggesting this as an issue was its cryptic 
statement that the plaintiff s co-workers who participated in the hiring proc-
ess were subject to the same requirement [to review the sexually explicit 
statement in the course of screening job applicants]. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271. 
However, this reference alludes to the requirement of reviewing the comment 
in the file, to which the plaintiff did not object, as opposed to the discussion of 
the comment at the meeting. With respect to the comment at the meeting, the 
Court viewed severity and pervasiveness, and not the because of sex re-
quirement, as the real hurdle. Id. (concluding that the incident was at worst 
an isolated inciden[t] that cannot remotely be considered extremely serious, 
as our cases require). 
 217. Id. at 27071. 
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able belief that the offending conduct amounted to illegal sex-
ual harassment, the retaliatory acts she experienced as a result 
of her informal complaints were not actionable.218 
My concern with Breeden is not the Courts analysis of 
whether the offending conversation amounted to sexual har-
assment. The Court was surely right that a Title VII hostile 
environment claim based on these facts falls well short of what 
existing precedent requires.219 However, whether a person 
could have a reasonable belief that the incident created a hos-
tile environment is a more complicated question. On this issue, 
the Ninth Circuits opinion in Breeden exhibited a more appro-
priate measure of caution, emphasizing the need to take into 
account the limited knowledge possessed by most Title VII 
plaintiffs about the factual and legal bases of their claims.220 
The Ninth Circuit evaluated reasonableness from the perspec-
tive of a Title VII plaintiff.221 The Supreme Courts cursory dis-
 
 218. The Courts different treatment of the plaintiff s participation clause 
claim demonstrates the greater difficulty plaintiffs have securing protection 
against informal opposition. The participation clause claim alleged that the 
plaintiff was transferred to a different job location as punishment for filing a 
Title VII charge with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission and the EEOC 
and, subsequently, a lawsuit based on the same incident. Id. at 27172. Be-
cause this claim fell under the participation clause, the unreasonableness of 
the plaintiff s belief that the challenged conduct violated Title VII was not an 
obstacle. Instead, the Court rejected this claim for lack of causation. Id. at 
27274. However, had the Court permitted the opposition claim to proceed, it 
is not clear that causation would have presented such a problem. Causation 
failed on the participation claim because the supervisor who decided to trans-
fer the plaintiff did not find out about the lawsuit before announcing that she 
was considering transferring the plaintiff, and because the notice of the EEOC 
charge was too remote in time, occurring nearly two years before the transfer. 
Id. at 27374. However, according to the Ninth Circuits more detailed de-
scription of the facts, the plaintiff s internal complaints to supervisors pre-
ceded both the transfer decision and the change in supervisory responsibili-
ties. See Breeden v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17564, at 
*69 (9th Cir. July 19, 2000), revd, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). Had the Court ad-
dressed the issue of causation under the opposition claim, it is not clear that it 
would have reached the same result. The Courts disposition of the participa-
tion claim shows that the possibility of asserting a claim under the participa-
tion clause for subsequent, formal complaints does not alleviate the hardship 
imposed by the opposition clause. 
 219. See generally THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING RE-
ALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
2029 (2005) (summarizing case law granting summary judgment to employ-
ers for insufficient proof of severity and pervasiveness). 
 220. Breeden, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17564, at *34 (quoting Moyo v. Go-
mez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 221. Id. at *4 (explaining that [t]he bar set by the reasonable belief  stan-
dard . . . is very low (quoting Moyo, 40 F.3d at 985)). 
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cussion of reasonableness clouded the question of perspective 
and implicitly adopted the Courts own perspective, shaped by 
the limits of existing case law. 
Since Breeden, courts have required plaintiffs bringing re-
taliation claims under the opposition clause to demonstrate a 
good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying conduct 
amounted to unlawful discrimination.222 Some courts have ex-
tended the reasonable belief requirement beyond Title VII to 
limit retaliation claims brought under other nondiscrimination 
laws as well. For example, lower courts recognizing retaliation 
claims under Title IX and Title VI have applied the reasonable 
belief doctrine as a limitation on the protection afforded under 
these statutes.223 They have done this despite the standards 
origin in Title VIIs unique statutory language, which parses 
participation and opposition into distinct clauses, and the 
absence of similar statutory language in Title IX and Title 
VI.224 
 
 222. See, e.g., Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that a plaintiff must have a reasonable belief that the prac-
tices are unlawful in order to satisfy an opposition clause claim); Little v. 
United Techs. Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997) (requir-
ing the plaintiff to have both a subjective good faith belief and an objectively 
reasonable belief that the employers practices are unlawful). The Tenth Cir-
cuit was the last holdout in adopting a reasonable belief requirement. Com-
pare Crumpacker v. Kansas, 338 F.3d 1163, 1171 (10th Cir. 2003) (overturning 
the subjective good faith standard in light of Breeden), with Shinwari v. Ray-
theon Aircraft Co., No. 98-3324, 2000 WL 731782, at *56 (10th Cir. June 8, 
2000) ([O]pposition activity is protected when it is based on a mistaken good 
faith belief that Title VII has been violated. (quotations omitted)), superseded 
by Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, as recognized in Crumpacker, 338 F.3d at 1171. If 
the objective reasonable belief standard is met, the subjective good faith re-
quirement should rarely be an obstacle. But see Monteiro v. Poole Silver Co., 
615 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1980) (affirming the district courts dismissal of a re-
taliation claim for lack of a good faith belief that the challenged practices 
amounted to unlawful discrimination based on its finding that it was at least 
as likely that the plaintiff s accusations were motivated by self-protection). 
 223. See, e.g., Preston v. Va. ex rel New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 
20607 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying the same standards for a Title IX retaliation 
claim as would apply under Title VII); Howell v. N. Cent. Coll., 331 F. Supp.2d 
660, 66366 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (applying a reasonable belief requirement to a Ti-
tle IX retaliation claim); Belgrave v. City of N.Y., 95-CV-1507 (JG), 1999 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13622, at *104, 11820 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1999) (applying the 
same standards for Title VI retaliation claim as would apply under Title VII); 
Nelson v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 923 F. Supp. 275, 284 (D. Me. 1996) (applying a 
reasonable belief requirement to a Title IX retaliation claim); cf. Sarno v. 
Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying a 
reasonable belief requirement to an Americans with Disabilities Act retalia-
tion claim). 
 224. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000) (Title IX); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) (Title VI); 
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The leading example of a court applying the reasonable be-
lief standard to a non-Title VII retaliation claim is Peters v. 
Jenney,225 the same case that broke from the Eleventh Circuits 
ruling in Jackson to recognize an implied private right of action 
under Title VI.226 Although the Fourth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict courts dismissal of the retaliation claim under Title VI,227 
the appellate courts reasoning remanding the case made rea-
sonable belief a critical and probably insurmountable hurdle for 
the plaintiff.228 The plaintiff in Peters claimed that her objec-
tions to the selection criteria in the schools gifted program, and 
her efforts to include more African-American students in the 
program, triggered retaliatory action by the school district re-
sulting in her termination as director of the program.229 The 
Fourth Circuit invoked a purportedly clear-cut distinction be-
tween intentional discrimination and disparate impact, ex-
plaining that the retaliation claim could succeed only if the 
conduct alleged by the plaintiff fell within the realm of inten-
tional discrimination, as opposed to mere disparate impact.230 
The court emphasized that, regardless of the plaintiff s subjec-
tive belief, it was not reasonable to believe that Title VI encom-
passes disparate impact discrimination.231 To succeed on re-
mand, the plaintiff will have to prove that the selection policies 
she opposed amounted to intentional discrimination and not 
mere disparate impact. Although the court acknowledged that 
the plaintiff need not prove that intentional discrimination ac-
tually occurred, it required her to show at a minimum that the 
practices she opposed raised a jury question as to whether the 
district had engaged in intentional discrimination.232 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000) (Title VII). 
 225. 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 226. See id. at 32526. 
 227. Id. at 31011. 
 228. See id. at 32021, 323. 
 229. See id. at 31113. 
 230. Id. at 315. 
 231. See id. 
 232. See id. at 31920. Peters suggests that the reasonable belief standard 
merges into a determination of whether the plaintiff s challenge to the under-
lying conduct could survive summary judgment in a discrimination claim. Id. 
This standard, equating reasonable belief to the threshold for surviving sum-
mary judgment, is exceedingly harsh in light of the high rate of summary 
judgment in discrimination cases. Other circuits have been careful to clarify, 
despite their own strict interpretations of reasonable belief, that the standard 
does not necessarily require proof sufficient to survive summary judgment. 
See, e.g., Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 176 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 
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Against this backdrop, the Jackson decision was silent on 
the question of what standard governs retaliation claims under 
Title IX. The majority opinion repeatedly tied its protection 
from retaliation to instances where, as the majority ambigu-
ously phrased it, the plaintiff had complained of or about sex 
discrimination.233 The Court offered no guidance in distinguish-
ing which complaints are about sex discrimination and which 
are not. Notably, the majority did not require Mr. Jackson to 
demonstrate that the school had in fact discriminated against 
his female basketball players as a prerequisite for his claim to 
go forward, and it is not clear from the Courts description of 
the facts that sex discrimination had indeed occurred.234 Also of 
note, the majority did not disagree with Justice Thomass accu-
rate statement that existing law does not require retaliation 
claimants to prove that their underlying discrimination com-
plaints were meritorious.235 However, the majority also opted 
not to respond to Justice Thomass explicit assumption that the 
same reasonable belief standard that governs retaliation claims 
under Title VIIs opposition clause would also apply to retalia-
tion claims under Title IX.236 For now, at least, the applicability 
of the reasonable belief standard under Title IX, and by exten-
sion Title VI, is an open question. Nevertheless, as evidenced 
by the Peters case, lower courts have already assumed its appli-
cability and, judging from Justice Thomass dissent, the major-
 
1999) ([A] plaintiff may state a prima facie case for retaliation even when her 
primary claim for discrimination is insufficient to survive summary judg-
ment.). 
 233. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1504 (2005) 
(Retaliation against a person because that person has complained of sex dis-
crimination is . . . encompassed by Title IXs private cause of action.); id. at 
1507 (extending protection from retaliation to a person who speaks out 
against sex discrimination); id. ([B]ecause the complainant speaks out about 
sex discrimination, the on the basis of sex requirement is satisfied.). 
 234. See Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the 
Theory Behind Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 12325 (200001) (ex-
plaining that the standard of Title IX compliance for equal treatment of mens 
and womens sports requires an overall program comparison, not a sport-by-
sport comparison, and that equal funding is not necessarily required by Title 
IX, nor is parity of treatment for individual mens and womens sports). 
 235. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1512 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 236. Id. at 1512 (Although this Court has never addressed the question, no 
Court of Appeals requires a complainant to show more than that he had a rea-
sonable, good-faith belief that discrimination occurred to prevail on a retalia-
tion claim.); id. at 1513 (For example, if a coach complains to school officials 
about the dismantling of the mens swimming team, which he honestly and 
reasonably, but incorrectly, believes is occurring because of the sex of the 
team, and he is fired, he may prevail.). 
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ity opinion in Jackson is unlikely to prompt a change in that 
assumption. Consequently, the reasonable belief standard has 
the potential to shape the scope and extent of protection from 
retaliation well beyond Title VII. 
B. HOW COURTS USE REASONABLE BELIEF TO REINFORCE 
NARROW CONSTRUCTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION 
The reasonable belief requirement has generated a highly 
problematic body of case law. The following discussion offers 
four critiques of how this doctrine thwarts the promise of re-
taliation claims. First, the reasonable belief doctrine masks the 
complexity of discrimination and squeezes out broader, compet-
ing understandings. Second, it misses the interconnectedness of 
different types of subordination and too finely parses the cate-
gorical bases of discrimination. Third, it obfuscates the interre-
lated harms to persons exposed to discrimination within insti-
tutions and enforces an artificial line between victims and 
nonvictims. Finally, it imposes a court-centric and privileged 
perspective that is concealed by the neutral language of rea-
sonableness. The end result is that the reasonable belief doc-
trine blunts the potential of retaliation claims to realize the 
progressive possibilities of discrimination law. 
1. Masking the Complexity of Discrimination 
Breeden itself foreshadows the first problemthat the rea-
sonable belief standard masks the complexity of discrimination 
and suppresses competing understandings. Although the Court 
correctly gauged the long distance between the sexual banter in 
Breeden and the discrete universe of unlawful sexual harass-
ment under existing case law, it vastly understated the slip-
periness of sexual harassment as a legal construct. The Court 
implicitly assumed a stability and simplicity of sexual harass-
ment law that does not exist in the real world of social and le-
gal conflict. Notwithstanding the Courts prior insistence that 
questions of harassment can be answered by resorting to 
common sense,237 applying sexual harassment law to particu-
lar factual scenarios involves a great deal of uncertainty, even 
for persons who study this area of law.238 For employees who do 
 
 237. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). 
 238. See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between 
What Judges and Reasonable People Believe is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 791 (2002) (discussing the gap between what judges and reasonable 
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not specialize in sexual harassment law, the main source of 
knowledge about what constitutes harassment is likely to come 
from their interpretation of cultural norms regulating sexual 
conduct in the workplace, perhaps supplemented by informa-
tion provided by the employer. Many employee handbooks, in-
cluding the one allegedly consulted by the plaintiff in Breeden, 
include cryptic examples of behaviorssuch as joking, teasing, 
and staringthat closely resemble the incident that triggered 
the plaintiff s opposition in Breeden.239 The plaintiff s sexual 
harassment claim in Breeden was indeed highly likely to fail 
when tested in court. However, by disparaging the reason-
ableness of the plaintiff s view, the Court abruptly halted a 
possibly productive conversation about what types of sexually 
offensive behaviors should be regulated and greatly overstated 
the clarity of the line demarcating actionable sexually-tinged 
exchanges. 
An added and related problem with the application of the 
reasonable belief standard in Breeden is the slipperiness of the 
threshold of harm required in a hostile environment sexual 
harassment claim. The Courts ruling in Breeden might have 
been less problematic had it concluded that the alleged incident 
did not come reasonably close to qualifying as the type of sexu-
ally harassing behavior that underlies a hostile environment 
claim.240 Instead, the Court ruled that, assuming the incident 
 
people recognize as sexually harassing); Donna Shestowsky, Note, Where is the 
Common Knowledge? Empirical Support for Requiring Expert Testimony in 
Sexual Harassment Trials, 51 STAN. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999) ([E]mpirical evi-
dence finding that men and women have vastly different perceptions of sexual 
harassment indicates that a common knowledge base for determining reason-
able behavior does not exist.). 
 239. See Breeden v. Clark County Sch. Dist., No. 99-15522, 2000 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 17564, at *45 (9th Cir. July 19, 2000) (noting, in support of the rea-
sonableness of the plaintiff s belief, that she had consulted the school districts 
regulations, which state that sexual harassment includes uninvited sexual 
teasing, jokes, remarks, and questions), revd, 532 U.S. 268 (2001); see also 
Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 209596 (2003) 
(discussing a trend toward employer policies broadly defining sexual harass-
ment and listing examples of harassing conduct, including sexual jokes and 
remarks). 
 240. For example, it is not obvious why the offending comment disadvan-
taged the plaintiff on the basis of her sex. See, e.g., BEINER, supra note 219, at 
10609 (discussing problems courts have viewing harassing behavior as be-
cause of sex when it permeates the environment instead of targeting mem-
bers of one sex exclusively). However, even here, one could elaborate reason-
able theories for meeting this requirement, including that the comment is an 
oblique reference to female anatomy that degrades womens sexuality and un-
dermines their competence at work. 
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qualified as unwelcome conduct that harmed the plaintiff be-
cause of her sex, not enough of it occurred for a reasonable per-
son to believe that it met the severity and pervasiveness 
threshold for creating a hostile environment.241 Other courts 
have followed Breeden to block retaliation claims when the un-
derlying harassment was not sufficiently pervasive to support a 
reasonable belief that it was actionable.242 Under this rationale, 
an employee risks legally permissible retaliation if she com-
plains of sexually harassing conduct too soon, before it becomes 
pervasive enough to support a reasonable belief that it amounts 
to a hostile environment. The double bind created by this stan-
dard is obvious: if the employee waits too long to complain, she 
risks losing a potential harassment claim for not having done 
enough to demonstrate that the harassment was unwelcome, as 
well as for failing to meet an affirmative defense if her failure 
to complain sooner was unreasonable.243 In addition, certain 
harassment claims require persons to complain internally as a 
prerequisite for institutional liability, thus putting them in a 
risky position unless accorded full protection from retalia-
tion.244 
 
 241. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001). 
 242. See, e.g., Little v. United Techs. Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 
95961 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that opposition to a single racially offensive 
remark by a co-worker was not protected); Holmes v. Long Island R.R. Co., No. 
96 CV 6196(NG), 2001 WL 797951, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 2001) (rejecting a 
railroad workers retaliation claim on the grounds that her allegationsthat 
the railroads physical therapist, whom she was required to see, made sexual 
comments about her body on three separate occasions and ordered her to dis-
robe when she believed such an examination was not necessarywere too iso-
lated in nature to support a reasonable belief that the incidents amounted to a 
hostile environment). 
 243. Cf. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (admonishing 
that a woman need not wait until she suffers a nervous breakdown before she 
has a viable hostile environment claim). 
 244. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., 123 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 
1997) (requiring notice to establish employer liability for co-worker sexual 
harassment). For an example of the double bind created by requiring employ-
ees to give notice of the harassment to establish liability and yet withholding 
protection from retaliation when they do, see Little, 103 F.3d at 960 (holding 
that the employees opposition to a harassing remark by a co-worker was not 
protected where the remark could not be attributed to the employer, and that 
the plaintiff s belief that the remark in itself violated Title VII must be objec-
tively reasonable). For a pre-Breeden case taking a more lenientand reason-
ableapproach, see Trent v. Valley Elec. Assn Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 
1994) (overruling the district courts rejection of the plaintiff s retaliation 
claim, where the plaintiff had opposed sexually offensive comments made by 
an outside consultant, because the sexually offensive remarks occurred at a 
mandatory seminar, such that the plaintiff certainly would be justified in be-
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As applied in Breeden, the reasonable belief standard ob-
scures the oceans of uncertainty surrounding the precise point 
at which sexually offensive behavior crosses the line from 
merely offensive and annoying to become sufficiently pervasive 
to create a hostile environment. The problem is not simply that 
most people lack the legal expertise to ascertain where that line 
begins and ends, but that the uncertainties of litigation prevent 
such a determination from being made in advance.245 
If Breeden were the only instance of the reasonable belief 
standard imposing orthodoxy upon competing conceptions of 
discrimination, we might reserve judgment about whether the 
standard is well-suited to police the limits of retaliation claims. 
The incident in Breeden is, after all, far removed from the kinds 
of extreme fact patterns that frequently surface in sexual har-
assment cases. Unfortunately, however, lower court decisions 
abound with examples of the reasonable belief standard silenc-
ing important conversations about the scope and limits of dis-
crimination law. 
The Fourth Circuits opinion in Peters v. Jenney gives a 
more troubling example of how courts use the reasonable belief 
standard to enforce a narrow understanding of discrimination 
and silence alternative perspectives. The court found it per se 
unreasonable to believe that practices with a disparate impact 
violate Title VI, which is limited to intentional discrimina-
tion.246 The courts ruling implicitly assumed that the Supreme 
Courts ruling in Sandoval corners the market on reasonable 
interpretations of Title VI.247 The courts contention that other 
perspectives are unreasonable belies the reality that lay per-
sons, unfamiliar with Sandoval, might well reasonably believe 
that unnecessary practices with the effect of disproportionately 
excluding African-American students violate Title VI. Academic 




lieving that Title VII would protect her from the offensive remarks she en-
dured while attending the meeting). 
 245. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases 
So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 556 (2001) (discussing the difficulty 
plaintiffs face in winning employment discrimination cases and the biases that 
affect judicial decision making). 
 246. 327 F.3d 307, 31921 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 247. Id. The court framed the correct inquiry as whether the practices 
which Peters opposed constituted intentional discrimination forbidden by Ti-
tle VI. Id. at 319. 
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Title VI that are far from unreasonable.248 The courts assump-
tion of a bright-line rule between impact and intent obfuscates 
the fuzziness of this line, both in theory and in practice. Early 
judicial decisions acknowledged that proof of impact is often the 
best, and sometimes the only, evidence of discriminatory in-
tent.249 
The category of intentional discrimination is not suffi-
ciently coherent to serve as the dividing line between reason-
able and unreasonable interpretations of a legal ban on dis-
crimination. Legal scholars have puzzled for decades over the 
meaning and legitimacy of the construct of intentional dis-
crimination and have reached widely varying conclusions.250 By 
labeling alternative and farther-reaching conceptions of dis-
crimination unreasonable, the court in Peters called for an 
abrupt halt to critical discourse challenging dominant construc-
tions of equality, on pain of retaliation without legal re-
course.251 The court also disguised its own role in jealously 
 
 248. For a sampling of academic commentary criticizing Sandoval, see 
Bradford C. Mank, Are Title VIs Disparate Impact Regulations Valid?, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 517, 51920 (2002); David J. Galalis, Note, Environmental Justice 
and Title VI in the Wake of Alexander v. Sandoval: Disparate-Impact Regula-
tions Still Valid Under Chevron, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 61, 92101 
(2004); Note, After Sandoval : Judicial Challenges and Administrative Possi-
bilities in Title VI Enforcement, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1774, 1781 (2003); see also 
Mank, supra note 83, at 47, 73 (Every federal court of appeals that addressed 
[the] question before Sandoval concluded that private plaintiffs may bring a 
private right of action to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations.). 
 249. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 25354 (1976) (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (stating that [f]requently the most probative evidence of intent 
will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence de-
scribing the subjective state of mind of the actor, and suggesting that the 
line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly 
as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the Courts opin-
ion might assume). 
 250. For a small sampling of such scholarship, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, 
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination 
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Charles R. 
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of In-
tent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1989); Michael Selmi, Proving 
Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 279 (1997); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of 
Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989). 
 251. In Peters, the Fourth Circuit not only rejected an impact standard as 
unreasonable, but also adopted a particularly narrow and strict version of the 
intent requirement, while labeling alternative approaches to intent unreason-
able. 327 F.3d at 321 n.18 (While proof of a disparate impact, in combination 
with other circumstantial and direct evidence of intent, can sometimes sup-
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guarding the knowledge it takes to form a reasonable belief, 
failing to acknowledge that the contrary understanding is only 
unreasonable if one knows of, and accepts, the exclusive le-
gitimacy of the Supreme Courts ruling in Sandoval. 
Another example of how the reasonable belief standard 
bolsters narrow and orthodox understandings of discrimination 
while silencing competing perspectives comes from a case in the 
Second Circuit, Galdieri-Ambrosini v. National Realty & Devel-
opment Corp.252 In this case, the plaintiff, a female secretary, 
alleged that she was fired in retaliation for complaining about 
gender stereotyping in the assignment of secretarial duties, 
which included attending to her bosss personal matters during 
work hours.253 The Second Circuit upheld the dismissal of her 
retaliation claim on the ground that such a theory of sex dis-
crimination was unreasonable because there were no male sec-
retaries in the firm to use as comparators and no evidence that 
the plaintiff was given such assignments because she was fe-
male.254 The court rejected a broader interpretation of Title VII 
that would encompass the assignment of sex-stereotyped duties 
to persons in female-dominated jobs and the devaluation of tra-
ditional womens work, ruling that Title VII does not prohibit 
supervisors from giving secretaries female-gendered work or 
 
port an inference of intentional discrimination, a jury issue on intentional dis-
crimination is not created ipso facto by pointing to a policys disparate ef-
fects . . . . Deliberate indifference to a policys disparate impacts, as opposed to 
the purposeful pursuit of those impacts, is not a viable theory under Title VI. 
(citations omitted)). 
 252. 136 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 253. Id. at 28083. The plaintiff claimed that she was overworked, given 
demeaning tasks, and required to assist her supervisor with personal matters. 
Id. at 28182. She alleged both gender and age discrimination, claiming that 
her work assignments were a result of being held to a sexual stereotype of 
what a female is in our society and in our workplace, and that her supervisor 
had a view of women that led him to overlook performance flaws in young 
attractive female[s], which led to increased burdens for the older less attrac-
tive plaintiff. Id.  
 254. Id. at 291. The court also faulted the plaintiff for not being clearer 
with her employer in specifying the basis of her complaint as gender discrimi-
nation. Id. at 292. I limit my critique of this case to its application of the rea-
sonable belief standard, but observe as an aside that this requirement can also 
impose a hefty burden on plaintiffs to carefully articulate the basis of their op-
position. Id. at 28788 ([I]t also was insufficient to show that [the employer] 
could reasonably have understood that [the plaintiff s] complaints about hav-
ing to do extra work because of the conduct of her two female co-workers, 
about having to locate Headley for the numerous calls from his girlfriend, and 
about having to do work on Simons personal matters, actually constituted 
complaints that she was being discriminated against on the basis of gender.). 
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requiring them to assist with personal matters.255 The courts 
adoption of the narrower differential-treatment perspective and 
its labeling of the plaintiff s alternative interpretation as un-
reasonable are particularly noteworthy given that a jury had 
found in favor of the plaintiff on her sex discrimination claim, 
presumably finding her theory of discrimination sufficiently 
reasonable to support its verdict.256 The courts application of 
the reasonable belief standard in this case illustrates how 
courts use this requirement to oversimplify the boundaries of 
discrimination law by enforcing an artificially narrow and ex-
clusive conception of discrimination.257 
 
 255. The court explained its rejection of the plaintiff s challenge to sex-
stereotyping in job duties as follows: 
[T]he tasks whose nature [plaintiff] argued showed sexual stereotyp-
ing were tasks of a kind typically done for an executive by his or her 
secretary, whether the secretary is female or male. It may be that his-
torically, in most firms, most secretaries have been women. But proof 
that an employer has assigned to a secretary tasks that are tradition-
ally secretarial taskseven if related to the employers personal 
businessdoes not suffice to support a verdict of gender discrimina-
tion under Title VII. 
Id. at 290. The court then addressed the plaintiff s argument that she was 
treated worse than attractive younger secretaries in the office who willingly 
performed female-gendered duties: 
We know of no provision of Title VII, nor any regulation or case con-
struing that statute, that imposes liability on an employer for prefer-
ring an employee who chose to ma[k]e [an executives] life more 
pleasant in the workplace, even if it was something as simple as 
bringing him coffee. 
Id. at 291. 
 256. The jury awarded the plaintiff $12,500 in compensatory damages and 
$87,500 in punitive damages, for a total of $100,000, on her sex discrimination 
claim. Id. at 284. For academic commentary supporting the reasonableness of 
a theory of discrimination similar to that pressed by the plaintiff, see Martha 
Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and 
Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 77277 (2001) (discussing the de-
valuation of activities associated with women as a form of gender bias). 
 257. For a sampling of other court decisions vulnerable to this critique, see 
Holden v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 793 F.2d 745, 74849 (6th Cir. 1986) (rejecting 
the plaintiff s claim that she was retaliated against for aggressively imple-
menting an affirmative action plan because Title VII does not require compa-
nies to implement any affirmative action plan, must less an aggressive one); 
Miller-Calabrese v. Contl Grain Co., No. 96 C 6626, 1997 WL 392340, at *34 
(N.D. Ill. July 8, 1997) (same). These courts acceptance of the position that it 
is unreasonable to interpret Title VII to require affirmative action belies 
credible and reasonable arguments by legal scholars that press the boundaries 
between discrimination and the failure to implement affirmative action. See, 
e.g., David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 
10506 (arguing that the principle of nondiscrimination may in some circum-
stances require affirmative action). 
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2. Ignoring the Interconnectedness Between Different  
Types of Subordination 
A second problem with the reasonable belief doctrine is 
that courts use it to oversimplify the categorical distinctions 
separating protected and unprotected classes, thereby ignoring 
and obfuscating the intersectionality and interdependence of 
systems of subordination. For example, the reasonable belief 
standard has been applied to impose orthodoxy in the contro-
versy over the line separating sex from sexual orientation as a 
basis for discrimination. 
In a case representative of this problem, Hamner v. St. 
Vincent, the Seventh Circuit applied such a distinction to reject 
a retaliation claim brought by a male nurse who claimed that 
he was terminated for complaining of harassment based on his 
sexual orientation.258 The court concluded that because Title 
VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, the 
plaintiff s sincere belief that there was no difference between 
harassment based on sex and sexual orientation was not objec-
tively reasonable.259 The court flippantly dismissed the rea-
sonableness of the plaintiff s belief in the interrelationship be-
tween sexual orientation and gender harassment.260 In doing 
so, it ignored a wealth of legal scholarship deconstructing such 
distinctions and marginalized a growing number of court deci-
sions that have begun to carve out room for recognizing sexual 
orientation harassment as a species of gender stereotyping 
prohibited by Title VII.261 Other courts have similarly asserted 
 
 258. 224 F.3d 701, 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 259. Id. at 707. 
 260. Id. The court briefly hinted at the possibility of greater complexity in 
the laws separation of sex and sexual orientation, acknowledging that the 
record may have supported Hamners reasonable belief claim if the record 
demonstrated that [the supervisor] disapproved of men in the nursing profes-
sion, and manifested his disapproval by perceiving all male nurses to be ho-
mosexuals, and harassed them accordingly, while female nurses were not sub-
jected to such harassment. Id. at 707 n.5. The court also acknowledged the 
argument, which it viewed as waived, that the harassment was based on sex 
because [the harassers] gestures (lisping and flipping his wrists) were specifi-
cally intimidating to men and their manhood[.] Id. at 707. But no sooner did 
the court open a window to the possibility that the line dividing sexual orien-
tation discrimination from sex discrimination might be less than crisp than it 
abruptly slammed it in conclusory fashion. Id. at 70708 ([T]his argument 
has no merit [because] the conduct that he opposed (harassment because of 
his sexual orientation) is not, under any circumstances, proscribed by Title 
VII.). 
 261. For court decisions that begin to break down a strict dichotomy of sex-
based and sexual orientation-based discrimination, see the cases cited supra 
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crisp distinctions between sex and sexual orientation bias to re-
ject retaliation claims for lack of a reasonable belief that a ban 
on sex discrimination encompasses sexual orientation bias.262 
Through the vehicle of the reasonable belief doctrine, these 
courts seek to silence ongoing conversations about the meaning 
and scope of sex equality law, while solidifying a dominant per-
spective that furthers both male privilege and heterosexual 
privilege.263 
3. Enforcing Artificial Lines Between Victims and Nonvictims 
Within Institutions 
A third problem with the reasonable belief doctrine is that 
it has functioned to enforce an artificial divide between persons 
at different levels and groupings within an organization, 
strictly separating those who are protected from those who are 
not. A number of the cases exemplifying this problem involve 
teachers and other professionals speaking out against per-
 
note 116. For a sampling of legal scholarship questioning the coherence of the 
boundary separating sex from sexual orientation as a basis for discrimination, 
see Brake, supra note 113; Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against 
Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); 
Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. 
REV. 187; Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstruct-
ing the Conflation of Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation in Euro-
American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995); cf. Ehrenreich, supra 
note 9, at 280316 (detailing the mechanisms by which systems of subordina-
tion are mutually reinforcing). 
 262. See Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 106566 
(7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a Title VII retaliation claim because it was not rea-
sonable for the plaintiff, a male employee, to believe that Title VII covered 
sexual orientation discrimination); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic, 194 F.3d 
252, 262 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting the plaintiff s argument that the inclusion of 
sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for discrimination in the employers 
policies supported a reasonable belief that sexual orientation discrimination 
violated Title VII); Howell v. North Cent. Coll., 331 F. Supp.2d 660, 66364 
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (rejecting the heterosexual plaintiff s claim of retaliation for 
complaining about bias against heterosexuals on womens basketball team be-
cause it was not reasonable to believe that Title IX covered sexual orientation 
discrimination). For a contrasting view of the reasonableness of this perspec-
tive, see Martin v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, 224 F. 
Supp. 2d 434, 448 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (refusing to apply the reasonable belief doc-
trine to reject the plaintiff s claim of retaliation for complaining of sexual ori-
entation discrimination, and explaining that it is not reasonable to presume 
that a layperson would know the state of the law before complaining, but 
granting summary judgment for lack of causation). 
 263. Cf. WILDMAN, supra note 152, at 3334 (discussing the interconnec-
tions between sexual orientation and gender oppression, and arguing that het-
erosexual privilege is inseparable from male privilege). 
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ceived bias and discrimination toward students or other per-
sons in the communities they serve. In one such case, Hill v. 
Chicago Board of Education, the court dismissed a school 
teachers Title VII claim of retaliation for raising complaints on 
behalf of students about sexual harassment by other stu-
dents.264 The court sharply rebuked the teacher for his belief 
that the schools tolerance of sexual harassment among stu-
dents violated Title VII, concluding that it is not reasonable to 
believe that the harassment of students could violate the Title 
VII rights of employees.265 
The reasonable belief standard produced a similar result in 
Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Department, a case involving 
a nonschool setting where the court drew a sharp line between 
the rights of employees and the interests of other persons sub-
jected to discrimination.266 In this case, the plaintiff was a 
white male police officer who alleged retaliation for speaking 
out against the departments treatment of minority citizens.267 
 
 264. No. 02 C 3534, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5703, at *33 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 
2004). 
 265. Id. The teacher had complained that a self-styled group of male stu-
dents calling themselves the Posse was harassing female students and creat-
ing a hostile environment. Id. at *5. The court dismissed the teachers under-
standing as unreasonable, stating simply that Title VII protects employees 
and not students. Id. at *33. 
 266. 176 F.3d 125, 13436 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 267. Id. at 128. The plaintiff alleged that early on in his police training, as 
part of a self-introduction statement required for all trainees, he identified 
himself as an officer in Humanity against Hatred, a group founded by New 
York police officers and clergy to oppose discrimination, and expressed his op-
position to collusion between police and prosecutors offices. Id. In addition, 
during field training, he reported overhearing officers using racial slurs and 
was dissuaded from asking questions about two instances when he witnessed 
an officer stopping minorities without cause. Id. at 129. He was fired at the 
conclusion of training, allegedly for speaking out against racism within the 
department. Id. at 128, 132. The department, however, claimed that he was 
fired for deficiencies in performance. Id. As with many retaliation cases, the 
factual record is mixed and messy, and it is difficult to separate the perform-
ance problems from the hostility toward the plaintiff based on his opposition to 
racism. For example, one of the supervising officers who rated the plaintiff 
most negatively was also alleged to have used racial slurs and to have known 
about the plaintiff s membership in Humanity against Hatred. Id. at 13031 
(discussing the plaintiff s interactions with Officer Ferrante); see also id. at 
131 (describing the plaintiff s allegation that one of the Lieutenants told him 
that the stop hatred thing didnt go over well with one of my FTOs in particu-
lar . . . didnt go over well with people at headquarters); id. at 132 (quoting 
the same Lieutenant as stating, at the meeting to discuss the plaintiff s per-
formance problems and continued employment, the words [the plaintiff] se-
lect[s] to express his thoughts tend [to] make others feel that he was liberal in 
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The Second Circuit dismissed the retaliation claim under Title 
VII, finding that the plaintiff lacked a reasonable belief that 
the police departments alleged race discrimination against mi-
nority citizens could violate an employees Title VII rights.268 
Numerous cases similarly refuse to protect employees from 
retaliation under Title VII when they complain of discrimina-
tion against persons who are served by or are otherwise con-
nected with their institutions, ruling that it is not reasonable to 
believe that Title VII forbids discrimination against nonem-
ployees.269 Although this blunt statement of the law matches 
reductionist hornbook understandings of Title VIIs limits,270 
 
his viewpoint). My critique here is limited to the courts use of the reasonable 
belief standard, but I note as an aside that proof of causation, as in disparate 
treatment cases, is complex and messy, especially where negative reactions to 
the plaintiff influence perceptions of job deficiencies. 
 268. Id. at 13436. 
 269. See, e.g., Lamb-Bowman v. Del. State Univ., 39 F. Appx. 748, 75051 
(3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting a Title VII retaliation claim where the plaintiff, a for-
mer womens basketball coach, alleged retaliation for complaining of inequal-
ity of female athletes); Artis v. Francis Howell N. Band Boosters Assn, 161 
F.3d 1178, 1183 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the plaintiff s claim that he was 
fired from the position of marching band instructor for complaining about the 
principals disparate treatment of black and white students because opposing 
an employers actions outside the ambit of an employment practice is unpro-
tected by Title VII); Evans v. Kansas City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 98, 100
101 (8th Cir. 1995) (overturning the district courts judgment for the plaintiff, 
a teacher, who alleged retaliation for opposing the principals plan to increase 
the nonminority student representation because the plaintiff s opposition did 
not involve any kind of employment practice); Crowley v. Prince Georges 
County, 890 F.2d 683, 687 (4th Cir. 1989) (rejecting retaliation claim by a 
white male former police officer because investigating instances of racial har-
assment perpetrated by police officers against members of the community did 
not involve an unlawful employment practice); Kunzler v. Canon, USA, Inc., 
257 F. Supp. 2d 574, 57982 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting the retaliation claim of 
a salesman who complained of a co-workers sexual harassment of a customer 
because the harassment of a customer is not an unlawful employment prac-
tice); Holt v. Lewis, 955 F. Supp. 1385, 138788 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (rejecting a 
professors Title VII claim alleging retaliation for assisting a female student 
with her sex discrimination claim because it was not reasonable for the plain-
tiff to believe that Title VII covers discrimination against students), aff d, 109 
F.3d 771 (11th Cir. 1997). For decisions prior to Breeden extending protection 
to employees who complain of discrimination against nonemployees, see Moyo 
v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 98485 (9th Cir. 1994) (permitting a Title VII retalia-
tion claim by a prison officer discharged for protesting discrimination against 
African-American inmates); Wrighten v. Metro. Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 
135356 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing a retaliation claim by a nurse who com-
plained of racist treatment of patients). 
 270. See, e.g., MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 9599, 126
28 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing Title VIIs definition of employee, and summariz-
ing the fundamental legal principles of retaliation under Title VII in the em-
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some case law, read more creatively, supports a broader under-
standing. It is not beyond reason to believe that an institutions 
treatment of nonemployees can affect the work environment of 
employees. By tolerating discrimination against students or cli-
ents, for example, institutions may exacerbate the work envi-
ronments of employees in ways that touch on employees own 
racial or gender identities. The Supreme Court endorsed just 
such a rationale in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,271 when it 
approvingly cited the Fifth Circuit case of Rogers v. EEOC.272 
In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit accepted the Hispanic plaintiff s 
claim that requiring African-American patients to sit in a seg-
regated waiting area contributed to a racially hostile work en-
vironment for the plaintiff, an employee.273 
Courts applying the reasonable belief doctrine in this fash-
ion, however, have cut short the implications of this precedent, 
refusing to acknowledge that discriminatory actions targeting 
the persons served by an organization may also adversely affect 
the work environment of the organizations employees. For ex-
ample, without citing or addressing Rogers, the court in Wim-
mer rejected such a hostile environment theory in cursory fash-
ion.274 In an interesting twist, however, the court faulted the 
plaintiff, a white male, for failing to introduce evidence from 
minority employees that they regarded the treatment of Afri-
can-American citizens as creating a hostile environment for 
them.275 This observation hints at the possibility of applying a 
hostile environment theory to such a situation. However, be-
cause such complexity would have undermined the courts posi-
tion that alternative interpretations are unreasonable, it 
abruptly resumed the façade of the hopelessness of the plain-
 
ployment discrimination context). 
 271. 477 U.S. 57, 6566 (1986). 
 272. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 273. Cf. Chew & Kelley, supra note 1, at 10 n.37 (observing that most dis-
cussions of Rogers assume that both the plaintiff and the clients were African 
American, but noting that the plaintiff actually identified her race as His-
panic). 
 274. Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Dept, 176 F.3d 125, 136 (2d Cir. 
1999) (It is inherent in the definition of a racially hostile work environment, 
however, that the person against whom the hostility is directed must be in an 
employment relationship with the employer.). 
 275. Id. (Because [plaintiff] did not introduce evidence that minority em-
ployees of the Department felt that they worked in a racially hostile environ-
ment, [plaintiff] could not reasonably have believed that he was protesting an 
unlawful hostile work environment.). 
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tiff s position.276 The courts flippant dismissal of a hostile envi-
ronment theory was unpersuasive. As discussed previously, re-
taliation law should and does protect persons who oppose dis-
crimination even if they are not the targets of the 
discrimination. Under this precedent, it is not clear why the 
plaintiff should need to introduce evidence from minority offi-
cers that they perceived the environment to be hostile as long 
as the plaintiff believed that such conduct created a hostile en-
vironment. For the same reasons that retaliation law protects 
persons who oppose discrimination against others, including 
the difficulty targets face in claiming discrimination, the law 
should not require the targets of discrimination to come for-
ward and testify to perceived discrimination to save the retalia-
tion claim. 
Instead of recognizing the interconnectedness and overlap-
ping harms of discrimination, these courts stifle conversations 
about the intersection of equality interests among different 
constituencies within institutions. In so doing, they miss impor-
tant relational harms of discrimination, which often radiate be-
yond their immediate targets. Courts applying the reasonable 
belief doctrine in this fashion treat discrimination as an indi-
vidualistic problem without appreciating its social dimensions. 
Furthermore, in failing to protect the construction of antiracist 
and antisexist identities of persons who are not among the 
class of persons immediately targeted, courts impair the forma-
tion of broad-based coalitions that cut across different constitu-
ency groups to promote gender and racial equality within insti-
tutions. 
4. Imposing a Narrow and Court-Centered Definition of 
Reasonableness 
The fourth and final critique offered here is implicit in each 
of the above criticisms and applies to all of the cases previously 
discussed. The reasonable belief standard imposes a court-
centric understanding that evaluates reasonableness from the 
privileged perspective of judges. In this respect, the reason-
ableness requirement here differs significantly from reason-
ableness inquiries in other areas of discrimination law, such as 
judging the reasonableness of perceiving a hostile environ-
 
 276. Id. at 136 n.5 (Even if [plaintiff] had presented such evidence, it is 
not clear that he would have standing to bring a Title VII hostile work envi-
ronment claim.). 
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ment.277 The issue of perspective is important in any judicial 
foray into reasonableness. Unlike harassment law, however, 
the reasonable belief doctrine in retaliation claims permits no 
room for variation in the subjective circumstances of the plain-
tiff to influence the determination of reasonableness.278 In-
stead, the perspective is self-consciously narrowed to that of a 
person with the perfect understanding of law and legal rea-
soningthat is, the judge who applies the reasonable belief 
standard in that particular case. 
In all of the cases discussed above, including Breeden, the 
perspectives of judges set the outer boundaries of reasonable-
ness. Some courts are more forthright about this perspective 
than others. In the following two cases, courts explicitly re-
jected the argument that reasonableness should be assessed 
from the perspective of a reasonable employee or layperson, 
and instead limited reasonableness to the constraints imposed 
by the courts reading of existing precedent. In each case, the 
relevant existing precedent was more ambiguous than the court 
acknowledged. These courts imposed their selective reading of 
the law as the limit on reasonableness, adopting a singularly 
narrow and privileged perspective from which to evaluate the 
reasonableness of the plaintiff s belief. 
In Talanda v. KFC National Management Co., the plaintiff, 
a store manager, had resisted orders to remove a woman who 
had serious dental problems from a customer service position 
because her appearance would not be sufficiently pleasing to 
customers.279 When the manager continued to resist because he 
believed it was legally and morally wrong to discriminate 
against someone for facial disfigurement,280 the employer 
fired him.281 The plaintiff claimed that the firing was a retalia-
tory discharge for opposing what he perceived as a violation of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, explaining that he be-
lieved that the woman was disabled and that the company re-
 
 277. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (setting the 
threshold for actionable sexual harassment as one that is severe or pervasive 
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environmentan envi-
ronment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive). 
 278. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) 
([T]he objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective 
of a reasonable person in the plaintiff s position, considering all the circum-
stances.). 
 279. 140 F.3d 1090, 109293 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 280. Id. at 1092. 
 281. Id. at 1094. 
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garded her as disabled.282 The Seventh Circuit dismissed this 
account as unreasonable, explaining that to qualify as an im-
pairment under the ADA, the womans disfigurement would 
have to substantially limit one or more major life activities.283 
The missing teeth did not rise to this level, the court explained, 
despite the fact that her disfigurement kept her from doing 
otherwise appropriate work for this employer.284 The court 
measured the reasonableness of the plaintiff s belief against its 
own selective reading of existing case law.285 By labeling com-
 
 282. Id. Courts generally apply the same legal standards to retaliation 
claims under the ADA as they do under Title VII. See id. at 109596 (stating 
that the elements comprising a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA 
are the same with respect to Title VII). 
 283. Id. at 109697 (citing ADA case law and regulations to show that the 
facial disfigurement did not substantially limit one or major life activities). 
Like many retaliation cases, this case is more factually complicated than this 
brief summary can convey. The employer alleged that the plaintiff acted inap-
propriately in a number of respects, including secretly tape recording a con-
versation with his supervisor in which he was ordered to fire the woman, pres-
suring the woman to take legal action herself so that they could make 
money, and failing to explain to the employer that he believed that the direc-
tive to fire her violated the ADA. Id. at 109395. If true, these facts might jus-
tify rejecting the plaintiff s retaliation claim on other grounds. I limit my cri-
tique to the courts application of the reasonable belief standard, which strictly 
construes existing legal precedent to set the outer limits of reasonable belief. 
 284. Id. at 1097 (citing EEOC regulations stating that the inability to per-
form a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the 
major life activity of working). 
 285. The courts reasoning is subject to questioning even within the frame-
work of the legal precedents that it cited. The court chided the plaintiff for re-
lying on Johnson v. Am. Chamber of Commerce Publishers, 108 F.3d 818, 819
20 (7th Cir. 1997), in which the Seventh Circuit reversed the district courts 
determination that the plaintiff s missing teeth did not rise to the level of a 
cosmetic disfigurement. Talanda, 140 F.3d at 109798 n.13. The court re-
buked the plaintiff s significant reliance on . . . Johnson, insisting that [a] 
precise reading of Johnson . . . offers no support for Mr. Talandas contention, 
since the reversal of the district court in Johnson was based on the district 
courts misapprehension that a person could not be regarded as having a dis-
ability unless that person actually had the disability. Id. As the Talanda 
court further explained, [w]e therefore made clear that a person need not ac-
tually have the impairment to be perceived as having it. Id. In other words, 
Mr. Talandas reliance on Johnson was inapposite because he could not prove 
that his employer perceived the woman as having an impairment that limits a 
major life activity, unlike the employers perception of the disability in John-
son. However, given that the employer ordered Mr. Talanda to remove the 
woman from her position because of what it viewed as a facial disfigurement, 
the unreasonableness of Mr. Talandas reading of his employers perception is 
far from obvious. The courts convoluted effort to limit its decision in Johnson 
would make for a lively dissection and discussion in a law school classfar 
from a sufficiently airtight rationale to deem alternative readings unreason-
able. 
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peting legal understandings as unreasonable, the court dis-
guised interpretive choices about the meaning and scope of dis-
crimination law. At the same time, the neutral language of rea-
sonableness obscured the privileged perspective that defined 
and imposed this dominant understanding.286 
A second example of a court imposing its selective interpre-
tation of legal precedent as the exclusive standard of reason-
ableness comes from the Eleventh Circuits decision in Harper 
v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corp.287 In Harper, the plaintiffs, 
male employees at Blockbuster, opposed the companys institu-
tion of a grooming policy requiring only male employees to 
maintain short haircuts.288 The court ruled that the plaintiffs 
did not engage in protected activity, despite the plaintiffs belief 
that the policy amounted to sex discrimination, because every 
circuit court that has considered sex-specific hairstyle policies 
has upheld them under Title VII.289 The court rejected the 
plaintiffs request that it judge the reasonableness of their be-
liefs as laypersons rather than based on the substantive law.290 
By invoking dominant interpretations of existing case law to 
set the outer boundaries of reasonableness, and marginalizing 
alternative and broader understandings, the court obfuscated 
the wide space for interpretive debate within legal interpreta-
 
 286. At the same time, however, the courts qualification that it did not 
mean to imply that facial disfigurement, including facial disfigurement 
caused by dental problems, can never be a disability for purposes of the ADA, 
revealed the slipperiness of the legal issue. Id. at 109798 n.13. The court 
cited several examples from the EEOC, revealing the complexity and contra-
dictions of the courts legal reasoning. Id. (citing the EEOC Appendix to the 
regulations, stating that disparate treatment occurs when an employer ex-
cludes an employee with a severe facial disfigurement from staff meetings be-
cause the employer does not like to look at the employee and noting that a 
prominent facial scar or involuntary head jerk may be perceived as an im-
pairment that substantially limits a major life activity when an employer dis-
criminates against the person because of the complaints of customers (cita-
tions omitted)). As these examples demonstrate, the EEOC regulations and 
examples leave more room than the court acknowledged for reasoned argu-
ment as to whether the womans facial disfigurement was a disability under 
the ADA. 
 287. 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 288. Id. at 1386. 
 289. Id. at 1388 (The reasonableness of the plaintiffs belief in this case is 
belied by the unanimity with which the courts have declared grooming policies 
like Blockbusters non-discriminatory.). 
 290. Id. at 1388 n.2 (If the plaintiffs are free to disclaim knowledge of the 
substantive law, the reasonableness inquiry becomes no more than specula-
tion regarding their substantive knowledge.). 
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tion.291 Used in such a fashion, the reasonable belief doctrine 
turns the retaliation claim into a device for legitimating ine-
quality and maintaining privilege, rather than an instrument 
for challenging it.292 
C. A CALL FOR REFORMING REASONABLE BELIEF 
The reasonable belief doctrine, as applied by the courts, is 
neither a necessary nor an inevitable limitation on retaliation 
claims under discrimination law. Having recognized that pro-
tection of oppositional activities is not limited to complaints 
about practices that are actually illegal, there is nothing in the 
language of Title VIIs opposition clause that requires courts to 
use a reasonable belief standard as the boundary for such 
claims, and certainly not one bounded to dominant judicial in- 
 
 
 291. Once again, however, the courts subsequent acknowledgement of 
some dissension on the issue reveals cracks in the orthodoxy. See id. at 1388. 
(The EEOC initially took a contrary position, but in the face of the unanimous 
position of the courts of appeal that have addressed the issue, it finally con-
cluded that successful litigation of male hair length cases would be virtually 
impossible. . . . Accordingly, the EEOC ran up a white flag on the issue, advis-
ing its field offices to administratively close all sex discrimination charges 
dealing with male hair length. (citation omitted)). The court proceeded to 
make weakly reasoned arguments distinguishing the precedent upon which 
plaintiffs relied, recasting UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991), for 
example, cited by plaintiffs for the principle that facially sex-based classifica-
tions violate Title VII, as a case colored by the fundamental right to bear chil-
dren. 139 F.3d 1385. As revealed by the courts acknowledgement of early un-
certainty and its weak reasoning distinguishing contrary case law, the limits 
imposed by legal precedent on the reasonableness of the plaintiffs belief 
have nothing to do with reason and everything to do with power. 
 292. For another example of an Eleventh Circuit decision that merges the 
courts selective reading of precedent with the outer boundaries of reasonable-
ness, see Weeks v. Harden Manufacturing Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 131213 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (rejecting the plaintiff s claim of retaliation for refusing to sign an 
agreement to arbitrate discrimination claims, notwithstanding the plaintiff s 
reliance on EEOC and Ninth Circuit authority invalidating such arbitration 
clauses, and emphasizing the near universal approval of arbitration agree-
ments in [a]lmost every other circuit). The court viewed the Ninth Circuit 
decision on which the plaintiff relied as wrongly decided, and the plaintiff s 
reliance on it and the EEOC guidance as unreasonable. Id. at 131517. But see 
EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 
2003) (en banc) (remanding to the district court with respect to the issue of 
whether adverse action against an employee who refuses to sign an agreement 
to arbitrate discrimination claims gives rise to a retaliation claim). Once 
again, the reasonableness of the plaintiff s belief was determined by judicial 
power and the courts preferred reading of precedent. 
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terpretations of current legal precedent.293 There is even less 
reason to import a reasonable belief standard into discrimina-
tion statutes, such as Title VI and Title IX, which lack any lin-
guistic distinction between participation and opposition. The 
importation of the reasonable belief standard into these stat-
utes threatens to erase the gains made in Jackson from recog-
nizing protection from retaliation under these statutes. 
The boundaries of the retaliation claim should be defined 
with due regard for the social reality that retaliation functions 
to silence discrimination claims and preserve social inequality, 
and for the theories elaborated above for why retaliation should 
be encompassed by prohibitions on discrimination. These rea-
sons counsel for a broader approach to the varied understand-
ings of bias and discrimination that form the basis for protected 
activity. Although it is true that retaliation for opposing a prac-
tice that has nothing to do with discrimination is not encom-
passed by the retaliation claim,294 a better standard would ask 
whether the plaintiff can make a reasoned case that the prac-
tices opposed interfere with the goals and objectives of dis-
crimination law. Such a standard should leave room for recog-
nizing interpretive ambiguity and different views as to the 
direction discrimination law should take. The perspective from 
which reasonableness is measured should not be that of the 
judge reading and selecting the dominant legal precedents, but 
the reasonable employee, student, or person in the organization 
who wishes to further the goals of discrimination law: disman-
tling unjust privilege and promoting the conditions necessary 
for equal citizenship. 
 
 293. The standard explanation for the tighter requirement applied to Title 
VII retaliation claims under the opposition clause is that Congress did not 
write the opposition clause to encompass as broad a level of protection as af-
forded under the participation clause. See, e.g., Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. 
Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (explaining this rationale). However, 
the use of the reasonable belief doctrine does not follow from any linguistic dif-
ferences between the two clauses, but rather from a desire to protect employer 
prerogatives to retaliate against persons who raise complaints in the work-
place that stray too far from dominant legal understandings of discrimination. 
To the extent that this is a valid interest, it can be accommodated with a sub-
jective good faith standard, coupled with the standard advocated here, that 
the plaintiff make a reasoned argument about how the practices opposed con-
flict with the goals and objectives of discrimination law. 
 294. Cf. Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 319 n.11 (4th Cir. 2003) (Termi-
nating an employee because she opposes practices which have nothing to do 
with Title VI is not Title VI retaliation.). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Much is at stake in the retaliation claim. The fear of re-
taliation and an awareness of the profound social costs of claim-
ing discrimination are the primary reasons why people stay si-
lent in the face of perceived inequality. For discrimination law 
to provide meaningful protection, legal standards must protect 
persons who perceive discrimination and give voice to their 
concerns. This is a worthy goal for discrimination law to pur-
sue, as giving voice to discrimination produces a myriad of 
benefits, both personal and societal.295 Vocalizing opposition to 
inequality opens the door to important social and institutional 
change and enables challengers to begin a valuable dialogue 
within their communities.296 By fully protecting persons who 
confront discrimination, the law can provide greater space for 
contesting and possibly reshaping the social norms that facili-
tate discrimination in the first place. 
The Courts decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of 
Education is an important starting point toward further theo-
rizing about the connections between discrimination and re-
taliation. The recognition of retaliation as a species of discrimi-
nation holds great promise for refocusing discrimination law on 
preserving privilege and reinvigorating its animating value of 
promoting equal citizenship. Situating the retaliation claim as 
part of a ban on intentional discrimination breaks down the 
status/conduct divide in the Courts nondiscrimination juris-
prudence and promotes and strengthens the democracy-
enhancing ambitions of discrimination law. 
However, we should not be too sanguine about the pros-
pects of legal doctrine to secure meaningful social change. The 
promise of the retaliation claim is undercut by unnecessarily 
restrictive doctrine that ultimately reinforces selective and 
narrow understandings of discrimination that do more to le-
gitimate than to disrupt inequality. It would be unfortunate if 
 
 295. For a discussion of the personal benefits of reporting discrimination, 
see Dodd et al., supra note 12, at 568 (citing research showing the many bene-
fits [of] confronting sexist remarks, including benefits to self-image, job per-
formance, and physical and emotional health). For a discussion of the societal 
benefits of challenging discrimination and the potential for reshaping social 
norms, see Swim & Hyers, supra note 26. 
 296. For an eloquent discourse on the value of complaining, see Crosby, su-
pra note 12, at 16984 (advocating the desirability of complaining as neces-
sary for change and developing a better world, despite the chilling social 
norms that punish complainers, and urging persons to rail against false si-
lences). 
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the retaliation claim languished under the burden of this overly 
restrictive doctrine, particularly in light of its unique potential 
for disrupting inequality within institutions. This Articles ex-
amination of the retaliation claim illustrates how legal doctrine 
can simultaneously function to challenge and legitimate ine-
quality. It also suggests a need for further attention to the var-
ied ways in which law punishes and renders vulnerable those 
persons who challenge inequality, particularly when the chal-
lenge exceeds the boundaries of dominant discourses about dis-
crimination. 
